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Abstract
This thesis investigates the choice of award mechanism and the process of implementing
the award of contracts in public procurement. Public procurement is an activity conducted
by the public sector to purchase goods and services. Government spending on public
procurement accounts for 10% to 25% of GDP in each country (World Bank Group,
2017).
Because of its large sharing in government expenditure, public procurement can shed
light on important practical policy issues, including those as investigated here: the choice
of award mechanism (i.e. the process for selecting contractors); the possibility of costly
delays in awarding contracts; and the concern that corruption may lead to inefficient
outcomes.
This thesis uses public procurement data for the UK and other EU countries plus
Iceland and Norway. These countries adopt the same benchmark award mechanisms (the
EU benchmark award mechanisms). The EU benchmark award mechanisms are imple-
mentations of the award mechanisms defined by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which influences the award mechanism
arrangement in 88 countries. There are four EU benchmark award mechanisms: the open
procedure, the restricted procedure, the negotiated procedure and the competitive dia-
logue. Few empirical studies have investigated these EU benchmark award mechanisms.
This thesis contains three independent and interrelated studies. The first study exam-
ines the choice of award mechanism in the UK, using the logit model. The results show
that UK public buyers choose award mechanisms that are consistent with the theoretical
suggestions. When a contract is complex, a UK public buyer is likely to employ an award
mechanism that allows for greater discretion of selection. It also provides evidence that
public buyer’s experience is an important factor in award mechanism choice.
Also based on UK data, the second study compares the decision speed of awarding a
contract, using the logit model and survival analysis. It uncovers that delay in contract
award is a serious issue for public procurement, as almost half of the contracts in our
sample experienced delays in contract awards. The empirical results show that the nego-
tiated procedure (which contains negotiations) is likely to be associated with a more rapid
decision speed and a lower probability of delay than the restricted procedure (which does
not contain negotiations). Therefore, this study casts doubt on the general expectation
of practitioners that negotiation causes delays.
The third study explores the relationship between discretion, corruption and compe-
tition in public procurement. Based on the revenue equivalence theorem and extensive
form game, it proposes a game theory model showing that discretion fosters corruption,
which in turn depresses the number of bidders and softens price competition. This is
a mechanism that the procurement literature agrees but few formal models exist. The
OLS estimates show a negative correlation between corruption and the number of bidders
and suggest that procuring agents may disguise the impact of corruption by inflating the
estimated contract value.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Public procurement is an activity initiated by the public sector to purchase goods,
works (e.g. construction) or services from private firms. Public procurement plays a
significant role in the economy. According to the World Bank Group (2017), public pro-
curement takes up 10% to 25% of GDP in each country. Examples of public procurement
include purchasing computers for a local office, refurbishing a community park, building
a bridge, constructing a school campus, and providing electricity.
Most studies on public procurement have focused on its cost and efficiency, i.e. pro-
viding the best value for money. The literature mainly examines the following issues:
compensation schemes, e.g. fixed-price versus cost-plus contracts (Laffont and Tirole,
1993, Tadelis, 2012), operational and financial structures, e.g. traditional procurement
versus public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Hart, 2003, Schmidt, 1996), and award mech-
anisms1, e.g. auctions versus negotiations (Bajari et al., 2008, McAfee and McMillan,
1987a, Tadelis, 2012).
The award mechanism is a process for deciding on the winner of a contract from a
group of bidders. A better choice of the award mechanism helps improve the time schedule
of procurement, identify a suitable contractor, and reach a better price-quality outcome.
1An award mechanism is also known as an award process, award procedure, procurement process
or procurement procedure. As these five terminologies are used interchangeably in practice and in the
literature, we follow this custom throughout the text.
1
1.2 Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis
This thesis investigates the process of procurement, using data for the UK and other
EU countries, plus Iceland and Norway. The EU (including the UK) implements award
procedures which are defined by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA).2 Besides the 28 EU member states, 50 members of the
WTO, including the US and Canada are participants of the GPA, and 10 WTO members,
including China and Australia, are in their process of joining in this agreement. Therefore,
this thesis also has implications for many countries outside the EU.
While many studies have examined the choice between auction and negotiation in
public procurement, few empirical studies have investigated all four benchmark award
mechanisms in the EU. These are the open procedure, the restricted procedure, the ne-
gotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue. The principal goal of this thesis is to
compare the features of the four award mechanisms and reveal the current award mech-
anism practice and the relevant factors to procurement outcomes. The thesis contains
three independent but interrelated studies, each of which examines one or more aspects
of the procurement process. A subsidiary goal is to explain both the public procurement
process and public procurement data so that anyone who wants to understand EU public
procurement would find it useful to review this thesis.
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
First, the thesis explains the EU public procurement data in detail, including the
operating steps of each award mechanism, the sequence of procurement notices and the
utilisation of each award mechanism. We also point out some of the limitations of public
data in the EU public procurement and provide suggestions for improving data accuracy.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, it is among the first studies to systematically
examine features of the competitive dialogue, which is a widely used award mechanism
2See WTO GPA website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.
2
for very complex contracts, such as a public-private partnerships (PPPs) project for con-
structing and operating an underground rail line. We offer insights of factors that are
relevant to the choice of award mechanism.
Third, although the public procurement literature acknowledges that both cost and
time escalations imply inefficiency in procurement and that the social welfare of public
contracts often depends on delivery time, it focuses on time spent by contractors, i.e.
time after a contract is awarded (Gori et al., 2017, Guccio et al., 2012, Lewis and Bajari,
2011, Love et al., 2013), and ignores time spent on making award decisions.3 This thesis
synthesises the strategic management and public procurement literatures to propose and
test novel hypotheses regarding the link between the choice of award mechanisms and
decision speed.
Fourth, most studies on public procurement equate corruption with discretion (Baldi
et al., 2016, Spagnolo, 2012), but discretion and corruption are not equivalent. We use
a measure other than discretion to account for corruption in public procurement and ex-
amine the relationship between discretion, corruption and competition. We are among
the few studies that separately and simultaneously analyse discretion and corruption in
public procurement. Others are Coviello et al. (2018) and Knack et al. (2017). Since cor-
ruption interacts with both discretion and competition, corruption and discretion should
be simultaneously considered in any regressions that take competition as a dependent
variable.
Lastly, we contribute to the theoretical literature on corruption in procurement by
introducing a model that shows how discretion contributes to corruption. While many
studies have proposed such a mechanism, very few have provided formal analysis.
In summary, by reviewing EU public procurement data, this thesis suggests the kind
of improvement that can be made in managing public procurement information, e.g. con-
3An UK public contract to widen highway M25 had an overall delay of 18 months in preparing and
and executing the procurement. The delays is estimated to increase the net present cost by £660 million,
which is 24% of the £3.4 billion total cost. The award decision was made nine months behind schedule.
Source: UK National Audit Office (2010).
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tract value and matching a series information regarding a subcontract. Through empirical
analysis, the thesis shows that public buyers are likely to have applied theoretically proper
award mechanisms regarding contract complexity, i.e. award mechanisms that allow for
greater discretion for more complex contracts. Empirical results also indicate that dis-
cretion, specifically negotiation, may slow down award decision speed, but bureaucratic
procedures in award processes are likely to be more detrimental to decision speed than
negotiation. A formal model confirms that discretion can be transferred to the risk of
corruption. The model shows that corruption may increase the expected profit of both
the corrupt bidder and the procurer. Our empirical results support the widely accepted
view that higher discretion and corruption levels are associated with fewer bidders and
higher contractual price. Overall, this thesis casts doubt on the application of the re-
stricted procedure and competitive dialogue (the more complicated versions of auction
and negotiation) and suggests a need for further studies on the procurement performance
of contracts awarded through these two mechanisms.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised into the following chapters:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of public procurement and the public procurement
data employed by this thesis. It first introduces the WTO GPA, a cornerstone of the
institutional framework of many countries, and subsequently reviews the classification of
award mechanisms and the life-cycle of procurement. Lastly, it describes the structure of
EU public procurement data, provides graphical and statistical descriptions of the data,
and points out some of the limitations of the data.
Chapter 3 is structured into three substantive sections to review the main issues in
the public procurement literature. The section on contract design compares different
compensation rules and compares public-private partnerships (PPPs) with traditional
procurement. The next section contrasts the terminologies for award mechanism classi-
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fication in theory and in practice. The penultimate section introduces the literature on
award mechanism design.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study of public buyers’ choices of award mechanisms, using
UK data. The multinomial logit model and the nested logit model are used to assess the
probability of employing the four EU benchmark award mechanisms. Specific questions
include: whether and how the levels of complexity and quality concerns are related to the
choice of award mechanism; whether and how the buyer’s experience in procurement is
related to the choice of award mechanism?
Chapter 5 presents an empirical study of the decision speed of awarding contracts,
using UK data. It underlines the significance of decision speed by combining the strate-
gic management literature with the public procurement literature. This chapter uses a
dichotomous logit model to evaluate the probability of delaying an award. It applies sur-
vival analysis to explore the duration of the award process and the duration of delays in
awarding contracts. Factors include the award mechanism, contract complexity, quality
concerns, and buyer’s experience are considered.
Chapter 6 explores the relationship between discretion, corruption and competition
in public procurement. This chapter discusses the importance of discretion in award
mechanism design. It also stresses that the risks of fewer participants and less price
competition are related to corruption, which accompanies discretion almost naturally. The
theoretical part shows a model that establishes a link between discretion and corruption,
by referring to the revenue equivalence theorem and the extensive form game. Lastly,
this chapter provides OLS estimates for the effects of discretion and corruption on the
number of bidders and price rebates, based on data from the EU member states, Iceland
and Norway.
Chapter 7 summarises the primary results and implications of each previous chapter.
It concludes the thesis with suggestions for practitioners, policymakers and researchers.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Public Procurement and Public Procure-
ment Data
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides background information of public procurement. It discusses the
link of public procurement arrangements in many countries, illustrates the procurement
process and introduces the structure of the public procurement data. Equipped with
knowledge from this chapter, readers will find it easier to understand analyses in Chapters
4 to 6.
Public procurement processes in many countries are similar, owing to the Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA) established by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
in an attempt to facilitate open public procurement.1 The GPA sets up the rules and
requirements that ensure open, fair and transparent competition in public procurement
and defines the basic types of award mechanism. The agreement involves 78 WTO member
countries as existing participants, including the UK and the other 27 EU member states,
US, Japan, Canada and India. In addition, 10 WTO member countries, including China
and Australia, are negotiating their accession to the agreement.
The GPA is implemented by local public procurement laws in each country. As a
political and economic union, the EU is the GPA party that applies harmonised legislation
to the greatest number of countries. All EU member states follow the same EU public
procurement directives.2
1See WTO GPA website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.
2The UK will follow the EU public procurement directives during the two-year course of Brexit ne-
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 explains the award
mechanisms that are allowed under the GPA and how these GPA award mechanisms are
implemented in the EU member states and some other countries. Section 2.3 reviews
the stages of public procurement with a focus on the procurement stage. Section 2.4
introduces our data source, i.e. the official platform for publicising EU public procurement
information and describes the public procurement data of the EU, Iceland and Norway.
Section 2.5 closes this chapter. Appendix A provides examples of award criteria. Appendix
B shows the methods for adjusting contract values in this thesis.
2.2 Award Mechanism Classification in Practice
The WTO GPA allows three award mechanisms. In their terminology, these are: open
tendering, selective tendering and limited tendering (World Trade Organisation, 2012).
Open tendering allows any interested suppliers to submit bids. Selective tendering allows
only qualified suppliers to submit bids.3 In particular cases, a procuring authority may
turn to limited tendering to contact a supplier (or suppliers) directly without calling for
tenders. These particular cases occur when open tendering or selective tendering fail and
when the goods or services can only be purchased from a particular supplier.
Negotiations may be conducted during the award process when the intention of negoti-
ation has been expressed in a notice of intended procurement or when no tender obviously
dominate other tenders.
gotiation, which lasts until 29 March 2019. After this date, the UK public procurement legislation is
not expected to change dramatically, because the UK will still be under the framework of the GPA and
significant changes in laws take a great deal of time for discussion.
3The GPA define the qualified supplier as “a supplier that a procuring entity recognizes as having
satisfied the conditions for participation”. See Article I from the Revised Agreement on Government
Procurement. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm.
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2.2.1 Award Mechanisms for EU Public Procurement
Until 2006, EU public procurement law permitted three benchmark award mechanisms
– the open procedure, the restricted procedure and the negotiated procedure. In 2006, the
EU introduced a fourth benchmark award mechanism, the competitive dialogue, through
the EU Directive 2004/18/EC (European Parliament and European Council, 2004).4 The
open procedure is the same as GPA open tendering and the restricted procedure is the
same as GPA selective tendering. The negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue
are implementations of GPA selective tendering incorporating negotiation.
The four main EU award mechanisms are distinguished by both their requirements for
prequalification and whether they allow negotiation (see Table 2.1). The open procedure
allows any interested firms to submit a tender and does not include prequalification. The
restricted procedure may preselect bidders who submit a request to participate and allow
only prequalified bidders to submit tenders. The open and restricted procedures forbid
discussion and negotiation.
The negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue allow preselection. The competi-
tive dialogue permits negotiations only before final bids are submitted and concludes with
a competitive bidding stage after the last round of negotiation. The negotiated proce-
dure permits one or more rounds of negotiation and does not conclude with competitive
bidding. Rather, negotiations continue until a winner is selected.
Table 2.1: Features of EU Award Mechanisms
Award mechanism Prequalification Minimum No. Discussion before Discussion after
of participants final bids final bids
after prequalification are submitted are submitted
Open procedure No n.a. No No
Restricted procedure Yes 5 No No
Competitive dialogue Yes 3 Yes No
Negotiated procedure Yes 3 Yes Yes
4The EU public procurement is currently governed by the Directive 2009/81/EC (European Par-
liament and European Council, 2009), Directive 2014/23/EU (European Parliament and European
Council, 2014a), Directive 2014/24/EU (European Parliament and European Council, 2014b), Directive
2014/25/EU (European Parliament and European Council, 2014c).
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The EU public procurement directives allow a procuring authority to freely choose
between open and restricted procedures. A procuring authority can use the negotiated
procedure and competitive dialogue only under specific circumstances, e.g. for contracts
that require complex technology.
The EU public procurement directive also allows for two accelerated procedures, which
may be applicable in urgent cases. Compared with the restricted procedure, the acceler-
ated restricted procedure shrinks the length of the procurement process but is otherwise
the same. The accelerated negotiated procedure is similarly a contracted version of the
negotiated procedure.5
All EU award mechanisms discussed so far require a notice to be published, as a call
for competition. In exceptional conditions, for example, if no satisfactory suppliers are
found under competitive award mechanisms, a procuring entity may seek for candidates
without prior publication of a call for competition. This exceptional award procedure
stems from limited tendering in the GPA.
2.2.2 Award Mechanisms in Non-EU Countries
The non-EU countries that are participants of the GPA or that are in the process
of joining in the GPA adopt public procurement procedures that are similar to those in
the EU. We illustrate with the public procurement procedures in the US and China as
examples.
The primary public procurement law in the US is the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
48 C.F.R. (FAR) (2002). The FAR specifies sealed bidding and the negotiated competitive
proposal as the two principal award mechanisms. Sealed bidding is essentially identical
to the open procedure in the EU. The negotiated competitive proposal can be similar to
5The minimum response period is 30 days for the restricted and negotiated procedures and 10 days for
the two accelerated procedures. The minimum screening period is 35 days for the restricted procedure and
10 days for the accelerated restricted procedure. The (accelerated) negotiated procedure is not bound by
a legally stipulated minimum screening period. See explanations of the response period and the screening
period in Section 2.3.
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either the competitive dialogue or the negotiated procedure in the EU.
The Government Procurement Law of the People’s Republic of China (2002) is the
main law that rules Chinese public procurement. China allows several award mechanisms.
The public tender is equivalent to the open or restricted procedures in the EU. Competitive
negotiation operates like the competitive dialogue in the EU. Bid by invitation, sole source
procurement and price inquiry are the three Chinese award mechanisms that are similar
to the limited tendering in the GPA, which does not require a call for tenders to be
published.
Countries that are not associated with the GPA tend to have less developed institu-
tional infrastructure for public procurement. For example, South Africa has no prescribed
public procurement procedures (Tucker and Gilfillan, 2014), although it is considered as
one of the most developed countries in Africa.
2.3 Timeline for Public Procurement
The life of a public procurement contract has three stages. First, in the feasibility
stage, the necessity of carrying out a procurement is evaluated. For more complex con-
tracts, e.g. public-private partnerships (PPPs) projects, the feasibility of the contract is
assessed by various factors. These factors include demand, supply, net present value and
internal rate of return. The next stage is the procurement stage, in which bids are called
for, received and evaluated, and a contractor is chosen. The last stage is the delivery of
the contract. For PPP contracts, the delivery stage consists of construction and operation
(Yescombe, 2007).
Since this thesis focuses on the procurement process, we describe the procurement
stage in detail, using EU award mechanisms as an example. Figure 2.1 is a timeline that
depicts the life-cycle of an above-threshold public contract within the EU.6 The release of
6The EU resets its procurement thresholds of contract value annually. See https://www.ojec.com/
thresholds.aspx. Contracts with a value that is equal to or above the procurement thresholds are
legally bound by the EU public procurement directives.
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Figure 2.1: Life-cycle of EU Public Procurement
Notes. 1. Response period: for submitting requests to participate under the (accelerated)
restricted, (accelerated) negotiated, and competitive dialogue procedures; for submitting tenders
under the open procedures. 2. Screening period: for preselection and bid evaluation under the
(accelerated) restricted, (accelerated) negotiated, and competitive dialogue procedures; for bid
evaluation under the open procedure. 3. Standstill period: a publicity period for challenging
the winning bid.
a contract notice (CN), which announces a contracting opportunity to the public, starts
the procurement stage. The CNs of above-threshold public contracts are required to be
published on the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). A CN specifies items
such as the target to be purchased, estimated value, award mechanism, requirements, and
end date of application. Some CNs also provide the planned contract start and end dates.
A procurement process is formed by three consecutive periods: the response period,
the screening period and the standstill period. The type of award mechanism determines
the content of the first two stages. The response period lasts until the end date of
the application. During this period, complete tenders are submitted under the open
procedure, and requests to participates are submitted under the (accelerated) restricted
procedure, (accelerated) negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue.
Immediately following the response period, the screening period allows the contracting
authority evaluates bids and chooses the contractor under the open procedure. The
contracting authority examines the qualification of interested bidders, issues the invitation
to tender to qualified bidders, and subsequently evaluates bids from prequalified bidders
in the screening period for the (accelerated) restricted procedure, (accelerated) negotiated
procedure and competitive dialogue.
An award decision notice is issued to all bidders at the end of the screening period
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with a standstill period of at least 10 days during which a winning bid can be challenged
before a contract is formally awarded and signed. Later, a contract award notice (CAN) is
published on the OJEU to announce the awarding outcome. Once a contract is awarded,
the contractor inputs production factors for delivering the contract.
2.4 Public Procurement Data
We have obtained all public procurement data of the 28 EU member countries, Iceland
and Norway that are published on the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) during the period
2009–2015. The data are downloadable from the European Union Open Data Portal (EU-
ODP).7 8 The TED is the digital version of the OJEU. EU Public procurement contracts
above the EU value thresholds must be advertised on OJEU by publishing a contract
notice (CN) and a contract award notice (CAN).
Meanwhile, the EU also encourages publishing under-threshold contracts on the TED.
As a result, this database contains all above-threshold contracts and some under-threshold
contracts during the defined time window.
The boundary between public-private partnerships (PPPs) and traditional procure-
ment is blurred.9 Many PPP contracts are concessions that fall under the Public Procure-
ment Directive 2014/23/EU (European Parliament and European Council, 2014a). These
PPP contracts are included in the TED dataset. However, the dataset from the EUODP
does not distinguish PPP contracts from traditional public procurement contracts. It is
only possible to identify PPP contracts by carefully reading through the original soliciting
documents. Quite a few PPPs are not public procurement and are not covered by EU
procurement directives.10
7See the EUODP website https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/ted-csv. Our data
are the 2nd February 2017 version.
8Iceland and Norway are in the European Economic Area. Their institutional arrangements in public
procurement are very close to those adopted in the EU.
9See Section 3.2.2 contrasts between PPPs and traditional procurement.
10Source: private communication with an officer from the European Commission.
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2.4.1 Data Structure
Our public procurement data consist of the contract notice (CN) dataset and the
contract award notice (CAN) datasets. In most cases, one CN corresponds to one CAN.
The two datasets can be linked by matching the future CAN ID from CN data and the
CAN ID from the CAN data.11
The CN describes the basic profile of intended contracts, including the identification
of the procuring authority, description of the procurement, estimated value of CN, lots
(i.e. proposed sub-contracts) included in a given contract notice, contract duration, award
mechanism to be used, award criteria.
Within the CAN there is data on the overall procurement as well as individual sub-
contracts, i.e. contract award (CA). The CAN updates procurement information by
adding both the contractual value of the overall CAN and CA information. The CA
information includes the winning bidder identification, the number of offers received, the
estimated value of the CA, and the contractual value of the CA.
A CA usually corresponds to a “lot” in a CN. In most cases, if a CN is divided into lots,
the number of CA equals the number of lots; if a CN is not divided into lots, the number
of lots has a value of zero and the CAN contains only one CA. There are occasionally
complicated cases where a CA is linked to several lots or a lot is linked to several CAs.
However, the management of sub-contract identifiers is generally not satisfactory, it is
often difficult to identify the lot(s) and CA(s) that match each other. This is an obstacle
to conducting research at the sub-contract level.
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show simplified examples of hypothetical CN and CAN data.
Suppose a public authority intends to construct a highway that connects London, Leices-
ter, Loughborough and Nottingham. It publishes a CN that divides the overall work of
the highway into three lots (Table 2.2). Therefore, the overall contract may be signed
11A Notes & Codebook that offers background information of the CN and CAN dataset and a short
description of each variable is available from the EUODP website.
13
with at most three contractors. Table 2.3 illustrates two potential results of awarding
contracts. In Example 1, the three lots are awarded to three contractors, which results in
three sub-contracts (i.e. three CAs). In Example 2, firm A wins lot number 1 and firm B
wins lots number 1 and 2, so two sub-contracts are signed (i.e. two CAs). In EU public
procurement practice, the corresponding lot number is often missing or hard to recognise.
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2.4.2 Data Description
Our raw data contain 1,244,504 entries of CN observations and 1,084,536 entries of
CAN observations. The number of CANs is about 15% less than the number of CNs. This
may be because contracting authorities of below-threshold contracts have a higher ten-
dency to publish CNs than to publish CANs, although they do not have to publish either
notice. A CN increases the exposure of procurement and may attract more bidders, but
the contracting authority can benefit little from the increased paperwork for publishing a
CAN.
Since the CN dataset contains more observations than the CAN dataset does, we
describe the CN dataset in order to reveal a more complete overall picture of the EU
public procurement. Figure 2.2 breaks down the number of CNs by country. France,
Germany and Poland are the countries with most CNs published during the period 2009-
2015. The total number of CNs from these three countries takes up more than half of the
CN observations in the dataset. The UK ranks fourth in terms of the number of CNs.
Figure 2.3 shows how frequently each award mechanism was used in each country.
Aggregately, around 82.74% of contracts were awarded through the open procedure,
8.24% through the negotiated procedure, 7.17% through the restricted procedure and
only 0.55% through the competitive dialogue. The accelerated restricted procedure ac-
counts for 0.95% of the observations. The number for the accelerated negotiated proce-
dure was 0.33%. A negligible proportion of procurements (0.02%) involves other award
mechanisms that do not publish a call for competition. Within each country, the open
procedure was used most frequently in all countries except in the UK. The most popular
award mechanism in the UK was the restricted procedure, followed by the open procedure
and the negotiated procedure. In the remaining countries, the second most popular award
mechanism was either the restricted procedure or the negotiated procedure.
Figure 2.4 presents how, on an aggregate level, the preference for each award mecha-
nism evolves. The frequency of using the open procedure increased from just below 80%
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Figure 2.2: Number of CNs by Country (2009-2015)
to about 85% over the period from 2009 to 2015. Correspondingly, the frequency of using
the restricted procedure dropped from around 10% to 5%. The application of acceler-
ated restricted procedure also declined. The frequencies of using remaining the award
mechanisms remained relatively stable.
“Lowest price” and “most economically advantageous tender” are the two broad award
criteria. When bids are evaluated under the “lowest price” award criteria, decisions are
based on price alone. When evaluating bids, public buyers using the award criteria of
“most economically advantageous tender” consider quality-related aspects along with the
price. The EU advocates less reliance on price-only award criteria. 30.69% of the 1,244,504
CNs take price as the single award criterion, 65.56% takes both price and quality into
account, and 3.75% do not specify the award criteria. Some CNs provide textual infor-
mation of award criteria. Appendix A summarises the top 20 most popular words in the
textual field of award criteria in UK public procurement from 2009 to 2015.
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Figure 2.5: Adoption of Award Criteria by Award Mechanism
Figure 2.5 illustrates how the two broad award criteria were used in combination
with each award mechanism. The open procedure is the award mechanism most likely
associated with price-only award criteria. The restricted and negotiated procedures are
equally likely to be used with price-only award criteria. A greater proportion of the
accelerated procedures are linked to the price-only award criteria than their corresponding
benchmark award mechanisms. Almost all contracts awarded through the competitive
dialogue were evaluated based on the “most economically advantageous tender”.
The contract price is one of the most crucial aspects of a project. Table 2.4 is a
summary of inflation-adjusted estimated contract values disaggregated by contract type.
Appendix B describes how estimated values are adjusted by inflation. Less than half of
CNs in the raw data provide an estimated value of the contract. The missing estimated
value in a CN may not necessarily indicate that the public buyer does not have a budget
for the procurement. The public buyers may not provide estimated value due to strategic
considerations. For instance, an estimated value can be taken as a reserve price, which
signals the amount that the public buyer is able to pay. If bidders agree that an estimated
19
value is set too high, they may collude and collectively bid at a high price that is close to
the estimated value.12
The estimated values in all contract types have abnormally huge spans and standard
deviations. The minimum value is e0.01 and the maximum value is e1.95×1023. By
going carefully through hundreds of contract notices, we discover two common causes
of error. (1) A unit of either “million” or “billion” is missing. Adding a unit of either
“million” or “billion” after a number which is less than 1 makes the overall value more
reasonable. For example, e0.01 then becomes e0.01 million or e0.01 billion. (2) When
a range of values is provided, a number without the connecting words is displayed, which
is an unrealistically large number. For example, an input of “between 85,000 and 102,000
euros” is displayed as “ 85,000,102,000 euros”.
To rule out the influence of extreme values, we filter out the potentially incorrect
numbers by excluding numbers that are smaller than e0.01 million, i.e. e10,000, and
that are larger than the top 1st percentile, i.e. 6.42×108. Columns (4) to (6) in Table
2.4 summarise estimated value by contract type after data cleaning. For each contract
type, the mean is much higher than the corresponding median, which implies that the
estimated values are positively skewed. The estimated value of works contracts is on
average three-times that of services contracts and four-times that of supply contracts.
12Klemperer (2002) discusses the pitfalls of setting a publicly-known reserve price.
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2.5 Conclusions
The World Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA)
guides public procurement for its 78 participants and 10 potential participants. As a
result, public procurement institutional arrangements are alike in many countries. This
makes analyses of award processes in any of these countries meaningful to the other
countries. We focus on institutional arrangements in the EU because all its member
countries unanimously adopt the same EU public procurement law.
The WTO GPA defines the open tendering, the selective tendering and the limited
tendering as the official award mechanisms. Based on the GPA award mechanisms, the
EU develops its benchmark award mechanisms: the open procedure, the restricted proce-
dure, the negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue. These award mechanisms
mainly differ in their treatment of prequalification and negotiation. EU public procure-
ment using different award mechanisms follows the similar timelines. A contract with a
value above the EU threshold must publish a contract notice (CN) to announce an in-
tended procurement and release a contract award notice (CAN) to conclude the contractor
selection.
The data description of public procurement in the EU, Iceland and Norway reveals
that the open procedure is generally the most widely used award mechanism and that
the uses of the restricted and negotiated procedures are balanced. The exception is the
UK, which uses the restricted procedure most frequently. The EU member countries
do not use the competitive dialogue often. Over time, in the EU, employment of the
restricted procedure is declining, application of the open procedure is rising while uses of
the negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue remain stable.
The EU encourages to evaluate bids based on both price and quality. The open
procedure is most likely to be associated with the price-only award criteria. Almost all
procurements with competitive dialogue adopt award criteria that consider both price
and quality. Price is the only award criterion for a small proportion of contracts awarded
22
through the restricted or negotiated procedures.
The EU public procurement data exhibit two major deficiencies. First, corresponding
sub-contract information cannot be easily paired for CN and CAN. Second, some infor-
mation is incorrect, either due to missing the unit of measurement for a single value or to
missing the connecting words for a value range. We have reported the causes of incorrect
contract values to the EUODP to help improve the quality of the public procurement
information.
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Appendix A: Top 20 Most Popular Words in Award Criteria
Table 2.5 shows the top 20 words that most frequently appear in the free text field
of award criteria adopted by UK public procurement during the period 2009-2015. 8,703
contract notices (CNs) contain textual information. The table also illustrates some ex-
amples of how these words are phrased as award criteria. The words price and quality are
most frequently used. 7,782 out of 8,703 CNs in this sample mention price or its synonyms
such as cost, charges, and fees in the award criteria. 5,489 CNs mentions quality. From
examples of award criteria in column (e), we can see that most non-price award criteria
essentially reflects consideration of quality.
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Appendix B: Methods for Adjusting (Estimated) Contract Values
To remove the effects of inflation on contract price, all (estimated) values used in this
thesis are (estimated) real values. These are (estimated) nominal values (from the raw
data) divided by the GDP deflator of the procuring country in the year when the contract
notice was released and then multiplied by 100:
Real (estimated) value =
Nominal (estimated) value
GDP deflator
× 100.
Table 2.6 presents the GDP deflators.
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Table 2.6: GDP Deflators by Country and Year
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Austria 90.041 90.746 92.41 94.308 95.839 97.738 100
Belgium 91.745 93.473 95.344 97.227 98.244 98.898 100
Bulgaria 90.142 91.14 96.589 98.091 97.401 97.842 100
Croatia 95.202 95.994 97.599 99.142 99.94 99.988 100
Cyprus 98.088 100.058 101.968 103.898 102.806 101.197 100
Czech Republic 95.061 93.706 93.725 95.094 96.455 98.848 100
Denmark 91.606 94.56 95.164 97.424 98.289 99.304 100
Estonia 85.084 86.561 91.115 93.994 97.336 98.769 100
Finland 88.811 89.123 91.426 94.126 96.528 98.162 100
France 94.555 95.576 96.478 97.595 98.353 98.919 100
Germany 91.333 92.025 93.01 94.443 96.299 98.027 100
Greece 104.252 104.954 105.792 105.4 102.921 101.035 100
Hungary 85.251 87.236 89.215 92.232 94.94 98.15 100
Iceland 79.314 83.633 86.116 88.944 90.612 94.302 100
Ireland 94.117 91.085 90.744 92.621 93.586 93.214 100
Italy 93.951 94.251 95.635 96.955 98.13 99.071 100
Latvia 88.415 87.697 93.305 96.679 98.271 99.999 100
Lithuania 88.058 90.153 94.866 97.426 98.681 99.695 100
Luxembourg 85.757 88.859 93.101 95.481 97.1 98.698 100
Malta 86.383 89.691 91.63 93.554 95.422 97.6 100
Netherlands 95.402 96.211 96.348 97.715 99.053 99.201 100
Norway 85.559 90.652 96.772 100.02 102.565 102.904 100
Poland 91.683 93.204 96.214 98.475 98.76 99.249 100
Portugal 95.15 95.762 95.504 95.125 97.281 98.011 100
Romania 80.195 84.539 88.547 92.696 95.863 97.479 100
Slovakia 96.487 96.955 98.553 99.796 100.314 100.153 100
Slovenia 96.155 95.205 96.271 96.713 98.262 99.042 100
Spain 98.981 99.14 99.169 99.236 99.587 99.393 100
Sweden 92.242 93.156 94.26 95.26 96.265 97.976 100
United Kingdom 91.263 92.696 94.56 96.039 97.867 99.546 100
Note. Data source: the World Bank.
The GDP deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. The base year is 2015.
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Chapter 3
Theories in Public Procurement
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a relative complete framework of literature review on
public procurement. It reviews the literature on contract design and award mechanism
design, which are used to deal with the two primary issues in public procurement: asym-
metric information and contractual incompleteness.
Asymmetric information arises when one party in a transaction owns more substantial
knowledge than the other party. Because different parties usually have different incentives,
the party with the informational advantage may exploit this advantageous status.1 For
instance, a private firm aims to gain profit from procurement contract, while the public
sector is interested in achieving value-for-money by ensuring private firms carrying out
their contractual obligations properly and efficiently (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). Conflicts
may exist in the different incentives of the private and public sectors. Cost-reduction
efforts by the private sector can be detrimental to quality (Hart, 2003). For example,
using low-quality cement to pave a road reduces the contractor’s cost but makes the road
less durable. As a result, the contractor will hide the fact of using low-quality cement
from its contracting authority.
Contract incompleteness comes from three sources: (1) difficulty of fully specifying the
intended goods or services due to insufficient expertise or unaffordable costs (Tadelis and
1Mas-Colell et al. (1995) (Chapter 13 and 14) show application of ex-ante information asymmetry (i.e.
adverse selection) and ex-post information asymmetry (i.e. the principal-agent problem, ex-post hidden
actions, and moral hazard) to contract theory. See also Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) which are two
of the seminal papers on asymmetric information.
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Bajari, 2006); (2) a potential contractor being unwilling to uncover its true cost function
in the selection process and planning to modify the contract once it wins (Flyvbjerg
et al., 2003); (3) unforeseeable incidents or endogenous changes in the procurer’s choice
(Ganuza, 2007). Contract incompleteness often leads to the need for ex post renegotiation
and overruns in cost and time.
A procurer determines, in sequence, the goods or services to be bought, contractual
obligations and compensation rules, the award mechanism, and perhaps ex post changes
(Tadelis, 2012). The public sector and social welfare suffer from asymmetric information
and incomplete contracts. To relieve the adverse impacts of these two issues, efforts are
made in contract design and award mechanism design.
Contract design interacts with award mechanism design in selecting contractor and
procurement outcomes. Since some concepts in contract design form the foundation of
some arguments in award mechanism design, we introduce theories in contract design
before turning to a discussion of award mechanism design. Section 3.2 covers the two
main topics in contract design: cost-reimbursement rules and the option between public-
private partnerships (PPPs) and traditional procurement. Section 3.3 discusses how award
mechanism classifications differ in theory and EU public procurement practice. Section
3.4 summarises the award mechanism design literature. Conclusions are drawn in Section
3.5.
3.2 Contract Design
This thesis focuses on award mechanism design in public procurement. The literature
review on award mechanism is incomplete if the literature of contract design is not referred
to. In particular, the cost-reimbursement rules in contract design is closely related to
award mechanism design.
Section 3.2.1 discusses the cost-reimbursement rules and Section 3.2.2 discusses the
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choice between public-private partnerships (PPPs) and traditional procurement. We pro-
vide a brief literature review of PPPs and traditional procurement for the completeness
of the literature review of theories in public procurement. Readers may feel free to skip
Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Cost-reimbursement Rules
In a world with asymmetric information and hidden actions (often referred to as moral
hazard), cost-reimbursement rules deal with the tradeoff between incentives provision
and rent extraction, which are two conflicting aims of buyers. Laffont and Tirole (1993)
provide a summary of this literature. According to them, “cost-reimbursement rules
refer to the extent of cost sharing between the firm and either the taxpayers or the
consumers”. In the context of public procurement, for simplification, we assume that
the contracting authority represents the interest of taxpayers and consumers.2 Nearly
all cost-reimbursement contracts are somewhere between the fixed-price contract and the
cost-plus(-fixed-fee) contract (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
A fixed-price contract is a high-powered incentive scheme, where a procuring authority
pays a prespecified fixed price to a private contractor for its efforts to meet its obligations.
It is an incentive scheme with high power because the private firm is required to bear all
the realised cost. Under a fixed-price contract, the private firm is the residual claimant
of every unit of money it saves, so the private firm is motivated to conduct cost-saving
actions. Since the payment is fixed, the government shares no benefits from the firm’s
cost reduction efforts.
A cost-plus(-fixed-fee) contract is a low-powered incentive scheme. The contractor is
paid with the realised cost plus a stipulated fee. In a cost-plus contract, the contractor
does not internalise the cost and the government is the residual claimant. Therefore, a
cost-plus contract provides very low incentive for private firms to reduce the cost (Cox
2Technically speaking, procuring authorities are agents of taxpayers and consumers. The incentives of
procuring authorities are not necessarily in line with the interests of taxpayers and consumers. Agency
problems due to asymmetric information exist in this relationship.
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et al., 1996). A cost-plus contract induces moral hazards. However, it offers the flexibility
to adopt suggestions from the public sector without incurring costly ex post haggling.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) show that a cost-plus contract is superior to a fixed-price
contract when the contract is complex, hard to specify fully and thus subject to a high
probability of renegotiation. The flexibility of a cost-plus contract accommodates ex post
adaptation well because the reimbursement rule is simply for the public sector to cover
all costs of adaptation. By contrast, ex post design revision is difficult and costly under
a fixed-price contract. The overall contract value has to be re-evaluated. The public
authority is vulnerable to the hold-up problem because the contractor is able to utilise
his position of being in the midst of the contract (Decarolis, 2014, Tadelis and Bajari,
2006). For example, the contracting authority has to meet the contractor’s request for a
large amount of extra payment because replacing the current contractor may incur even
larger costs. By contrast, simple contracts with a high level completeness are less prone to
unexpected ex post changes, so the fixed-price contracts are suitable for simple contracts
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006).
3.2.2 PPPs versus Traditional Procurement
The choice between public-private partnerships (PPPs) and traditional procurement
is relevant to a project that contains a construction stage and an operation stage. In
traditional procurement, the contracting authority funds and owns the infrastructure and
unbundles the decisions of building and operating the infrastructure. The building and
operation tasks are carried out by two separate contractors. In PPPs, one single agent
is responsible for building and operating the infrastructure. In addition, the single agent
funds and owns the asset. The contracting authority commits to buy services provided
by this infrastructure.
PPPs were launched due to the need to decorate the public account under the strict
financial control of the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s (Grout, 1997). The public
sector seeks a private partner to finance public projects so that government debt shown on
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the public sector’s balance sheet and the public sector’s financial exposure appears to be
lower. One famous example is the Channel Tunnel Rail Link between the UK and France
(Yescombe, 2007). In the UK, PPPs are called Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), named
after their reliance on private finance. Although the private sector funds and owns the
project, the public sector may still bear the risk of PPPs. The public sector’s long-term
commitment to purchase services in effect indirectly finances the project (Grout, 1997).
Besides, the public sector has to pay a risk premium to compensate for the risk borne by
the contractor (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).
Starting with Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995) and Hart and Moore (1990),
abundant studies have emphasised the effect of contract incompleteness and the impor-
tance of ownership. Asset ownership confers residual rights of the asset and the owner
internalises externalities in different stages of the contract (Bennett and Iossa, 2006). An
example of the externality is that effort in the building stage reduces (increases) the op-
erational cost. When a contract is incomplete, the private contractor will under-invest in
the project in fear of being held-up ex post by the public sector who owns the project,
i.e. the public sector captures a proportion of benefits generated by the private sector’s
investment. The owner of the infrastructure should be the party that values the overall
value of the infrastructure most (Besley and Ghatak, 2001).
Grout (1997) contends that rewards based on service quality in PPPs motivate private
firms to reduce costs in both the building and operating stages without sacrificing quality.
Hart (2003) demonstrates that PPPs (bundling) is preferred to traditional procurement
(unbundling) when the quality of services provided during the operation stage can be
reliably verified and the quality of construction cannot be; traditional procurement dom-
inates PPPs when a contract for building can be well specified and a contract for service
cannot be. In the second case, creating a competition for the right to operate the in-
frastructure encourages efforts in building because the builder’s payoff is based on the
potential operators’ valuation of the building (Iossa and Legros, 2004). Such competition
also helps to price the service contract because it (partly) reveals potential operators’ cost
function of operating the asset.
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Bentz et al. (2005) emphasise the role of asymmetric information. The operator has
private information on the amount of operating cost. This private information leaves the
operator with an informational rent. In PPPs, where the contractor is both the builder
and operator, the knowledge of operation enables the contractor to adopt a design that
minimises operational cost. However, the contractor will choose to do so only if the
investment can be covered by the reduction in operational cost. If the investment is too
large relative to the amount of cost reduction or the amount of cost reduction is uncertain,
the contractor will not invest in operational cost reduction. In this latter case, unbundling
is preferred to PPPs.
Private finance helps restore the benefits of PPPs when productivity shocks are highly
uncertain and expertise of external financiers could assist in evaluating operational risk
(Iossa and Martimort, 2012). Dewatripont and Legros (2005) point out that as in cor-
porate finance, large outside equity in PPPs dilutes the private partner’s incentives to
make efforts in cost-reduction because benefits of effort are proportionally collected by
outside equity holders. Since debt leads to no residual claims of outside debt holders,
external debt reserves the private partner’s incentives to exert effort. The benefits of
outside expertise survive when the number of outside investors is concentrated because
a dispersed structure gives rise to a free-rider problem in providing expertise (Berle and
Means, 1991, Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2003). Therefore, for PPP projects, it is better to
form a financial structure with concentrated external debt.
3.3 A Typology of Award Mechanism Design
There is an extensive theoretical literature on award mechanism design. As an essential
part of the award mechanism design literature, the auction design literature emphasises
the differences between various auction formats. The award mechanism literature, in
general, compares auctions as a whole with other award mechanisms.
The award mechanism design literature is developed in two settings. 1) The single-
33
seller-many-buyers context : a monopolist designs a selling mechanism and sells goods,
services or franchises to potential buyers. 2) The single-buyer-many-sellers context, i.e.
procurement: a monopsonist designs a purchasing mechanism to buy goods or services
from many potential sellers. Henceforce, in this and the next sections, we use the phrase
“the award mechanism designer” to represent either the monopolist or monopsonist and
the word “bidders” to refer to either buyers in a monopolist case or sellers in a monopsonist
case, depending on the context discussed.
From a theoretical point of view, the objectives of award mechanism design in the
single-seller and single-buyer contexts are essentially the same (Easley and Kleinberg,
2010, McAfee and McMillan, 1987a,b). In both settings, the award mechanism designer
aims to maximise its own expected utility, e.g. to maximise its expected profit, minimise
its expected cost, or maximise the social surplus. Because of their similar attributes, the
award mechanism literature has not set a very clear boundary between the two contexts.
Many studies rooted in one context refer to studies developed in the other context.
There are however differences between the two settings. Sellers usually have informa-
tional advantages over buyers, so transactions under both the single-seller and single-buyer
contexts are games with information asymmetry. However, buyers in the single-seller con-
text tend to be exposed only to ex-ante information asymmetry, while buyers in procure-
ment can be jeopardised not only by ex-ante information asymmetry but also by ex-post
hidden actions, especially for works and services contracts.3
Here we cite two examples of ex-post problems suffered by a procurer in a single-buyer
context. Contractors may reduce the cost by sacrificing building or service quality, e.g.
using steels with inferior quality to reduce the cost of building a bridge. During the
contracting period of service, a consulting company may hold up the procurer by asking
for higher payment than agreed in the contract.
Adverse selection is an ex-ante problem that can exist in both single-seller and single-
3Supply contracts are usually guided by commonly accepted product standards, so they are less likely
to suffer from ex-post hidden actions.
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buyer contexts. In procurement, a contract may be awarded to a contractor who offers a
low price merely because it expects to profit from ex-post renegotiation due to a design
defect that has been identified only by him but not by anyone else (Flyvbjerg et al.,
2003); a highest-cost-and-least-able bidder may be awarded the contract under a cost-
plus(-fixed-fee) contract when more competent bidders bid for a fee that is higher than
the least able bidder (Tadelis and Bajari, 2006).4 In a single-seller case, a buyer purchases
a product without detecting its deficiencies.
The “winner’s curse” is another ex-ante problem that may take place in both the
contexts. In the single-seller context, it appears when the winning bidder (buyer) overpays
for the target item due to overestimating the value of the object.5 In the single-buyer
context, the “winner’s curse” may also occur because the winner (seller) underestimates
the cost. But, unlike the single-seller case, in a single-buyer context the winner that
suffers from the “winner’s curse” may be able to transfer its losses to the buyer through
ex-post hidden actions.
The classifications of award mechanisms in theory and in public procurement prac-
tice, though share commonalities, diverge in some essential features. The remainder of
this section introduces the theoretical award mechanism classification (Section 3.3.1) and
compares the award mechanism classifications in theory and in practice (Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Award Mechanism Classification in Theory
The theoretical literature on award mechanism design compares auctions with bar-
gaining formats. This subsection introduces firstly the main auction formats and then
the bargaining formats.
4See Section 3.2.1 for the definition of cost-plus(-fixed-fee) contract.
5The “winner’s curse” in the single-seller context may take one of two forms: 1) the winner pays
for the object at a higher price than its value; 2) the value of the asset is less than that is estimated
by the winner, so the winner gets less utility than anticipated (Thaler, 1988). For more discussions on
the “winner’s curse”, see also the seminal paper Capen et al. (1971) that first put forward the concept
and Kagel and Levin (1986) that discuss how the “winner’s curse” and availability of public information
interactively affect revenue of the seller (award mechanism designer).
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The auction design literature explores four main auction formats: the ascending-price
auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction and the
descending-price auction. In most cases, the four auction formats are discussed under
the single-seller-many-buyer context. Based on descriptions by Easley and Kleinberg
(2010), Eastin and Arbogast (2014), McAfee and McMillan (1987a) and Vickrey (1961),
the following introduces the main auction formats under the single-seller context:
• The ascending-price auction (also called the English auction, or the oral open auc-
tion). Bids are offered interactively in real time. The auctioneer starts with a
low price and increases the price gradually. The essential feature of the ascending-
price auction is that all bidders can observe others’ bids and can accordingly revise
their own bids. The buyer with the highest bid becomes the winner. Antiques and
artwork are commonly sold through the ascending-price auction.
• The descending-price auction (or Dutch auction). It is like a mirror image of the
ascending-price auction. The auction begins with a price that is higher than the
price that bidders are willing to offer. Then the price is lowered incrementally until
a buyer accepts the current price.
• The sealed-bid auction. All buyers submit their bids and the values of the bids
are kept confidential from other bidders during the auction. That rivals’ bids are
unobservable in real-time is the key feature that distinguishes the seal bid auction
from the ascending and descending-price auction.
– The first-price sealed-bid auction: the buyer with the highest offer wins the
goods or services and the payment is its actual bid price.
– The second-price sealed-bid auction (or Vickrey auction): the bidder with the
highest price wins the target object at a cost that equals the second-highest
bid (Vickrey, 1961).
Several minor changes need to be made, to convert standard auction formats from
the single-seller-many-buyers case to the single-buyer-many-sellers (i.e. procurement)
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case. Under the ascending-price auction, the descending-price auction, and the first-price
sealed-bid auction, the seller with the lowest bid becomes the winner and the contractual
price is the same as his bid. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, the bidder with the
lowest price is awarded the contract with a contractual price at the amount of the second-
lowest bid.
In procurement, the scoring auction has been developed to incorporate some non-
monetary dimensions (i.e. dimensions in addition to price) in award criteria. The award
mechanism designer scores and ranks bids according to prespecified scoring rules. Quality
is often considered as the most crucial non-monetary factor.6
The theme of auction design is centred around how to avoid collusion and to alleviate
the “winner’s curse” problem. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the recipients of the bidders’
signals are the main difference between the ascending (descending) price auctions and
the sealed-bid auctions. In ascending (descending) auctions, each bidder’s signals are
transmitted not only to the award mechanism designer but also to other bidders, so a
bidder would respond to its rival’s signals and update its tactic accordingly. In sealed-bid
auctions, signals from each bidder can only be received by the award mechanism designer
but not by other competitors.
In auctions, an award mechanism designer processes information from all bidders si-
multaneously, so all bidders have an equal opportunity to submit bids or accept an offer.
While auctions are cases of multilateral communication, bargaining formats are usually
cases of sequential bilateral communication.
In bargaining formats, the award mechanism designer only communicates with coun-
terparties and makes price offers to or considers price offers from counterparties, one at a
time (Ehrman and Peters, 1994). A bargaining format may end up with multilateral com-
munications depending on how firmly the award mechanism designer sticks to its initial
offer and on whether any of the previous offers has been accepted (Riley and Zeckhauser,
6To reveal the use of various award criteria, Appendix A in Chapter 2 summarises the most popuplar
words in award criteria in 2009-2015 UK public procurement.
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1983). The three benchmark bargaining formats may be described as:
• If a bidder refuses to accept a pure take-it-or-leave-it offer, the award mechanism
designer terminates the communication with this bidder.
• It is possible that a bidder who declines the offer provided by the award mechanism
designer subsequently submits its own offer, and the award mechanism designer re-
serves the option to accept that offer depending upon later bidders’ actions. The
award mechanism designer turns to multilateral communication by comparing all
bids that have been offered by bidders only when no bidder accepts its initial offer.
In other words, the award mechanism designer sequentially discusses with potential
bidders about their willingness to trade. It would look for new bidders if no agree-
ment can be reached with the current bidder. If no bidder accepts its provisions,
the award mechanism designer would trade with the previously contacted bidder
who offers the most favourable bid (Ehrman and Peters, 1994). In the literature,
this award mechanism is usually called a sequential process, though all the three
bargaining formats discussed here have some sense of “sequence”.
• At the opposite pole to the pure take-it-or-leave-it offer is haggling. A haggling
session may contain several rounds of negotiations with a single bidder before the
award mechanism designer moves on to next bidder. Haggling may also end up with
a multilateral communication where the award mechanism designer compares bids
from several buyers.
3.3.2 Discrepancies in Theoretical and Practical Classifications
It is worth stressing that the award mechanisms in the theoretical award mechanism
design literature and those in the public procurement practice, though they share some
similarities, are not identical. Table 3.1 contrasts award mechanisms in the literature
and in EU public procurement on four dimensions: whether they enable one-way or two-
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(b) Sealed Bid Auctions
Figure 3.1: A Comparison between Ascending and Descending Price Auctions with Sealed-
Bid Auctions
Table 3.1: Classification of Award Mechanisms in Theory and Practice
One-way communication Two-way communica-
tion
Simultaneous com-
munication
Public procurement
practice
Open procedure Negotiated procedure
Restricted procedure Competitive dialogue
Award mechanism
design literature
Ascending-price auction
n.a.
Descending-price auction
First-price sealed-bid auction
Second-price sealed-bid auction
Scoring auction
Sequential bilateral
communication
Award mechanism
design literature
n.a.
Take-it-or-leave-it offer
Sequential process
Haggling
way communication, and whether they enable simultaneous communication or sequential
bilateral communication.
To recap, the four benchmark types of award mechanisms in EU public procurement
practice are the open, restricted, negotiated and competitive dialogue procedures.7 The
open and restricted procedures are sometimes collectively referred to as auctions. In the
theoretical award mechanism design literature, the auction formats include the ascending-
price auction, first-price sealed-bid auction, second-price sealed-bid auction, and scoring
auction, while the bargaining formats include take-it-or-leave-it offer, sequential process
7See Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for more details.
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and haggling.8
The auctions in theory and in practice facilitate one-way communication. Signals
are transmitted from bidders to the award mechanism designer. The remaining award
mechanisms allow two-way communication. Signals are transmitted from bidders to the
award mechanism designer and from the award mechanism designer to bidders. Figure
3.2 illustrates the direction of signal transmission.
The main auction formats in theory and the EU benchmark award mechanisms are
simultaneous-communication modes. The award mechanism designer processes signals
from all bidders at the same time. Most of the time, the bargaining formats only facil-
itate sequential bilateral communication. The award mechanism designer communicates
and decides whether to deal with the bidder, one at a time. Figure 3.3 displays the
simultaneous and sequential bilateral communication modes.
In award mechanisms that allows two-way communications, a public procurer discusses
design and terms of contract with bidders one by one. The literature tends to blur
the boundary between the negotiated procedure in practice, which allows simultaneous
two-way communication, and the sequential process in theory, which allows sequential
bilateral two-way communication. Some theoretical papers occasionally refer to the take-
it-or-leave-it-offer or the sequential process as the “negotiation” (e.g. Aktas et al., 2008,
Bulow and Klemperer, 1996), while empirical papers refer to the negotiated procedure as
the “negotiation” (e.g. Chong et al., 2014, Europe Economics, 2011, Lædre et al., 2006).
The award mechanism designer has more discretion on whether to contact an ad-
ditional bidder in a sequential process than in a negotiated procedure or competitive
dialogue. The award mechanism designer will search for the next bidder only when it is
not satisfied with the current bidder. It is possible that the award mechanism designer
accepts an extremely alluring bid, i.e. “jump-bid”, and stops looking for additional bid-
ders (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009). In practice, the identification of the bidders who will
attend the award process has been determined when the invitation to tender is issued to
8See Section 3.3.1 for more details.
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Figure 3.3: Parties in the Communication
41
qualified bidders, unless the procurement fails.
3.4 Award Mechanism Design
Information asymmetry is pervasive in transactions (McAfee and McMillan, 1987a).
The party that possesses informational advantages (e.g. holding private information on
production cost) can acquire surplus (i.e. informational rent) by just meeting the mini-
mum requirement of the other party. If a bidder’s private information becomes publicly
known, his expected surplus is zero (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983, Milgrom, 1981,
Milgrom and Weber, 1982). People make efforts in award mechanism design to (at least
partially) reveal bidders’ true valuation, which bidders prefer to keep confidential in order
to earn the informational rent. McAfee and McMillan (1987a) provide a thorough review
of the award mechanism design literature before the late 1980s. Extending McAfee and
McMillan (1987a), this section outlines the award mechanism design literature up to more
recent years.
3.4.1 Popular Discussions since the Early Literature
The early award mechanism design literature focuses on the auction design under
the single-seller-many-buyer context. As the seminal papers in award mechanism design,
Vickrey (1961, 1962) establish the revenue equivalence theorem. Later on, Myerson (1981)
and Riley and Samuelson (1981) generalise the revenue equivalence theorem, which then
becomes a cornerstone of the award mechanism design.9
The revenue equivalence theorem is built on what is now referred to as the benchmark
model that meets four conditions: (1) bidders’ type (based on bidders’ true valuation
on the target) is drawn independently from a distribution, the cumulative distribution
function of which is strictly increasing and continuous; (2) risk neutrality holds for each
bidder and the seller; (3) the bidder with the highest type (i.e. highest true valuation
9See Jackson (2013) and Tadelis (2013) for summaries of this theorem.
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on the target) wins; (4) the bidder with the lowest type has an expected payoff of zero.
According to the revenue equivalence theorem, any auction game that meets these condi-
tions generates the same payment rule and expected payoff for each type of bidder and
yields the same expected revenue for the seller.
Take the four main auction formats as an example to illustrate the revenue equivalence
theorem.10 The descending-price auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction are equiva-
lent because in both cases bidders must decide the amount of their bid while not knowing
other bidders’ decisions and the winner pays the exact amount that he bids (Vickrey,
1961). A sophisticated bidder will offer a bid that is just above the second-highest bid so
that he can win the contract and earn a profit of the difference between his own valua-
tion and the value of the second-highest bid. Therefore, the price that derives from the
descending-price auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction is, on average, the expec-
tation of the second-highest valuation conditional on the valuation of the winner (McAfee
and McMillan, 1987a).
In the ascending-price auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction, the price ex-
actly equals the second-highest valuation. In an ascending-price auction, the bidder with
the second-highest valuation will quit the competition once the price exceeds his valuation
of the object. The bidder with the highest valuation wins and pays the amount of the
second-highest valuation. The second-price sealed-bid auction gives bidders incentives to
reflect their own valuation truthfully. If a bidder submits a bid that is higher than his
true valuation, he runs a risk of winning with a negative profit; if a bidder submits a bid
that is lower than his true valuation, he lowers the probability of winning and thus lowers
his expected gain. The payment rule defined by the second-price sealed-bid auction is to
pay the amount of the second-highest bid, which equals the second-highest valuation due
to the incentive compatible mechanism.
Under the benchmark model setting, the expected second-highest valuation and the
second-highest valuation are equal on average and the award mechanism designer would
10See Section 3.3.1 for an introduction of the four main auction formats
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be indifferent to the four main auction formats. However, the validity of the revenue equiv-
alence theorem is very sensitive to the assumed conditions. If any of the four conditions
is removed, the revenue equivalence collapses and some award mechanism(s) become(s)
superior to others.
3.4.1.1 Relaxing the Assumptions in the Benchmark Model
Here we discuss the situations when relaxing the assumptions in the benchmark model.
Information Asymmetry
When bidders’ valuations are not drawn from a uniform distribution and bidders are
asymmetric, bidders of the low valuation type perceive a higher level of competition
than bidders of the high valuation type. The outcomes of the ascending-price auction
and the first-price sealed-bid auction diverge (Maskin and Riley, 2000, 1985, Vickrey,
1961). Unlike the ascending-price auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction does not
transit signals of bidders’ valuations between the competitors. In the first-price sealed-
bid auction, low valuation bidders tend to bid more aggressively than high valuation
bidders. The bidder with the highest valuation may not necessarily win.
Affiliated Valuations
When bidders share a common value of the target or bidders’ valuations are highly
affiliated, publicising information about the valuation of the target helps price discovery
and lightens the problem of winner’s curse (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).11 Bidders adjust
their valuations by referring to the valuations of others. This lessens the potential of
negative gains and reduces excessive conservation in bidding. Therefore, the ascending-
price auction, which conveys valuation information across bidders, produces a higher
revenue for the seller than the other three main auction formats.
11For example, when bidding for an oil field, bidders’ valuations of the oil field are affiliated. Their
valuations depend on the same factors such as the storage and quality of oil, the difficulty of extration
and the expected oil price.
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Risk Aversion
If buyers are risk averse instead of risk neutral, for the seller, the first-price sealed-bid
auction strictly dominates the ascending-price auction and the second-price sealed-bid
auction (Harris and Raviv, 1981, Holt, 1980, Riley and Samuelson, 1981). The expected
buyers’ gain is expressed as
Expected buyers′ gain = Private valuation× Prob. of winning − Expected payment.
Buyers bear a risk of earning a positive rent when they win and earning nothing when
they lose. To increase the bid would increase the probability of winning and the amount
of payment. By properly balancing this tradeoff, a buyer may still get a positive expected
gain. Facing unobservable rivals’ actions under the sealed-bid auction and uncertain value
of the item, bidders are driven by risk aversion to offer a higher bid than that they would
offer in the ascending-price auction. Because the winner pays the second-highest price
instead of the price he bids in the second-price sealed-bid auction, the first-price sealed-
bid auction generates the highest expected income for the seller. Reynolds and Wooders
(2009) show that the seller can take advantage of buyers’ risk aversion by offering a
sufficiently but not prohibitively high buyout price and receive a higher expected revenue
in a sequential process than by using the ascending-price auction.
The above discussion of risk aversion may, however, neglect possible interactions be-
tween information and risk aversion. When the value of the object is uncertain and
valuations are common or affiliated, information can increase or lower the seller’s revenue
(Albano, Dimitri, Pacini and Spagnolo, 2006). Buyers tend to behave more conservatively
and underbid when they are aware of the winner’s curse and are more risk averse; they
tend to bid more aggressively and overbid when they believe that the risk of the winner’s
curse is low.12
12Kagel and Levin (1986) provides empirical supports to this conclusion: providing public information
about the target value lowers the seller’s revenue in the presence of winner’s curse and increases the
seller’s revenue in the absence of the winner’s curse.
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3.4.1.2 The Ability to Make Commitments
The early theoretical literature also discusses the benefits and costs of making com-
mitments. By setting and committing to a reserve price, the seller will choose from one
of the bidders that bid above the reserve price and refuse to sell the object when all bids
are below the reserve price. A credible reserve price pushes buyers to bid higher and
transfers part of buyers’ surplus to the seller (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1993, McAfee and
McMillan, 1987a). Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) show that the primary cost of haggling is
a failure to sell at a high price and this cost cannot be made up by the price discrimination
opportunities offered by haggling. The downside of committing to a reserve price is that
the item is not sold even when bids are above the seller’s valuation but below the reserve
price. According to Mathews and Katzman (2006), a risk-averse seller would choose a low
buyout price in a sequential process so that the object will be sold at the buyout price
with a positive probability. This arrangement is likely to improve Pareto efficiency com-
pared with a second-price sealed-bid auction. Such improvement takes place because the
risk-averse seller is better off by shifting risk to risk-neutral bidders while the risk-neutral
bidders are not worse off.
3.4.1.3 Competition and the Number of Bidders
Increasing the number of bidders strengthens the intensity of competition. The second-
highest valuation on average increases as the number of bidders increases. The threat of
losing forces high-valuation bidders to bid closer to their actual valuations. Therefore,
the revenue of the seller on average increases with the number of bidders; as the number
of bidders approaches infinity, the second-highest bid and hence the transaction price get
infinitely close to the highest possible valuation (Harris and Raviv, 1981, Holt, 1979).
The revenue equivalence theorem generalises the effects of increasing the number of
bidders on bidders’ tactics under a Nash equilibrium. In a case of N bidders whose types
are drawn from a uniform distribution defined over an interval [v, v¯], a Nash equilibrium
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is that each bidder bids N−1
N
vi, where vi is bidder i’s actual valuation.
N−1
N
is called the
bid shading factor, which represents the fraction that a bidder is willing to pay out from
his actual valuation and is defined over (0,1).
The bid-shading factor is the outcome of balancing the tradeoff between the amount
of payment and the probability of winning. Increasing the bid increases the probability
of winning but also increases the amount of payment if one wins; lowering the bid makes
one pays less if he wins but lowers the probability of winning. As the number of buyers
increases, each buyer bids closer to his true valuation and the bid shading factor increases
from nearly zero to one.
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) assess the benefits of a large number of bidders by
marginal revenue (MR). Assuming the seller’s expected revenue equals the MR of the
successful buyer who has the highest MR among all buyers, the seller’s expected MR with
N + 1 buyers is greater than or equal to his expected MR with N buyers. Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) note that when risk neutrality holds for both parties, the seller should
not accept any “jump-bid” in exchange for not introducing additional bidders.
The strength of competition is also affected by the dispersion of bidders’ valuations.
McAfee and McMillan (1986) show that for certain distributions of bidders’ valuations, e.g.
normal and uniform distributions, increasing the variance increases the average payment
to the seller and average rent to the winner. Holding the mean valuation constant, a
larger variance is on average accompanied with a higher second-highest valuation and a
greater difference between the highest valuation and the second-highest valuation.
In addition, competition can be arbitrarily enhanced by introducing price discrimina-
tion. Favouring bidders with lower valuation motivates bidders with higher valuation to
increase their bids more than they otherwise would (McAfee and McMillan, 1989). The
favourable term is an add-up to the lower valuation bids and has the potential to increase
the second-highest bid perceived by the highest valuation bidder. For instance, to protect
domestic firms, the seller announces that an operating license will be sold to a foreign
firm only when the foreign firm bids 6% higher than the highest bid from domestic firms.
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This stipulation on the one hand exploits surplus of the highest valuation bidder but on
the other hand runs the risk of selling the item at a low price to a domestic firm.
3.4.1.4 Communication Costs
The communication cost of including a large number of bidders is non-negligible. The
award mechanism designer incurs costs of locating and evaluating bidders and bidders
bears bid-preparation costs and opportunity costs (Ehrman and Peters, 1994, McAfee
and McMillan, 1988, Samuelson, 1985). Introducing too many bidders may increase so-
cial costs while not increasing social benefits. It may ultimately bring in many nearly
identical bidders, not increase the dispersion of bidders’ valuation distribution, and lead
to a higher aggregate bid-preparation cost. The anticipation of competition with many
low valuation bidders drives high valuation bidders away from investing time and capital
in bid preparation (Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). With many potential homogeneous bidders
or many potential low valuation bidders, to restrict the number of bidders and conduct
a non-competitive procedure may improve social welfare (French and McCormick, 1984,
Samuelson, 1985, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006).
McAfee and McMillan (1988) point out that the benchmark model fails to take com-
munication costs into account. In absence of communication costs, implementing any of
the four main auction formats together with a reasonable reserve price is an ideal choice
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987a, Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981). However,
pure auctions are not efficient in terms of communication costs (Bulow and Klemperer,
2009, Ehrman and Peters, 1994, McAfee and McMillan, 1988). To convene an auction
with simultaneous presence of multiple bidders, the award mechanism designer incurs a
large amount of sunk cost. A sequential search enables the award mechanism designer to
communicate with bidders one after another and avoid a large sum of sunk cost (McAfee
and McMillan, 1988).
Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and Ehrman and Peters (1994) discuss the communica-
tion cost from the standpoint of bidders. Bidders bear opportunity costs because they
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forego alternative trading opportunities while they are waiting for the result of a particular
selling or buying scheme. A particular bidder faces a higher opportunity cost in auctions
than in a take-it-or-leave-it scheme. An award mechanism designer tends to take more
time to evaluate multiple bids in an auction than to compare one bid against the reserve
price in a take-it-or-leave-it process. Admittedly, if bidders value time more and have a
higher discount rate measured by time than the award mechanism designer, the award
mechanism designer can extract a larger surplus by slowing down the selection process
(Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). However, the award mechanism designer must balance the
tradeoff between extracting bidders’ surplus and discouraging participation (Bulow and
Klemperer, 1996, Mathews, 2004).
Bulow and Klemperer (2009) examine the acquisition of firms, where the current price
of the target firm and bidding history are publicly available to potential bidders. In a
sequential process, bidders can use public information to decide entry. By entering the
competition only when earlier bids are of low value, a later potential bidder can circumvent
losing and spending entry cost in vain when previous bidders have higher valuations than
its valuation but fail to win the contract.
3.4.2 More Recent Development
As early as forty years ago, Goldberg (1977) and Williamson (1976) put forward
that in the presence of uncertainty and relationship-specific investments, the selection
process should be designed to convey information that is not restricted to price. Not
until the recent two decades do more people start to emphasise the nature of the target
object other than price, most predominantly quality, in determining the proper award
mechanism (Albano et al., 2017, Asker and Cantillon, 2008, 2010, Che, 1993, Laffont and
Tirole, 1993, Manelli and Vincent, 1995, Tadelis, 2012, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006).
Multidimensional screening is more of a matter to award mechanism design under the
single-buyer-many-seller context (i.e. procurement) than under the single-seller-many-
buyer context. The quality of target object in a single-seller-many-buyer context is fixed
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whether or not it is ex ante verifiable; but quality in procurement is endogenously deter-
mined throughout the life of procurement (Asker and Cantillon, 2010). When quality is
an important factor in determining costs, selection solely based on price may result in the
provision of the poorest quality (Manelli and Vincent, 1995). Manelli and Vincent (1995)
show that the conditions to maximise buyers’ expected profits, social surplus or seller’s
surplus are less stringent in a sequential process than in a price-only auction.
Competitive tendering is appropriate when quality is verifiable and is modelled into
the selection criteria. By prescribing criteria and scoring rules, a procurer can score
proposals on merits of both price and quality (Dini et al., 2006). The selection can then
be implemented through any of the four basic auction forms. Asker and Cantillon (2008)
show that a scoring auction dominates both a price-only auction and negotiation. Asker
and Cantillon (2010) further show that a scoring auction performs better than bargaining
in utility maximisation primarily because bargaining fosters a lack of commitment to
delivering the contract in the agreed quality. They also demonstrate that the scoring
auction is close to the optimal mechanism.
However, not all quality aspects can be easily verified. Unverifiable quality dimen-
sions cannot be scored (Albano et al., 2017, Dellarocas et al., 2006). For example, a
consultant’s proactivity in a legal service contract is difficult, if not impossible, to verify.
Unverifiable quality nurtures suppliers’ opportunistic behaviour (Dellarocas et al., 2006).
Ex-ante opportunism takes places during the selection process. An undesirable supplier is
awarded the contract because the buyer cannot properly judge the valuation of the goods
or services with unverifiable characteristics. Post-contracting opportunism emerges when
the contractor takes actions against the procurer’s welfare (in order to reduce its own
costs). This unsatisfactory outcome is unknown to the buyer until he takes ownership of
the product. Besides, the unsatisfactory outcome may be detected by actual users but
hard to verify by a third party.
To tackle opportunistic behaviour caused by non-verifiability of quality, reputation
mechanisms are suggested, in which suppliers’ future trading opportunities are affected
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by their previous performance (Dellarocas et al., 2006). One approach is to build the
past performance into a scoring auction (Albano et al., 2017). Handicapping suppliers
with poor performance history is an effective threat to firms who intend to gain from
non-verifiable quality when this approached is widely adopted and applied over time.
An extreme case of this approach is to exclude cheating firms from future contracting
opportunities (Board, 2011, Dellarocas et al., 2006, Klein and Leffler, 1981). Although this
harsh punishment disciplines suppliers to provide the agreed quality, it may be harmful
to the strength of competition in the future, especially for the procurement that requires
special expertise that is acquired by only a few suppliers (Albano et al., 2017).
The other approach to deal with unverifiable quality is to negotiate with a limited
number of reputable suppliers instead of using a competitive auction (Goldberg, 1977,
Manelli and Vincent, 1995, Tadelis, 2012, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). Unlike auctions which
stifle communication, negotiation facilitates communication between the buyer and sellers.
Negotiation is particularly helpful for complex contracts where both buyers and sellers
share uncertainty about the profile of the final product (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Brown
et al., 2016). Mutual communication lets both parties understand what exactly is to be
procured, improves contract design and avoids wasting relationship-specific investments
that lock up both parties (Brown et al., 2016).
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and their subsequent empirical study Bajari et al. (2008)
combine award mechanism design with cost-reimbursement rules. They point out that
it is sometimes impossible to completely specify a contract and that leaving a contract
incomplete may turn out to be necessary due to dynamic uncertainty. A cost-plus(-fixed-
fee) contract is known to accommodating ex post adaptions well so that it is suitable for
complex contracts which contain uncertain prospects and unverifiable features.13 Since
the actual cost is unknown until the product is delivered, a competitive auction only
enables competition on the “fixed fee”. More able efficient suppliers tend to ask for a
higher fixed fee for providing efficiency. Bidding for the “fixed fee” results in choosing
13Section 3.2.1 discusses the cost-reimbursement rules: the cost-plus(-fixed-fee) contract and the fixed-
price contract.
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the least efficient supplier and the overall cost when accounting for the realised cost (i.e.
the cost-plus component) is the highest. Instead, negotiation enables the procurer to
get a more complete understanding of the ability of sellers and ensures choosing a more
cost-effective supplier. Bajari and Tadelis suggest a rule of thumb: for simple contracts
with a high level of completeness, to use a fixed-price contract combined with competitive
tendering; for complex contracts with low level of completeness, to negotiate a cost-plus
contract with a reputable seller; for intermediately complex contracts that can be specified
with moderate costs, a fixed-price contract and competitive tendering is favoured when
the number of potential bidders is large, whereas the cost-plus contract and negotiation
is preferred when the number of potential bidders is small.
While accepting the benefits of negotiating contracts with uncertain aspects, some
knowledge of contract attributes and bidders’ valuations is nevertheless a prerequisite for
using negotiation. When a bidder can exploit the buyer’s ignorance and make a credible
take-it-or-leave-it offer, it may extract a significant amount of surplus. Buyers who lack
knowledge are vulnerable to this trap in negotiation. On the other hand, a simultaneous
competitive auction allows the buyer to obtain a substantial amount of surplus without
any pre-required knowledge (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009). Thus, when the buyer has little
knowledge, a competitive auction that considers past performance should be favoured over
negotiations.
3.4.3 Considerations on Corruption and Collusion
Corruption and collusion are two interlinked crimes that undermine the efficiency of
award mechanisms in selling an item at a high price or buying products at a cost-effective
price. We sketch some fundamental ideas from the literature on these two topics.
Corruption is inherently a principal-agent problem (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002,
Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin, 2006, Rose-Ackerman, 1975). In public procurement,
the principal is a public authority which purchases the goods or services. A public official
or an external expert is the procuring agent who is supposed to act on behalf of the public
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authority. Corruption occurs when the the procuring agent distorts the selection crite-
ria to receive bribes from bidders who are treated favourably in the distorted selection.
Corruption comes from the agents’ discretionary power (Burguet and Che, 2004, Rose-
Ackerman, 1975). Therefore, transparent rule-based award mechanisms, e.g. auctions,
that limit the the procuring agent’s discretionary power and expose the the procuring
agent’s behaviour to the public supervision can alleviate the problem (Lengwiler and
Wolfstetter, 2006).
The early auction literature, represented by the literature on the revenue equivalence
theorem (e.g. Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981) assumes that participants bid
non-cooperatively. However, collusion occurs when a group of bidders reach an explicit or
tacit agreement and play coordinately to soften price competition and increase joint profit
(Albano, Buccirossi, Spagnolo and Zanza, 2006). When compounded with collusion, it is
not easy to solve the problem of corruption. As a remedy for corruption, transparency
nevertheless facilitates collusion because the collusive cartel can swiftly detect and retal-
iate against any bidder who betrays the agreement (Stigler, 1964). Moreover, the the
procuring agent may direct the coordination among collusive bidders and share the illegal
gains (Albano, Buccirossi, Spagnolo and Zanza, 2006). Sequential purchasing of several
different but related items is also a channel for collusive cartels to punish internal de-
viations (Klemperer, 2002, McAfee and McMillan, 1987a). It allows bidders to interact
repeatedly and at least reveals some information after each award.
Collusion is less likely to be sustained when the number of bidders is large. It is
difficult to coordinate a large number of competitors, and each bidder’s share of collusive
gains declines with the increasing number of bidders (Klemperer, 2002). As collusion
effectively reduces the number of bidders and changes the bidding distribution, setting a
reserve price, which increases with the number of participants in the cartel, can restore
the effects of competition (McAfee and McMillan, 1987a).
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter attempt to provide an outline theoretical literature review of public
procurement, which contains two main topics: contract design and award mechanism
design. Both contract design and award mechanism design deal with rent extraction and
incentive provision. The theories under the contract design – cost-reimbursement rules
and the choice between public-private partnerships (PPPs) and traditional procurement
– make less stringent assumptions and are closer to the real world than the theories under
the award mechanism design. Thus, contract design theories seem to be more complete
and practically valid than award mechanism theories.
Award mechanism design requires sophisticated skills. Many interacting factors should
be considered, including, but not limited to, what has been discussed: common or affiliated
valuations versus independent valuations, risk preference of both buyers and sellers, ability
to make commitment, competition and the number of (potential) bidders, communication
costs of both parties, dispersion of bidders’ valuations, discrimination arrangements (e.g.
discrimination based on valuation and discrimination based on past performance), quality
dimensions in addition to price as award criteria, the level of contract completeness,
buyer’s competence, and problems of corruption and collusion.
There are indications that the waste of public money is pervasive (Bandiera et al., 2009,
Coviello and Mariniello, 2014, Eklo¨f, 2005). Applying inappropriate award mechanisms
is a factor leading to such waste. Therefore, empirical studies that uncover the facts
of award mechanism practice in public procurement and check practice against theory
should always be welcomed. This helps the public sector to understand what has been
done poorly and make improvements accordingly.
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Chapter 4
Study 1: Choice of Award Mechanism in UK Public
Procurement
4.1 Introduction
Based on UK public procurement data from 2009 to 2015, this study estimates the
probability of adopting the four EU benchmark award mechanisms (the auction-based
open and restricted procedures, and negotiation-based negotiated procedure and compet-
itive dialogue) using the logit model. It focuses on the relationship between the choice of
award mechanism, contract complexity, quality concerns and buyer’s experience.
This study is among the first to compare the competitive dialogue and other proce-
dures. To our knowledge, it is also the first study that explicitly tests the link between
quality concerns (an important factor suggested by the theoretical literature) and the
choice of award mechanism rather than proxying quality concerns by the level of com-
plexity. In addition, we uncover some facts about the reputation mechanism that considers
bidders’ past performance in public procurement selection.
Auctions are known for providing competition and avoiding favouritism (Bulow and
Klemperer, 1996). Because of the market discipline introduced by the competition of
many bidders, auctions impose fewer requirements than negotiations on the award mech-
anism designer’s knowledge in reaching a desirable outcome. Mainly due to these reasons,
procurement policymakers advocate the use of auctions over negotiations. For example,
the current EU public procurement directives encourage the use of open or restricted pro-
cedures and require justification for using negotiated procedure or competitive dialogue
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(which contain a stage of negotiation).
There are reasons why negotiation may be preferred to an auction-based award mech-
anism. Pre-contracting communication costs and post-contracting renegotiation costs
should be counted in designing award mechanisms (Ehrman and Peters, 1994, McAfee
and McMillan, 1988, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). The costs of conducting auctions, e.g.
costs of specifying awarding rules, are higher than those of conducting negotiations. Such
costs erode benefits from competition created by auctions and are usually high when it is
difficult to clearly specify the contract.
Although the (potential) competition of extra bidders improves the outcomes of both
auctions and negotiations (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009), the benefits of auctions rely more
on the number of participants and the distribution of participants’ valuations (Calzolari
and Spagnolo, 2009, French and McCormick, 1984). In particular, auctions are more likely
to produce the expected outcome when there is a group of heterogeneous suppliers.
When contracts are complex and characterised by uncertainties, it is misleading to
judge award mechanisms only on the monetary cost of the tenders (Bajari et al., 2008,
Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Goldberg, 1977, Williamson, 1971, 1976). Instead, the quality of
the product and the total final payment encompassing any renegotiation costs should be
considered. These considerations favour negotiations. Auctions by their nature impede
communications that customise contract design and hinder adaption to ex post changes.
Bajari et al. (2014) and Decarolis (2014) show empirical evidence that ex post renegoti-
ation costs are high. Cameron (2000) reveals that contracts awarded through first-price
sealed-bid auction are more susceptible to renegotiations than those awarded through
negotiations in US long-term supply contracts in the energy industry.
When quality is a key concern, regardless of its verifiability, a reputation mechanism
that evaluates bids at least partially on the basis of bidders’ past performance is a helpful
weapon against opportunistic behaviour (Albano et al., 2017, Board, 2011, Coviello et al.,
2018, Klein and Leffler, 1981, Spagnolo, 2012). An example of the reputation mechanism
is that procurers discriminate against bidders that underperformed in past deliveries.
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Translated into EU public procurement practice, this arrangement is a pre-qualification
process implemented by a restricted procedure, a negotiated procedure or a competitive
dialogue.
Many theoretical studies investigate the optimal choice of award mechanism (Albano
et al., 2017, Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Bulow and Klemperer, 1996, 2009, McAfee and
McMillan, 1988). Some empirical studies test the impact of award mechanism on pro-
curement outcomes (Cameron, 2000, Coviello et al., 2018, Decarolis, 2014, Eklo¨f, 2005,
Europe Economics, 2011, Hyytinen et al., 2018). However, empirical analyses that exam-
ine the choice of award mechanism are scant. Bajari et al. (2008), Baldi et al. (2016) and
Chong et al. (2012, 2014) seem to be the only empirical studies on this topic.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant
theoretical and empirical studies. Section 4.3 introduces the data source and provides
data descriptions. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical models relevant to this study: the
dichotomous logit model, the multinomial logit model and the nested logit model. Section
4.5 explains the endogeneity and multicollinearity problems in this study. Section 4.6
discusses the results from the dichotomous logit model and the multinomial logit model
and Section 4.7 concludes. The Appendix provides results from the nested logit model as
a robustness check of the results from the multinomial logit model.
4.2 Relevant Literature
This chapter presents an empirical study on the factors (contract complexity, qual-
ity concerns and buyer’s experience) that are related to the choice of auction-based and
negotiation-based EU benchmark award mechanisms. It is closely related to the theo-
retical literature that compares auctions and negotiations under different circumstances.
This literature focuses on the impact of the number of bidders, complexity and quality
concerns on award mechanism design.
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This study shares a similar theme with a small empirical literature that explores the
influential factors on the choice of award mechanism. Among these factors, complexity
and buyer’s experience have attracted the most attention. However, none of them has
explicitly tested the relationship between quality concerns and the award mechanism
choice. This study is also related to a larger empirical literature on the choice of award
mechanism and procurement outcomes.
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Auctions have been recognised as an effective mechanism in extracting surplus for
the award mechanism designer when the number of participants is large, communication
cost is low, and the contract is well-specified (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009, McAfee and
McMillan, 1987a, Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981, Tadelis, 2012). According
to the revenue equivalence theorem, a cornerstone of the award mechanism theory in
the single-seller-many-buyer context, the seller benefits from the competitive pressure
created by auctions (Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981, Vickrey, 1961, 1962).1
Increasing the number of participants pushes the highest- and second-highest valuations
to a high level and the difference between these two values becomes small. In order to
win, the buyer with the highest valuation has to bid closer to its true valuation, and
therefore more surplus is transferred to the seller. This competitive environment allows
the award mechanism designer to extract surplus without acquiring knowledge of bidders’
valuations (Bulow and Klemperer, 2009). Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that under
certain assumptions, the extra competition from auctions is more effective than any skillful
negotiation in extracting surplus from firms.
However, although under both auctions and negotiations, increasing the number of
(potential) bidders places the award mechanism designer in a more favourable position for
rent extraction, the effectiveness of auctions depends particularly heavily on the number of
bidders and also on the distribution of bidders’ valuations (Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2009,
1See more details of the revenue equivalence theorem in Section 3.4.1.
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French and McCormick, 1984, Samuelson, 1985). A small group of bidders is less likely
to create a competition between high valuation bidders. In addition, if there is not much
dispersion in bidders’ valuations, introducing more participants creates higher screening
costs for the seller and incurs social welfare loss as more bidders waste their preparation
costs (Ehrman and Peters, 1994, McAfee and McMillan, 1988). These higher costs of
conducting auctions rather than negotiations can undermine the benefits of auctions.
Goldberg (1977) and Williamson (1971, 1976) point out that buyers care about qual-
ity in addition to price, but their preferences on quality cannot be effectively conveyed
through auctions. Although scoring auctions can incorporate the provision of quality into
a scoring system, scoring an auction requires the quality to be clearly stated (Albano
et al., 2017, Dellarocas et al., 2006). There are indeed cases when buyers have a sense
of what they need but are unable to clearly specify their needs in contract terms. In
addition, it is expensive (if not impossible) to create a list of exhaustive scoring rules
(Albano et al., 2017, Dellarocas et al., 2006).
Accounting for non-contractible quality and ex post renegotiation costs, some re-
searchers argue that negotiating with reputable suppliers is better than an auction when
contracts are complex and incomplete (Goldberg, 1977, Manelli and Vincent, 1995, Tadelis,
2012, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). On the one hand, negotiations facilitate communication
that enhances mutual understanding of what is purchased and therefore reduce the need
for ex post changes. On the other hand, negotiations lend themselves to cost-plus com-
pensation rules, which allow for and accommodate the need for renegotiating unavoidable
incomplete contracts.2
The other strand of the literature advocates a reputation mechanism to ensure that
suppliers deliver satisfied quality with a reasonable payment. The contractor is selected
partially based on competitors’ track records (Albano et al., 2017, Spagnolo, 2012). A
harsh punishment for suppliers with poor performance is to ban them completely from
future trading opportunities (Board, 2011, Coviello et al., 2018, Klein and Leffler, 1981).
2See 3.4.2 for detailed reasoning about this statement. See the definition of cost-plus contracts in
Section 3.2.1.
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Facing the threat of being disadvantaged in future competitions, suppliers are less likely
to behave opportunistically and to profit from non-verifiable quality at the cost of buyers.
The EU public procurement directives apply a reputation mechanism in a pre-qualification
arrangement that excludes bidders who do not satisfy certain requirements. The restricted
and negotiated procedures and competitive dialogue contain the pre-qualification process,
while the open procedure does not.
4.2.2 Empirical Studies
This study is closely related to empirical work by Bajari et al. (2008), Baldi et al.
(2016) and Chong et al. (2012, 2014). These studies examine how the characteristics
of the contract and the buyer are linked to the choice of award mechanism. Bajari
et al. (2008) find a positive correlation between the level of contract complexity and the
choice of negotiation rather than auction and a positive correlation between the buyer’s
experience and choice of auctions, using data from Northern California private sector
building contracts between 1995 and 2000. They also find that more reputable suppliers
are more likely to be selected regardless of the choice of award mechanism. This indicates
that buyers consider suppliers’ past performance in bid evaluation.
Baldi et al. (2016) offer an analysis of the choice between the open and negotiated
procedures based on public contracts awarded by Italian municipalities in the period
2007–2012. They show a positive correlation between contract complexity and the use of
the negotiated procedure. Their results suggest a more pronounced positive relationship
between the two when the contracting municipality exhibits a lower level of corruption.
Chong et al. (2012) and Chong et al. (2014) base their studies on French public procure-
ment. The prediction from Chong et al. (2012) indicates that considerations of avoiding
suspicion of favouritism and corruption make public authorities favour auctions over ne-
gotiation. Using nonparametric approaches, Chong et al. (2014) show that auctions are
more frequently used by more experienced buyers. They also find that contract value and
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contract duration, as proxies of complexity, have no apparent link with the choice of any
particular award mechanism for works contracts in France. However, their results should
be interpreted with caution because their results may capture impact of other factors that
they fail to consider simultaneously.
This study is also related to a larger empirical literature on the impact of award mech-
anisms on ex ante procurement outcomes (e.g. the number of participants and winning
rebates) and ex post procurement outcomes (e.g. renegotiation costs, cost overruns, and
time overruns) (Cameron, 2000, Coviello et al., 2018, Decarolis, 2014, Eklo¨f, 2005, Europe
Economics, 2011, Hyytinen et al., 2018). These studies provide empirical evidence on why
a particular award mechanism should be favoured or opposed.
4.3 Data
This study employs UK public procurement data from the Tenders Electronic Daily
(TED) in logit models to analyse the probability of using the four EU benchmark award
mechanisms. This sections introduces the data source and describes the data.
4.3.1 Data Source
This research is based on UK public procurement data released on the TED. The TED
is the official site for EU member states to publicise public procurement contracts.3 The
time horizon of the data is from 2009 to 2015.
We choose the UK data in this period mainly because of our interest in competitive
dialogue. First, as a pioneer in adopting innovation in public procurement, the UK
swiftly enforced the EU directive 2004/18/EC, which formally introduced competitive
dialogue as a new award mechanism, through the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 on
31 January 2006. By the end of 2008, public authorities should have developed some
3See detailed description of the data souce in Section 2.4.
61
understanding of competitive dialogue and are less likely to reject this procedure merely
because they are unfamiliar with it. The UK government and municipalities are active in
public procurement (See Figure 2.2). The relatively large sample size from the UK allows
us to catch sufficient variations for our prediction model.
Second, the EU changed the common procurement vocabulary (CPV) used to classify
the type of procurement, in September 2008. The old and new CPV are difficult to com-
pare because they have a many-to-many matching, i.e. there are some overlaps amongst
the old and new definitions. Lastly, European Union Open Data Portal (EUODP), the
source of the data, points out that more recent public procurement data have better qual-
ity.4 In order to improve data quality, the EU regularly updates the public procurement
standard forms used by public buyers to publicise their procurement needs. However,
data from 2016 and 2017 are excluded to avoid estimation bias that may be introduced
by the adoption of the most recent EU public procurement directives which have been
implemented in the UK nationwide since 2016.
We use information from contract notices (CNs) rather than contract award notices
(CANs).5 The choice of award mechanism is an ex-ante decision. Public buyers have
decided the type of award mechanism to be used by the time they publish CNs. While
CANs summarise contractual outcomes after interactions with bidders, CNs more accu-
rately reflect public buyers’ ex-ante perceptions of contracts and thus are more relevant
to award mechanism design. According to the EUODP, the choice of award mechanism
is a CN/CAN decision. Therefore, it is better to examine this decision at an aggregate
(i.e. CN/CAN) level than in a subcontract (i.e. lots/contract awards) level. The cost of
using CNs is forgoing the number of bidders as an explanatory variable, which appears in
CANs. This variable is expected to be endogenous to the award mechanism choice.
4See the Notes & Codebook in the EUODP website https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/
dataset/ted-csv.
5See Section 2.4 for descriptions of CNs, CANs, lots and awards
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4.3.2 Data Description
Table 4.1 summarises the definitions of the main variables. The EU public procure-
ment directives prespecify three contract types: works contracts, mainly for construction
projects; services contracts, for example, technical, financial and legal services; and supply
contracts, such as water and electricity supply.
There are four basic types of award mechanisms: the open procedure, restricted proce-
dure, negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue. The open and restricted procedures
are auctions that do not allow any discussion between buyer and sellers before or after bid
submission. Competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure permit different degrees
of negotiation. While the open procedure allows any interested supplier to submit a bid,
the remaining three procedures may pre-select bidders to limit the number of partici-
pants.6
We follow the literature by using contract value and duration as proxies of complexity
(Bajari et al., 2008, Chong et al., 2014). Arguably, a more complex contract is usually
more expensive and tend to take more time to develop. But instead of a contract value
signed by the two parties, an estimated contract value is used. The estimated value reflects
the public buyer’s perception of complexity when deciding the award mechanism to be
used. These estimated values are adjusted by the GDP deflator to remove the effects of
inflation.
We also use the number of lots as an additional measure of complexity. There are
two arguments for this measure. First, more complex contracts involve more personnel
from different professional fields, so more sub-contracts are needed. Second, the use of
lots means that the responsibility of each party can be further clarified. The greater the
number of smaller sub-contracts, the easier it is to carry out the overall contract.
A quality criterion dummy is introduced. It equals 1 for the criterion of “most eco-
nomically advantageous tender”, which evaluates quality together with the price; much
6See Section 2.2 for more information on award mechanisms.
63
more rarely it equals 0 for the criterion of “lowest price”, which considers only the price.
We take the buyer’s experience as an explanatory variable because it may play a role
in both the costs of implementing an award process and the buyer’s bargaining power.
Following Chong et al. (2014) and Bajari et al. (2008), the number of times a buyer has
appeared in the dataset is used as a measure of buyer’s experience.
The common procurement vocabulary (CPV) and region are used as control variables.
The EU uses the CPV to classify contracts with further details beyond the contract type.
The CPV has five levels and the first level contains 45 categories.7 Because the variation
in the CPV for contracts awarded through the negotiated procedure and competitive dia-
logue is small, the CPV is not included in estimations that contain these two procedures.
Lastly, we manually assign the region of the procuring authority. This variable is used to
capture demographic and economic fixed effects.
7See the “Guide to the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV)” by European Commission (2008)
for details. URL: https://simap.ted.europa.eu/documents/10184/36234/cpv_2008_guide_en.pdf.
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Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. Services contracts took
up nearly 60% of UK public procurement, supply contract around 30% and works con-
tracts just over 10%. The restricted procedure was most frequently used by the UK public
authorities, followed by the open procedure, the negotiated procedure and competitive
dialogue. Most contracts were evaluated by criteria on both price and quality. The ma-
jority of UK public procurement was initiated by public authorities located in England
and the number of procurement contracts is greater in Greater London than in Scotland,
Wales or Northern Ireland. This indicates that factors such as population and economic
level affect the demand for public procurement.
All continuous variables are positively skewed. Since the degrees of skewness of con-
tract value and experience are large, we use natural logarithms to transform these two
variables. Nearly 75% of contracts did not use lots. Among the contracts with lots, the
number of lots varies.
Next, we turn to figures for a closer look at some variables. Figure 4.1 summarises
contract type by year. There are more services contracts than any other type in each
year throughout the sample period. According to Figure 4.2, the use of the restricted
procedure declined dramatically from nearly two-thirds of contracts in 2009 to roughly
one-third of contracts in 2015. By contrast, the frequency of the open procedure surged.
The uses of the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue were fairly stable.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of award mechanism by contract type. For works
contracts, the weight of restricted procedure (nearly 80%) is very much larger than the
other award mechanisms; for services contracts the weight of the restricted procedure
(more than 50%) is higher than the weight of the open procedure (just below 40%); for
supply contracts the open procedure has the highest weight (more than 50%) and the
weight of the restricted procedure is around 40%.
We learn from Figure 4.4 that a higher percentage of services contracts than works or
supply contracts use the “most economically advantageous tender” criterion. The different
patterns of award mechanism and award criteria exhibited by the services, supply and
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Categorical Variables
No. of Obs. Proportion
Contract type
Works 4632 12.16%
Services 22547 59.18%
Supply 10922 28.67%
Award mechanism
Open 15106 39.65%
Restricted 20188 52.99%
Competitive dialogue 711 1.87%
Negotiated 2094 5.50%
Others 2 0.01%
Criteria
Lowest price 1586 4.16%
Most economically advantageous tender 36226 95.08%
Not specified 289 0.76%
Region
England outside London 23356 61.30%
Greater London 5992 15.73%
Scotland 4556 11.96%
Wales 1738 4.56%
Northern Ireland 2451 6.43%
Overseas 8 0.02%
All observations 38101 100.00%
Panel B: Continuous Variables
No. of Obs. Mean CI (lower) CI (upper) S.D.
Contract value (e) 38101 10500577 10182833 10818320 31643376
Duration (days) 38101 42.22 42.00 42.44 22.26
No. of lots 38101 1.60 1.53 1.66 6.15
Experience 38101 95.43 93.92 96.94 149.94
Min. 25th 50th 75th Max.
Contract value (e) 12031.59 402423 1246170 6015793 368958721
Duration (days) 2.24 24.01 36.02 48.03 162
No. of lots 0 0 0 2 393
Experience 1 15 45 106.75 882
Notes. Experience is measured by the cumulative sum of contract notices (CNs) by each public
authority.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Award Criteria by Contract Type
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Award Criteria by Award Mechanism
works contracts imply that attributes of these contracts may differ, so regressions for each
contract type should be done separately.
Figure 4.5 depicts award criteria by award mechanism. It shows that the open pro-
cedure is the award mechanism most likely to be used in combination with the “lowest
price” criterion, followed by the restricted procedure. This result, though preliminary,
supports the suggestion from the theory that quality concerns and the use of negotiation
should be positively correlated.
According to Figure 4.6, buyers with more experience tend to use the open procedure
more often. This finding supports the argument that accumulating experience lowers
administrative costs of auction and is in line with the results from Bajari et al. (2008) and
Chong et al. (2014). However, the average buyer’s experience is higher for the negotiated
procedure than for the restricted procedure.
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Note. 1. This is a box-and-whisker plot. The lower bound of a rectangle is the 25th percentile, the upper
bound the 75th percentile, and the horizontal line in the rectangle the median. The values of medians
are marked below the median lines. The two vertical lines above and below each rectangle represent the
range of observations that are within 1.5 times the interquartile range (the difference between 75th and
25th percentiles). The diamond point within each rectangle indicates the mean value, which is labelled
above the point. 2. Experience is measured by the cumulative sum of contract notices (CNs) by each
public authority.
4.4 Methodology
The choice of award mechanism is a question of probability, which can be evaluated
with the logit model (or logistic model). The empirical analysis in this chapter uses three
common logit models. This section firstly introduces the simplest logit model and then
moves to the more complicated models.
Section 4.4.1 introduces the dichotomous logit model, which is suitable for a binary
dependent variable. We use the dichotomous logit model to compare the choice of the
open and restricted procedures. Section 4.4.2 introduces the multinomial logit model,
which is appropriate when the dependent variable contains multiple categories. This
model is used to compare the choice of the four benchmark award mechanisms. However,
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the multinomial logit model imposes the assumption of independence from irrelevant al-
ternatives (IIA). IIA may not be valid in the decision of using the four EU benchmark
award mechanisms. Section 4.4.3 illustrates cases when IIA fails. The nested logit model
partially relaxes the IIA assumption and may be more suitable than the multinomial logit
model to examine the choice of the four EU benchmark award mechanisms. Section 4.4.4
discusses the techniques under the nested logit model.
4.4.1 Dichotomous Logit Model
Before turning to the dichotomous logit model, we consider the linear-probability
model for dichotomous data. Given a procurement with two potential choices of award
mechanism, auction and negotiation, a dummy variable for the choice of award mechanism
Y can be coded as 1 for auction and 0 for negotiation. Suppose contract value X is a
factor that affects the choice of award mechanism. The conditional probability pii of using
the auction for procurement i when X = xi is
pii ≡ Pr(Yi) ≡ Pr(Y = 1 | X = xi) (4.1)
and the conditional expectation E(Y | xi) is
E(Y | xi) = pi(1) + (1− pii)(0) = pii. (4.2)
If a linear-probability model is used to capture the dependency of Y on X, then
Yi = α + βXi + εi (4.3)
and
pii = E(Yi) = α + βXi, (4.4)
where εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε), εi and εi′ are independent and identically distributed for i 6= i′, and
X and ε are independent.
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The linear-probability model is problematic because it cannot confine the probabil-
ity pii to the interval of [0, 1]. To overcome this problem, the cumulative probability
distribution function of the logistic distribution
Λ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(4.5)
can be used to transform pii into the unit interval [0, 1] and retain the linear structure.
Hence, the linear dichotomous logit model is produced:
pii = Λ(α + βXi) =
1
1 + exp[−(α + βXi)] . (4.6)
Rearranging Equation 4.6 produces
pii
1− pii = exp(α + βXi). (4.7)
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of Equation 4.7, we have
Λ−1(pi) = loge
pii
1− pii = α + βXi. (4.8)
The ratio pii
1−pii is the odds of auction (i.e. when Yi = 1). The inverse transformation
Λ−1(pi) = loge pii1−pii is called the logit of pii and would be interpreted as the log-odds
when Yi = 1. While the odds is bounded below by 0 and unbounded above, the logit is
symmetric around 0 and unbounded both below and above. Increasing X by 1 increases
the logit by β and multiplies the odds by eβ.
It is straightforward to include several explanatory variables in the dichotomous logit
model. The logit model for multiple regression with k explanatory variables from X1 to
Xk is
Λ−1(pi) = loge
pii
1− pii = α + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + ...+ βkXik. (4.9)
The normal distribution can be used to transform the linear-probability model into
the linear probit model. Although the logit and probit models usually yield very similar
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results, we use the logit model due to its two practical advantages. First, the logit
model is simpler; second, the inverse linearising transformation for the logit model can be
interpreted as log-odds, but the inverse transformation for the probit model is not directly
interpretable (Fox, 2015).
4.4.2 Multinomial Logit Model
In this study, the type of award mechanism as a response variable contains four cat-
egories. To adapt to this attribute of multiple categories, we employ the multivariate
logistic distribution to generalise the dichotomous logit model to the multinomial logit
model (or polytomy logit model).
Suppose award mechanism Y includes m types: Yi can be assigned with a value from
1 to m, depending on the type of award mechanism that the ith procurement uses. The
values of Y are nominal and do not have ordinal properties. Let piij denote the probability
that the ith procurement uses a type j award mechanism and let X1 to Xk represent the
potential explanatory variables. The multinomial logit model is expressed as:
piij =
exp(γ0j + γ1jXi1 + ...+ γkjXik)
1 +
∑m−1
l=1 exp(γ0l + γ1lXi1 + ....+ γklXik)
for j = 1, ...,m− 1 (4.10)
and
piim = 1−
m∑
j=1
piij (for category m) (4.11)
Award mechanism m is chosen as the baseline category. Each of remaining m − 1
award mechanisms has a set of parameters, γ0j, γ1j, ..., γkj. The sum of the probability of
all award mechanisms is 1:
m∑
j=1
piij = 1.
The log-odds of award mechanism j versus the baseline category m can be deduced
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from Equations 4.10 and 4.11:
loge
piij
piim
= γ0j + γ1jXi1 + ...+ γkjXik for j = 1, ...,m− 1. (4.12)
The interpretation for coefficients γ1j, ..., γkj is similar to that for β in the dichotomous
logit model. The log-odds of category j and any category j′, except for baseline category
m, can also be derived:
loge
piij
piij′
= loge
piij/piim
piij′/piim
= loge
piij
piim
− loge piij′
piim
= (γ0j − γ0j′) + (γ1j − γ1j′)Xi1 + ...+ (γkj − γkj′)Xik
(4.13)
4.4.3 The IIA Assumption
The multinomial logit model relies on the assumption of independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA), which states that the ratio of logit probabilities for any two alternatives
does not depend on the availability or attributes of any other alternatives. The IIA
assumption is appropriate in some cases (Cushing and Cushing, 2007, Luce, 2005). For
example, retirees may consider only a few destinations where they would like to live, so
their choice decision will not be significantly affected by changes in other destinations.
However, the IIA assumption is inappropriate in other cases (Chipman, 1960, Debreu,
1960). The famous red-bus-blue-bus problem illustrates a case when the IIA assumption
is unrealistic. A commuter has to choose between going to work by car or by a blue bus.
Suppose the initial probabilities of choosing a car (Pc) and choosing the blue bus (Pbb)
are equal, so Pc = Pbb =
1
2
and Pc/Pbb = 1. Suppose later a red bus is introduced and
the red bus is identical to the blue bus except for colour. According to IIA, the ratio of
probabilities of choosing a car and the blue bus remains at 1, i.e. Pc/Pbb = 1. However,
if the traveller is rational, he would be indifferent to taking a blue bus or a red bus. The
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new expected probability of taking a blue bus should equal to the expected probability of
taking a red bus (Prb), and the two probabilities should sum up to the original probability
of taking the blue bus (before the red bus was introduced), thus Pbb + Prd =
1
2
and
Pbb = Prd =
1
4
. Because the probability of taking a car is unchanged, Pc =
1
2
, the new
ratio of the probabilities of taking a car and taking the blue bus becomes Pc/Pbb = 2,
rather than remaining constant at 1 as suggested by the IIA assumption.
In our case, suppose that the probabilities of choosing the open procedure, restricted
procedure, negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue are respectively Po, Pr, Pn and
Pc and that Po = Pr = 0.4, Pn = 0.2,
Po
Pn
= Pr
Pn
= 2 before competitive dialogue is intro-
duced. If the IIA holds, the introduction of competitive dialogue affects the probabilities
of using the former three award mechanisms proportionally. For example, a change to
Po = Pr = 0.38, Pn = 0.14, and Pc = 0.1 makes the value of
Po
Pn
and Pr
Pn
unchanged. If the
changes in Po, Pr and Pn are not proportional, IIA is violated. For example, when only the
probability of the negotiated procedure is affected, Po = Pr = 0.4, Pn = 0.18, Pc = 0.02
and Po
Pn
= Pr
Pn
= 20
9
.
Because the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue allow discussion and the
open and restricted procedures do not, the introduction of competitive dialogue may affect
only the use of the negotiated procedure. In this case, the nested logit model may be a
replacement of the multinomial logit model.
4.4.4 Nested Logit Model
In the nested logit model, alternatives that share some properties are grouped into
subsets, called nests. IIA holds within each nest, i.e. for any two alternatives in the same
nest the ratio of probabilities is independent of the attributes or existence of all other
alternatives. IIA does not hold in general for alternatives in different nests, i.e. for any
two alternatives in different nests the ratio of probabilities can depend on the attributes
of other alternatives in the two nests (Train, 2009). Thus, the nested logit model is
suitable when the introduction of competitive dialogue affects only the probability of the
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negotiated procedure.
The nested model is built on utility maximisation. Let the set of alternatives j be
partitioned into K nonoverlapping subsets denoted by B1, B2,..., BK . The utility that
buyer n obtains from alternative j in nest Bk is denoted as Unj = Vnj + εnj , where Vnj
is observed by researchers and εnj is a random variable whose value is not observed by
researchers. The object j will be chosen if and only if Unj > Uni for j 6= i.
The probability that object j is chosen by individual i can be described as:
Pnj = P (Unj > Uni)
= P (Vnj + εnj > Vni + εni)
= P (εni − εnj < Vnj − Vni),
(4.14)
for all j 6= i. To solve Equation 4.14, a probability density function or cumulative density
function must be imposed. The nested logit model is obtained by assuming that the
vector of unobserved utility, εn = εn1, ..., εnJ , has a cumulative distribution
exp
− K∑
k=1
(∑
j∈Bk
e−εnj/λk
)λk , (4.15)
where Cov(εnj, εnm) = 0 for any j ∈ Bk and m ∈ Bl with l 6= k. The parameter λk is
a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives in
nest k. A higher value of λk means greater independence. Combining this distribution
and Equation 4.14 produces the choice probability for alternative i ∈ Bk:
Pni =
eVni/λk
( ∑
j∈Bk
eVnj/λk
)λk−1
K∑
l=1
(∑
j∈Bl
eVnj/λk
)λl . (4.16)
The probability ratio of individual n choosing between alternatives i ∈ Bk and m ∈ Bl
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is:
Pni
Pnm
=
eVni/λk(
∑
j∈Bk e
Vnj/λk)λk−1
eVnm/λl(
∑
j∈Bl e
Vnj/λl)λl−1
(4.17)
.
If alternatives i and m are in the same nest, i.e. k = l, then the terms in parentheses
cancel out, so:
Pni
Pnm
=
eVni/λk
eVnm/λl
(4.18)
4.5 General Problems of the Models
Our models share the common problems of endogeneity and multicollinearity in the
generalised linear models. This section introduces these two problems and potential reme-
dies to reduce bias in the estimates.
Endogeneity occurs when the error term is correlated with any independent variables.
Endogeneity may be caused by omitted variables, measurement error and simultaneity
(i.e. reverse causality). The main source of endogeneity in this study is the omitted
variables. Notably, we do not hold data on selection cost and the number of bidders.
These two variables are related to contract complexity, a variable with available data.
The error term captures the impacts of these two omitted variables, so the error term is
correlated with contract complexity and causes endogeneity. Both the public data provider
and the author have endeavoured to refine the data to keep measurement error in this
study (particularly in the variables of contract value and duration) as low as possible.
The number of bidders is the factor that is most likely to have a reverse causality with
the choice of award mechanism, the dependent variable. Since it is an omitted variable,
simultaneity is not a great concern in this study. Instrumental variable (IV) is a widely
adopted remedy for endogeneity. An IV is correlated with the endogenous variable and
uncorrelated with the error term. However, our dataset does not contain information to
form appropriate IVs for the omitted variables.
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Multicollinearity occurs when any of the independent variables are highly correlated.
Although it is sensible to include several independent variables into one regression to
examine their partial effects only when those variables are correlated. Very high corre-
lation may cause high standard errors and unexpected signs in estimates. The problem
of unreliable estimates can be greatly mitigated by increasing the sample size. Because
our sample size is reasonably large, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem
in this study.
Readers may feel free to skip the remainder of this section that mainly introduces
the econometrics under endogeneity and multicollinearity. Section 4.5.1 discusses the
econometrics under endogeneity in an order of omitted variables, measurement error,
simultaneity and standard solutions. Section 4.5.2 discusses multicollinearity.
4.5.1 Endogeneity
To make the illustration of endogeneity easier, simplify the population model as
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βkxk + u, (4.19)
where y refers to the log-odds of one of the award mechanisms to the baseline category,
and x1, x2, ..., xk represent factors that may affect the choice of award mechanism.
One assumption for unbiased OLS estimations in multiple linear regressions is the zero
conditional mean assumption that the error term has an expected value of zero regardless
of values of independent variables, i.e. E(u | x1, x2, ..., xk) = 0. The necessary condition
of the zero conditional mean assumption is that the expectation of the error term is zero
and the independent variables are not correlated with the error term, that is E(u) = 0
and Cov(xj, u) = 0 for j = 1, 2, ...k. The problem of endogeneity occurs when any
independent variables are correlated with the error term. Endogeneity has three sources:
omitted variable, measurement error and simultaneity.8
8References of endogeneity can be found in Verbeek (2008) and Wooldridge (2009, 2010)
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4.5.1.1 Omitted Variables
Omitted variables are defined as variables that are not included as the independent
variables in a regression model but are correlated with any of independent variables and
the error term in the model. Omitted variables are usually due to ignorance or data
unavailability. In a multiple regression case, omitted variables usually lead to bias in OLS
estimators.
One remedy is to use a variable that is correlated with the omitted variable as a proxy
variable in the OLS regression (plug-in solution). For example, if xk is unobservable and
x∗k is used as the proxy variable for xk, then the relationship between xk and x is captured
by
xk = δ0 + δkx
∗
k + vk. (4.20)
The requirements for the plug-in solution to produce unbiased results are: 1) the error
term u is uncorrelated with x1, x2, ..., xk−1 and xk and 2) the error term vk is uncorrelated
with x1, x2, ..., xk−1 and x∗k.
Many factors may influence the choice of award mechanism, but we can measure or
find proxies for several of them.9 Omitted variables still cause endogeneity in the model.
For example, as omitted variables, the cost of selection and number of bidders are likely
to be correlated with proxies for complexity.
4.5.1.2 Measurement Error
Measurement errors exist when an imprecise observable measure is used to represent
a variable of interest. Dougherty (2007) takes imperfect proxy variables as a cause of
measurement error because the statistical structures of the measurement error problem
are similar to the omitted variable-proxy problem. However, Wooldridge (2009) argues
that these two problems are conceptually different:
9See Section 3.4 for a complete discussion of the influential factors.
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“In the proxy variable case, we are looking for a variable that is somehow
associated with the unobserved variable. In the measurement error case, the
variable that we do not observe has a well-defined, quantitative meaning (such
as a marginal tax rate or annual income, but our recorded measures of it may
contain error. (Wooldridge, 2009, p.315)”
When the measurement error is in the dependent variable and is uncorrelated with in-
dependent variables, then the OLS estimators are unbiased and consistent; otherwise,
the OLS estimators are biased and inconsistent. The dependent variable in this study
is the award mechanism. Since the type of award mechanism is one of the most critical
specifications for a contract, it is unlikely to be erroneous.
When the measurement error is in an independent variable, taking x∗1 as a measure
of the unobserved explanatory variable x1, the measurement error in the population is
e1 = x
∗
1−x1. Assume zero mean of the measurement error, E(e1) = 0. If the measurement
error e1 is uncorrelated with the observed measure x
∗
1, then e1 must be correlated with
the unobserved variable x1. Replacing x1 in the population model Equation 4.19 with
x1 = x
∗
1 − e1 is:
y = β0 + β1x
∗
1 + β2x2 + ...+ βkxk + (u− β1e1). (4.21)
Because u and e1 both have zero means and are uncorrelated with x
∗
1, the composite
error term (u − β1e1) also has a zero mean and is uncorrelated with x∗1. Therefore,
estimators in Equation 4.21 are unbiased. But the composite error variance in Equation
4.21, V ar(u − β1e1) = σ2u + β21σ2e1 , is higher than the error variance σ2u in the original
population model.
A more common assumption is that the measurement error e1 is uncorrelated with the
unobserved independent variable x1 (the classical errors-in-variables assumption). This
assumption implies that the measurement error must be correlated with the observed
measure x∗1:
Cov(x∗1, e1) = E(x
∗
1e1) = E(x1e1) + E(e
2
1) = 0 + σ
2
e1
= σ2e1 . (4.22)
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For the modified model (Equation 4.21), the covariance between x∗1 and the composite
error (u− β1e1) is
Cov(x∗1, u− β1e1) = Cov(x∗1, u)− Cov(x∗1, β1e1) = 0− β1Cov(x∗1, e1) = −β1σ2e1 . (4.23)
The correlation between x∗1 and the composite error (u− β1e1) usually causes bias in all
estimators, except in the special case that x1 is uncorrelated with x2, x3, ..., xk.
This study may have a measurement error problem, especially for the variables of
contract value and duration. Nevertheless, the EUODP (the data provider) and the
author have put effort into refining data to keep measurement error in this study to as
low a level as possible.
4.5.1.3 Simultaneity
Simultaneity describes a causal loop between the independent and dependent variables.
Namely, not only does an independent variable affects the dependent variable, but also
the dependent variable, in turn, affects the independent variable.
We demonstrate endogeneity due to simultaneity using the two-equation structural
model with an endogenous variable in each equation:
y1 = β10 + α1y2 + β1z1 + u1 (4.24)
and
y2 = β20 + α2y1 + β2z2 + u2. (4.25)
Here y1 and y2 denote the endogenous variables; z1 represents a set of exogenous variables
in Equation 4.24, z2 represents a set of exogenous variables in Equation 4.25, and u1 and
u2 are the structural error terms. By definition, y1 is correlated with u1 and y2 is correlated
with u2; z1 is uncorrelated with u1 and z2 is uncorrelated with u2.
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Replacing y1 in Equation 4.25 with Equation 4.24 produces
(1− α1α2)y2 = (β20 + α2β10) + (α2β1z1 + β2z2) + (α2u1 + u2). (4.26)
If α1α2 6= 1, then the above equation can be written as
y2 = pi20 + pi21z1 + pi22z2 + v2, (4.27)
where pi20 =
β20+α2β10
1−α1α2 , pi21 =
α2β1
1−α1α2 , pi22 =
β2
1−α1α2 , and v2 =
α2u1+u2
1−α1α2 . Equation 4.27 is
the reduced form equation for y2 because y2 is expressed by exogenous variables and the
reduced form error v2. v2 is correlated with u1 because v2 is a linear function of u1 and
u2. From Equation 4.27, it can be inferred that y2 and u1 are correlated through v2, so
the OLS estimators for Equation 4.24 are biased and inconsistent except in special cases.
The reduced form equation for y1 is similar to the reduced form equation for y2. Similar
proofs of endogeneity apply for Equation 4.25.
The number of bidders and award mechanism are the pair that most likely to have
reverse causality. The benefits from auctions are most prominent when a large number of
bidders exist, so anticipating a large number of bidders is likely to result in choosing an
auction. Auctions require submission of complete bids to express interest to participate
but negotiations do not have such a requirement. Higher participation costs at the early
stage may keep some suppliers away from participating auctions. Since information from
the contract notices does not contain the number of bidders, the number of bidders is an
omitted variable rather than a source of simultaneity.
4.5.1.4 Proposed Solutions
Instrumental variable (IV) method is a popular solution for the endogeneity problem.
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Supposing in a simple structural model
y = β0 + β1x+ u, (4.28)
Because x and the error term u are correlated, the estimator of β1 is inconsistent.
An observable variable z is an instrumental variable for x, if z satisfies two assumptions:
1) z is uncorrelated with u, i.e. Cov(z, u) = 0 and 2) z is correlated with x, i.e. Cov(z, x) 6=
0. The first assumption is untestable because the error term u is not observable. Its
validity is usually checked by economic theory. The second assumption can be tested
by regressing x on z. If the parameter of z is statistically different from zero, then the
relationship Cov(z, x) 6= 0 holds.
Based on Equation 4.28, the covariance between z and y is
Cov(z, y) = β1Cov(z, x) + Cov(z, u). (4.29)
Because Cov(z, u) = 0 and Cov(z, x) 6= 0, the parameter β1 can be identified:
β1 =
Cov(z, y)
Cov(z, x)
. (4.30)
The IV method can be further developed into a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method
if the number of exogenous variables that are not included in the structural model is
greater than the number of endogenous explanatory variables in the structural model, and
at the same time, at least one exogenous variable excluded from the structural model is
correlated with each endogenous explanatory variable. Thus, the best IV estimators may
be derived from the reduced form equation for the endogenous explanatory variables.10
In addition to the IV and the 2SLS approaches as the potential solutions for en-
dogenous bias in general and proper proxy variables for omitted variable bias, the fixed
10However, the sufficient condition for identifying the parameters of the endogenous explanatory vari-
ables is more complicated. For more details of the 2SLS approach, see Chapter 15 and Chapter 16 in
Wooldridge (2009) and Chapter 5 in Wooldridge (2010).
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effects or first-differencing methods can be used to remove the unobserved effects from
time-constant omitted variables in panel data analysis.11
Endogeneity, mainly due to omitted variables, is a concern for this study. However, it
is particularly challenging to identify proper IVs for those endogenous variables. This calls
for publicising more detailed contract level data. Since pooled cross-sectional data are
used in this study, the fixed effects and first-differencing methods are not applicable. Thus,
with the currently available data, we have to conduct the analysis while acknowledging
the potential endogeneity.
4.5.2 Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables or combinations of
independent variables are highly correlated and exhibit an approximately linear relation-
ship. Technically, when the matrix defined by two variables is nearly not invertible, the
correlation between these two variables is said to be “too high”.12
It should be underlined that multiple regression models allow correlations between
the independent variables. Grouping several independent variables in one regression to
examine their partial effects makes sense only when the researcher suspects that these
variables are correlated. However, multicollinearity may cause unreliable estimators with
high standard errors and unexpected sign or magnitude. A large number of observations
with sufficient variation may help produce more reliable estimators when multicollinearity
exists. A shortcut solution for multicollinearity is to drop one or more independent
variables that are highly correlated.
Multicollinearity may be caused by two observable independent variables that share
the same latent variable, for example, the contract value and the contract duration, which
are proxies for complexity in this study. Multicollinearity may also result from a causal
relationship between independent variables. For example, contract value may be highly
11See Chapter 13 and 14 in Wooldridge (2009) for discussions on these methods
12Chapter 2 in Verbeek (2008) discusses multicollinearity.
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correlated with quality concerns. Buyers are generally less worried about the quality of a
contract with low valuation because a low value contract usually does not have sophisti-
cated technical requirements. Overall, multicollinearity is unlikely to cause considerable
problems in this study because our sample size is reasonably large.
4.6 Results
In this section, we present estimates of 1) a dichotomous logit model that compares the
open procedure against the restricted procedure (Section 4.6.1) and 2) two multinomial
logit models that respectively compare the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue
with the remaining procedures (Section 4.6.2). We run separate regressions for works,
services and supply contracts. The Appendix provides results from two nested logit models
that correspond to the multinomial logit models.
4.6.1 Open Procedure versus Restricted Procedure
Table 4.3 presents results that compare the open procedure to the restricted procedure,
which is the baseline category. Two regressions are run for each contract type: one controls
for year, region and the CPV, whereas the other does not.
The estimates for the traditional measures of complexity, i.e. log contract value and
duration, and for the quality criterion dummy are conflicting across contract types. It
seems that public authorities do not greatly differentiate between the open and restricted
procedures too much with respect to contract complexity and quality concerns.
Contracts with a greater number of lots are more likely to use the open procedure.
This confirms our second explanation about lots. The applicability of lots means that
individual sub-contracts are likely to be clearly distinguished from one another. This
lowers bidders’ costs of preparing tendering documents and the public buyer’s cost of
screening bids. Therefore, benefits from the competitive pressure introduced by a large
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number of bidders dominate the costs. As a result, the open procedure is preferred to the
restricted procedure.
More experienced buyers tend to use the open procedure more frequently than the
restricted procedure. This may be explained by the reduced administrative costs of con-
ducting an open procedure due to accumulated experience.
4.6.2 Auctions versus Negotiations
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 compare the four benchmark award mechanisms in the EU.
Table 4.4 presents results from the multinomial logit model that uses the negotiated pro-
cedure as the baseline category. Table 4.5 summarises the results from the multinomial
logit model with competitive dialogue as the baseline category. Two regressions are pre-
sented under each contract type. One of them controls for the year and region, and the
other does not.13
Table 4.4 demonstrates strong and consistent estimates that contract value, contract
duration and the quality criterion dummy are negatively related to using either the open or
restricted procedure, compared to the negotiated procedure. This provides evidence that
complexity and quality concerns play a role in the choice between a negotiated procedure
and auctions (i.e. the open and restricted procedures). Divisibility into a greater number
of lots suggests a higher probability of using auctions due to lower costs for both buyer
and bidders.
More experienced buyers are more likely to use an open procedure than a negotiated
procedure. Since experience may lower costs, this result supports the conclusion from
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that auctions produce a higher surplus to the buyer than
negotiations when the marginal cost of the buyer is zero.
13We have tried to control for the CPV, but no estimates can be produced because the CPV introduces
strong multicollinearity.
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On the other hand, more experienced buyers are less likely to use a restricted procedure
than a negotiated procedure. Although the restricted and negotiated procedures both
limit the number of bidders, the effectiveness of the restricted procedure in extracting
bidder’s rent relies more on the strength of competition. As a public buyer becomes
more experienced and more skillful in negotiation, its gains from negotiation increase.
An experienced buyer may benefit more from a negotiated procedure than a restricted
procedure.
All but one of the estimates in Table 4.5 comparing open or restricted procedures
with competitive dialogue are similar and consistent with estimates in Table 4.4, when
interpreting both the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue as applications of
negotiations.14
The exception is that more experienced buyers tend to use restricted procedures more
often than competitive dialogue. While the restricted procedure contains a round of
prequalification followed directly by competitive bidding, competitive dialogue follows a
process of prequalification, negotiation and competitive bidding. Moreover, the required
minimum number of bidder is five for the restricted procedure and three for competitive
dialogue. It is likely that with lower administrative costs accompanied by more experi-
ence, the benefits from more bidders in the competitive bidding exceed the benefits from
negotiation.
Lastly, we turn to the comparison between the negotiated procedure and competi-
tive dialogue in Table 4.4.15 The estimates for the quality criterion dummy and for all
complexity measures are not consistent across different contract types. This implies that
public buyers may not distinguish these two award mechanisms when considering com-
plexity and quality only. Buyer’s experience is the only factor with consistent estimates
14Lack of variation is the reason that the model yields large standard errors in the quality criterion
dummy estimates for the supply contracts. In few cases, competitive dialogue is applied simultaneously
with the “lowest price” criterion (see Figure 4.5).
15Table 4.5 provides nearly identical estimates but opposite signs when comparing the negotiated
procedure with competitive dialogue. This is because of the switch of the baseline category from the
negotiated procedure to competitive dialogue. We can ignore the comparison between these two award
mechanisms in Table 4.5 and focus on that in Table 4.4.
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across contract types. More experience accumulated by a buyer is associated with a
higher probability of using the negotiated procedure rather than competitive dialogue.
Competitive dialogue differs from the negotiated procedure because it contains an addi-
tional competitive bidding stage. The results show that experienced buyers tend to put
less value on competitive bidding in the competitive dialogue procedure. It is likely that
competitive bidding in competitive dialogue involves only a small group of bidders, so the
competitive pressure cannot force bidders to give up sufficient rents to induce the buyer
to run this more complicated award mechanism.
As a robustness check, the Appendix presents results from the nested logit models
that use the negotiated procedure or the competitive dialogue as the baseline category.
The estimates from the nested logit models are generally consistent with the multinomial
logit models.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the choice in UK public procurement of whether to pre-
select bidders in public procurement, and the further choice between the auction-based
award mechanisms (i.e. open and restricted procedures) and the negotiation-based award
mechanisms allowed under EU law (i.e. the negotiated procedure and competitive dia-
logue).
We learn from theory that quality concerns generally increase with contract complex-
ity. A reputation mechanism, e.g. prequalification, can alleviate opportunistic behaviour
that exploits contract incompleteness, which is often the case for complex contracts. Nego-
tiations are better suited than auctions to complex contracts because they combine efforts
from buyer and sellers to improve contract design and provide flexibility in unavoidable
ex post renegotiation.
Our empirical results show that although the restricted procedure contains prequalifi-
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cation and the open procedure does not, public buyers tend not to treat the two procedures
differently when considering only quality concerns and complexity (Table 4.3). Nor do
they tend to differentiate between the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue
(Table 4.4). It also turns out that public buyers take negotiation as a better approach
than prequalification to tackle quality concerns and complexity (Table 4.4).
In addition, our results show evidence of two opposite impacts of buyer’s experience.
First, according to theory, more experience may put a buyer in a more advantageous
position in negotiation and thus he is able to extract a higher surplus than a buyer with
less experience. This view suggests that a more experienced buyer has a higher tendency
to choose negotiation. This view is supported by the result from Table 4.4 that the
log odds of the restricted procedure against the negotiated procedure decrease with the
increase of buyer’s experience.
Second, according to industry practitioners, greater experience enables buyers to re-
duce the administrative costs of conducting auctions involving a large group of bidders, so
more experienced bidders are more likely to use auctions (Bajari et al., 2008). Our results
show that increasing experience increases the probability of using the open procedure
to the probability of using the negotiated procedure (Table 4.4) or competitive dialogue
(Table 4.5).
Overall, this study suggests that the UK public procurement practice is generally
consistent with the theoretical considerations on the optimal award mechanism choice.
Negotiation is superior in cases of high complexity and quality concerns and auctions are
preferred when contracts are simple and the cost of introducing an additional bidder is
low.
The UK public authority may not be fully aware of the advantage of the restricted
procedure over the open procedure when a contract is incomplete. Although the empirical
results from Coviello et al. (2018) show that the restricted procedure does not worsen (and
may even improve) various ex ante procurement outcomes (e.g. the number of bidders)
or ex post procurement outcomes (e.g. time or cost overruns) when compared with the
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open procedure, we find that the frequency of using the restricted procedure in the UK
has declined in recent years.
Siemonsma et al. (2012) offer some evidence that competitive dialogue may provide
value for PPP contracts in port development and operations, but the UK public author-
ities do not exhibit great preference for either competitive dialogue over the negotiated
procedure or the reverse. The lower executive cost of running a negotiated procedure
presumably makes the UK public authorities use negotiated procedures more often.
It is possible that some shortcomings in the restricted procedure and competitive
dialogue have prevented public buyers from using these two procedures. Inspired by this,
the next chapter explores the tendering period in different award mechanisms, which is a
feature that has been explored by few studies.
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Appendix: Results from the Nested Logit Regressions
This Appendix presents estimates from the nested logit models in Table 4.6 and Table
4.7. The results from the nested logit models are generally consistent with the results
from the multinomial logit models (our main models).
Each table includes two regressions for each contract type. The second regressions
for the works and services contracts control for year and region, while the corresponding
first regressions do not. The quality criterion dummy and region cannot be included in
the regression for supply contracts because they introduce high multicollinearity when
compounded with competitive dialogue. Therefore, for supply contracts, one regression
controls for the year but not the region and the other controls neither factors.
Table 4.6 contains results from using the negotiated procedure as the baseline, so it
offers a robustness check for results from the multinomial model in Table 4.4. Table
4.7 provides results from using competitive dialogue as the baseline and thus it can be
compared with Table 4.5.
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Chapter 5
Study 2: Award Mechanism and Decision Speed in
Public Procurement
5.1 Introduction
A notable amount of time in public procurement is spent on award decision making.
From 2009 to 2015, the decision time for UK public contracts was on average six months.
Almost half of the contracts were not awarded on the original schedule. For example, nine
months of delay occurred during the award process of the UK public contract to widen
highway M25 and it contributed to an overall project delay of 18 months. The overall
delay of the project is estimated to increase the net present cost by £660 million, a 24%
increase of the initial £2.7 billion total cost (UK National Audit Office, 2010).
This chapter explores how the choice of EU award mechanisms in the UK is related to
the award decision speed. Specifically, this chapter tests the relationship between award
mechanisms and three dimensions of decision speed: the duration of the award process,
the probability of delaying the award and the duration of delay.
EU public procurement utilises four benchmark award mechanisms: the open proce-
dure, the restricted procedure, the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue.1 The
open and restricted procedures do not allow negotiations, the competitive dialogue allows
negotiation at an early stage, and the negotiated procedure allows negotiation throughout
the whole procedure.
Practitioners (e.g. Lynch, 2015 and Yescombe, 2007) and policymakers (e.g. UK Na-
1See Section 2.2.1 for detail of the benchmark award mechanisms in the EU.
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tional Audit Office, 2007) usually claim that negotiations slow down the decision speed
in public procurement. However, to the best of our knowledge, this claim has not been
empirically well-supported. Reeves et al. (2017) assert that they test the impact of com-
petitive dialogue. However, they represent competitive dialogue by using a time dummy,
which may be an inaccurate approach. Besides, they only compare competitive dialogue
with the negotiated procedure.
Within this context, our contributions are twofold. First, we build upon theories in the
strategic management and public procurement literatures to propose and test hypotheses
regarding the link between the four EU benchmark award mechanisms and decision speed.
Second, we provide new insights into the understanding of the tradeoffs between using
different award mechanisms in public procurement practice. The knowledge might help
public buyers choose a suitable award mechanism and propose a reasonable procurement
schedule. In addition, the knowledge may help policymakers move forward in award
mechanism design, as it uncovers some features that may slow down decision speed.
Given the economic and political significance of public projects (e.g. Loader, 2013,
Pickard, 2017, Plimmer, 2016, Deloitte, 2016, and Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010), a rela-
tively large body of literature examines the significance of different award mechanisms for
realising the desired social benefits from public contracts (e.g. Bajari et al., 2008, Bulow
and Klemperer, 1996, McAfee and McMillan, 1987a, Tadelis, 2012). While the direct
monetary and quality impact are indeed crucial for public procurement, not many studies
have investigated delivery time.
In particular, the public procurement literature has not yet explicitly tested the de-
cision speed associated with various award mechanisms.2 This is surprising because the
strategic management literature lays considerable emphasis on the role of decision speed
in determining the economic benefits associated with private firms (Baum and Wally,
2003, Eisenhardt, 1989, Forbes, 2005, Judge and Miller, 1991). The European Commis-
sion (2017a) comments that very lengthy procedures should be avoided because they are
2In this chapter, decision speed for public procurement contracts refers to the time elapsed from
publication of a procurement opportunity (contract notice) to the award of contract.
99
expensive and cause uncertainty for both the public buyer and bidders. While acknowl-
edging that both cost and time escalations imply inefficiencies in procurement and that
the social welfare of public contract often depends on delivery time, the public procure-
ment literature focuses on time spent by contractors, i.e. time after a contract is awarded,
and largely ignores time spent on making award decisions (Gori et al., 2017, Guccio et al.,
2012, Lewis and Bajari, 2011, Love et al., 2013).3 We have identified only two prior quan-
titative empirical studies on decision speed in public procurement: Reeves et al. (2017)
and Reeves et al. (2015) focus on sectoral variations of decision speed for PPPs but do
not relate their model specifications to theories of decision process.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section explains the signifi-
cance of decision speed and identifies the explanatory variables based on the theoretical
framework from the strategic management literature. Section 5.3 proposes hypotheses
and describes the data. Section 5.4 introduces the dichotomous logit model and survival
analysis. These two methods form the split-population survival time model employed by
our analysis. Section 5.5 discusses the results. Section 5.6 is the conclusion. The Ap-
pendices provide supplemental information for the survival analysis: the non-parametric
methods in Appendix A and alternative hazard models in Appendix B.
5.2 Significance and Determinants of Decision Speed
This section draws the importance of decision speed and the determinants of decision
speed from the strategic management literature. It extends the knowledge from the
strategic management literature to the public procurement context because studies of
decision speed are scarce in the public procurement literature.
3A larger number of studies from the project management and engineering literatures also focus on
the time overrun after contract award (Ahsan and Gunawan, 2010, Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006, Odeh and
Battaineh, 2002, Sambasivan and Soon, 2007). Most of these studies are based on surveys collected
from practitioners. While practitioners’ hands-on experiences are invaluable, their perceptions may be
subjectively biased.
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Rajagopalan et al. (1993) take decision speed as one of the process outcomes in their
integrative framework that summarises the strategic management literature on decision-
making processes (see Figure 5.1 for a simplified version). The process outcomes are
affected by three sets of antecedent factors (environmental, organisational and decision-
specific factors) and decision process characteristics. In turn, the process outcomes affect
the economic outcomes (e.g. firm performance), which is indirectly affected by the an-
tecedent factors.4
The main interest of this study is in whether and how the award mechanism choice is
related to the award decision speed in public procurement. The award mechanism choice
determines many aspects of the decision process characteristic in a contract award deci-
sion. While the next section discusses the hypotheses regarding the relationship between
the award mechanism choice and decision speed, this section reviews the importance of
decision speed (Section 5.2.1) and the environmental, organisational and decision-specific
factors in sequence. Since we take the environmental, organisational and decision-specific
factors as control variables in the analysis, readers may wish to skim the subsections
(Sections 5.2.2 to 5.2.6) about these factors.
We attempt to link the existing arguments in the strategic management literature to
the context of award decision in public procurement. Corresponding factors in award
decision-makings in public procurement can be identified according to the integrative
framework of the strategic decision process by Rajagopalan et al. (1993). We identify the
level of competition as an environmental factor; authority experience, authority type and
whether it is an “on behalf” purchase as the organisational factors; contract complexity
and quality concerns as decision-specific factors; and lastly, the type of award mechanism
as a decision process characteristic.
4Papadakis et al. (1998) and Shepherd and Rudd (2014) also construct frameworks of the strategic
decision making process.
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Environmental Factors Organizational Factors Decision-specific Factors
Decision Process 
Characteristics
Process Outcomes
Economic Outcomes
Direct Effects
Indirect Effects
Figure 5.1: Strategic Decision Process: An Integrative Framework
Source: Rajagopalan et al. (1993)
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5.2.1 Significance of Decision Speed
The strategic management literature refers decision speed to “how quickly organisa-
tions execute all aspects of the decision-making process, spanning from the initial con-
sideration of alternative courses of action to the time at which a commitment to act is
made” (Eisenhardt and Mintzberg et al. in Forbes, 2005, p. 355). This literature on
decision speed focuses on private firms. It emphasises that decision speed can affect firm
performance not only directly but also indirectly through strategic implications.
The relationship between decision speed and firm performance is most evident in a
fast-moving environment (Elbanna and Child, 2007). In a dynamic environment that is
characterised by unpredictability, firms that make faster decisions are likely to reap first-
mover advantages by exploiting opportunities that elapse rapidly (D’Aveni et al., 2010,
Gumpert and Stevenson, 1985, Makadok, 1998, Nadler and Tushman, 1999). Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt (1988) and Eisenhardt (1989) start the study on the association between
decision speed and firm performance. They identify positive relationships between de-
cision speed and decision quality and between decision speed and firm performance in
high-velocity (i.e. fast-moving) environments. Baum and Wally (2003) find empirical
support that fast decision predicts growth and profit, and Judge and Miller (1991) find
that a positive association between decision speed and firm performance exists only in
high-velocity environments.
Admittedly, a side-effect of making fast decisions is to forgo the benefits of informa-
tion that is disclosed slowly over time (Shankar et al., 1998). But as the circulation of
information and information-processing efficiency are enhanced by advancing information
technology, a slow decision-making process may not necessarily lead to more accurate
decisions (Keen, 1988).
A more recent study on new ventures indicates that firms that make faster decisions
are more likely to close (Forbes, 2005). This may be explained by the speed trap that
over-emphasising on fast decision-making would mislead firms into a vicious cycle of less
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attention to decision content and more critical issues to be decided (Perlow et al., 2002).
Decision speed has strategic implications that indirectly affect firm performance. Fast
decision making accelerates the cognitive process and enhances learning because deci-
sion makers are obliged to be more deeply immersed in the decision environment (Eisen-
hardt, 1989), to more intensively develop and evaluate alternative choices (Anderson,
1983, Eisenhardt, 1989), and to more efficiently integrate information within time con-
straints (Hayes, 1981, Payne et al., 1988). Moreover, fast decision making may indicate
proactive behaviour the management, which can enhance commitment from stakeholders,
e.g. employees and potential investors (Langley, 1989). It nurtures a culture of action that
applying knowledge into practice instead of over-emphasising the importance of planning
(Pfeffer and Sutton, 2013).
A number of insights from the strategic management literature apply to public pro-
curement. The concept of the first mover advantage and speed trap are relevant. A
lengthy tendering period imposes high opportunity costs on bidders because they lose al-
ternative trading opportunities (Ehrman and Peters, 1994). Since public buyers compete
with each other for the best suppliers, those who make fast decisions are likely to get a
larger number of bidders, which enhances competition and benefits the public buyers.
As time is also a cost to the public buyer, the downsides of delaying award decisions
are self-evident (Van den Hurk and Verhoest, 2015). Time spent on an award decision
is added to the overall time spent on delivery. Time overruns in award period affect
post-award schedules because additional efforts by contractors are required to accelerate
production and delivery arrangements in order to get back on schedule and adhere to the
initial contract completion date (Lewis and Bajari, 2011). Otherwise, delays in delivering
contracts will occur.5 Additional efforts are often compensated by extra payments. There-
fore, an extended tendering period reduces social welfare by imposing a higher social cost
or postponing user access to infrastructures or services (Lewis and Bajari, 2011, Reeves
5In their study on international development projects in Asia, Ahsan and Gunawan (2010) identify
88 out of 243 cases of delay in overall projects that can be ascribed to the lengthy evaluation in award
mechanism or the award mechanism itself.
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et al., 2015, 2017). However, making an award decision too fast may indicate insufficient
care by the buyer in scrutinising bids.
Improvement of cognition and learning and enhancement of stakeholders’ commit-
ments are also relevant to public procurement. Like decision makers in firms, decision
makers in public procurement can improve their cognitive and learning processes through
the processing more information per unit of time. Making timely award decisions can
signal that the public authority values punctuality. This may, in turn, strengthen con-
tractors’ commitment to carry out contracts on time.
However, the literature on decision speeds in the private sector offers no clues on how
decision speed varies with award mechanisms, which determine various characteristics of
the award decision process in public procurement.
5.2.2 Environmental Factor: Level of Competition
Theories in the strategic management and award mechanism design literatures jointly
suggest that the level of competition affects award decision speed partially through the
choice of award mechanism. According to the award mechanism literature, greater com-
petition allows the award mechanism designer to extract more surplus (Bulow and Klem-
perer, 1996, Harris and Raviv, 1981, Holt, 1979). A greater level of competition generally
means a larger number of bidders, allowing more alternatives to be considered by the
contracting authority. Auctions are inherently able to incorporate more participants than
negotiations.
In the strategic management literature, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that considering
more alternatives at the same time accelerates cognitive processing and therefore, de-
cision making speed. This argument is endorsed by empirical evidence from Anderson
(1983) and Judge and Miller (1991) and laboratory experiment results from Schwenk
(1983). An alternative viewpoint is that comparing and evaluating more alternatives re-
quire more time and slow down the pace of decision making (Fredrickson and Mitchell,
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1984, Mintzberg et al., 1976, Schweiger et al., 1986).
5.2.3 Organisational Factor: Authority Experience
Experience is an intangible asset of human capital possessed by individuals that can
facilitate strategically valuable behaviour, such as the procurement of resources (Becker,
1994, Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Pfeffer, 1994). It potentially affects both decision speed and
choice of award mechanism.
Relevant experience is likely to accelerate decision making because people gather and
process information more quickly. People with prior relevant experience are familiar
with relevant information sources so they can gather information faster (Forbes, 2005).
Second, people with prior relevant experience already possess a stock of knowledge which
enables them to identify useful information more efficiently (Forbes, 2005). Lastly, because
people with prior relevant experience know well about the decision process and data
interpretation, they are likely to analyse information more swiftly (Lord and Maher,
1990).
Experience benefits public buyers in both auctions and negotiations (Bajari et al.,
2008).6 On the one hand, the costs of implementing auctions are likely to decrease with
experience. On the other hand, the more experienced buyer is more skillful in extracting
rents in negotiations.
5.2.4 Organisational Factor: “On Behalf” Purchase
An “on behalf” procurement is conducted by a central purchasing body or by several
buyers buying together. An on behalf procurement is an analogue to a decentralised
decision making structure. In a decentralised structure, information is held separately.
Vertical and/or horizontal interactions across units are more frequent in a decentralised
6It is also supported by empirical results from Chapter 4.
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structure than in a centralised structure (Wally and Baum, 1994).
A centralised structure accelerates decision making. A centralised organisation con-
centrates information in a small group of decision makers who are less dependent on
consultation (Eisenhardt, 1989, Galbraith, 1977). Besides, centralisation requires fewer
interactions across different units and thus reduces the necessity of sharing information
and mediating conflicts (Pfeffer, 1981, Shrivastava and Grant, 1985). Baum and Wally
(2003), Eisenhardt (1989) and Wally and Baum (1994) show a positive relationship be-
tween decision speed and concentration in their empirical results. Using an agent-based
simulation, Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) suggest that decentralisation speeds up decision
making in simple conditions, but in complex conditions when sophisticated coordination
across different units is burdensome, centralisation accelerates decision making speed in
the context of public procurement.
An on behalf purchase may also affect the choice of award mechanism. Such bulk
purchase is more attractive to suppliers than purchase of smaller size because it is likely
to generate a larger amount of absolute profit. Since the attractiveness of the offer is a
factor that determines bargaining power, on behalf purchase may endow public buyers
with higher bargaining power, which in favours public buyers in negotiations (Spaniel,
2014).
5.2.5 Organisational Factor: Authority Type
Whether local authorities or the central government conduct the procurement may af-
fect award decision speed through their typical characteristics, e.g. access to information,
organisation size, and flexibility of the organisational system.
Access to information. Access to complete information may boost decision makers’
confidence and thus speed up decision making (Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985, Galbraith,
1977). Compared with the central government, local authorities lack human, financial
and technical resources (Crook and Sverrisson, 1999, Smith, 1985). Lack of resources
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may impede local authorities from getting complete information about the purchase and
bidders’ characteristics and thus slow down the award decision making.
Organisational size. Jin and Zou (2002) show some statistics of subnational and
national government sizes of 17 industrial and 15 developing countries over the period
from 1980 to 1994.7 They measure subnational and national government size by the
proportion of a nation’s GDP taken up by the total expenditure at the corresponding
government level. In these countries, subnational governments on average account for
14.5% of GDP and national governments on average account for 32% of GDP in 1994.
A larger organisation size indicates a more complex organisation structure (Pugh et al.,
1968), which tends to slow strategic decision making (March et al., 1976). Studies on
decision speed by Forbes (2005), Judge and Miller (1991) and Wally and Baum (1994)
have controlled for organisation size.
Formalisation. Formalisation refers to rigidification and inflexibility of the system.
Structural formalisation may slow down the decision making process by requiring collect-
ing large amounts of data and analysing alternatives extremely thoroughly (Fredrickson
and Mitchell, 1984) and by encouraging organisational inertia (Wally and Baum, 1994).
Though simultaneously considering many alternatives may not slow the decision making
speed (Eisenhardt, 1989, Judge and Miller, 1991), excessively evaluating the alternatives
may do. Structural formalisation is one of the manifestations of comprehensiveness (Wally
and Baum, 1994) and large organisations are more comprehensive in terms of the strate-
gic decision making process than smaller organisations (Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989,
Papadakis et al., 1998). Therefore, it can be expected that central government tends to be
characterised by a higher level of formalisation, which is a feature that would decelerate
the award decision process.
7The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colom-
bia, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe.
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5.2.6 Decision-Specific Factor: Complexity and Quality Concerns
Contract complexity and the accompanying quality concerns affect both decision speed
and the award mechanism used. While Holland (2014) points out that complexity does
not have a rigorous definition, the complexity of a contract may be defined as the effort
required to provide a complete set of plans (Tadelis, 2012). Complex contracts contain
dimensions that are difficult or even impossible to specify and are likely to give rise to
higher quality concerns. They require more effort and therefore are more time-consuming
to design.
Increasing complexity and quality call for interactions between the contracting au-
thority and potential suppliers as well as greater discretionary power for the contracting
authorities to restrict the number of providers to only the most competent (Bajari and
Tadelis, 2001, Manelli and Vincent, 1995). Negotiations facilitate communications to im-
prove contract design and accommodate needs for ex post renegotiation (Goldberg, 1977,
Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). Compared with auctions, negotiations are more suitable for
more complex contracts.
5.3 Hypotheses and Data
The last section introduces the significance of decision speed and the control variables.
This section focuses on the independent variable of main interest – the choice of award
mechanism, which is closely related to many decision process characteristics. It firstly
discusses the views on the role of award mechanism in decision speed and proposes hy-
potheses accordingly (Section 5.3.1), then describes decision speed by award mechanism
classification using descriptive statistics (Section 5.3.2) and the Kaplan-Meier Curve (Sec-
tion 5.3.3) and lastly explains the definitions of variables applied in later regressions using
the dichotomous logit model and survival analysis (Section 5.3.4).
This study takes the process outcomes (i.e. the log duration of award process, hazard
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of award and probability delay) as the dependent variable and the choice of award mech-
anism as the main independent variable. In addition, it controls for some environmental,
organisational and decision-specific factors.
5.3.1 Hypotheses about Award Mechanism
It seems that no theoretical studies have examined the relationship between award
mechanism and decision speed. This may be because the relationship between award
mechanism, which defines many aspects of process characteristics, and speed of decision
making, which is one of the process outcomes, is regarded as self-evident (Rajagopalan
et al., 1993).
Some practitioners and regulators blame negotiation for a lengthy procurement process
and delays in contract awarding, but their claims have no credible empirical support –
almost no study has comprehensively examined the link between award mechanism and
award decision speed.
According to Yescombe (2007), PPP contracts often involve very lengthy negotiations.
Without controlling other variables, UK National Audit Office (2007) explicitly takes
negotiation as a cause of a lengthy award period. It states that:
...[T]endering period overall lasted an average of 34 months [for projects closed
between 2004 and 2006]...- no better than the average for projects that closed
between 2000 and 2003. ... However, we found that many of the reasons for
long tendering periods. ... Within the overall tendering period, negotiations to
finalise deals with a single preferred bidder have increased, lasting on average
over a year and in some cases as long as five years. (UK National Audit Office,
2007, p. 5)
Lynch (2015), an international procurement advisor, lists contract negotiations as one of
the eight causes of delay in the procurement process for general public contracts.
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As far as we know, Reeves et al. (2017) is the only prior quantitative study that tests
the relationship between decision speed and award mechanism while controlling for other
variables. They compare competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure regarding
the award decision speed of public-private partnership (PPP) contracts. Their results
show that competitive dialogue, which is designed to limit the length of negotiation, cor-
responds to a longer overall tendering period. This contradicts the views that negotiations
slow down award decision speed. However, they use a time dummy to account for com-
petitive dialogue, defined by the year of its introduction, 2006. This dummy variable
may not accurately affect the impact of the competitive dialogue because it captures too
many additional factors, among which are included, the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the
subsequent economic recovery.
We propose three hypotheses to test the general expectations of practitioners on the
role of negotiation in decision speed:
Hypothesis 1. Award mechanisms with negotiation are associated with longer duration
of the overall award process than award mechanisms without negotiation.
Hypothesis 2. Award mechanisms with negotiation are associated with a higher proba-
bility of delaying award than award mechanisms without negotiation.
Hypothesis 3. Award mechanisms with negotiation are associated with longer delays
in awarding contracts than award mechanisms without negotiation.
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Decision Speed
Our data include all UK public procurement contracts published in the Tenders Elec-
tronic Daily (TED) during the period 2009–2015. TED is the digital version of the Official
Journal of the European Union, where public procurement contracts above EU thresholds
must be advertised. The EU also encourages under-threshold contracts to be published in
the TED. As a result, this database contains both above- and under-threshold contracts.
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The data consist of two parts, contract notices (CNs) and contract award notices (CANs),
linked by a common variable CAN ID. The data include 8,217 observations that have both
parts and have the planned contract start date in the CN, tPS. These observations also
contain the CN dispatch date, tCN , the end date of application, tEA, and the date of con-
tract award, tCA. Most of the observations have information on contract characteristics
such as the description of the target to be purchased, estimated value, award mechanism,
and award criteria.
Referring back to Figure 2.1, the response period is calculated as the difference between
tCN and tEA. A combination of the screening period and the standstill period is computed
as the difference between tEA and tCA.
Table 5.1 Panel A gives descriptive statistics for the response period after removing
observations with a response period of less than 10 days.8 Due to the small dispersion
(and the relatively large data size), the narrow 95% confidence intervals indicate reliable
estimates of the population means. The duration of the response periods generally comply
with the EU requirement of the minimum response period: the response period for the
open procedure is on average the longest, the response period for the accelerated proce-
dures are on average the shortest, and those for the restricted, negotiated and competitive
dialogue procedures are in between. There are no great differences in the duration of re-
sponse period among the four EU benchmark award mechanisms and between the two
accelerated procedures. Besides, the statistics indicate that the duration of the response
period is roughly symmetrically distributed around the mean.
Panel B from Table 5.1 describes the duration of the screening period plus the standstill
8 According to the EU public procurement directive 2004/18/EC (European Parliament and Euro-
pean Council, 2004) Article 38, the minimum response period is 10 days for the accelerated restricted
and accelerated negotiated procedures, 30 days for the restricted, negotiated and competitive dialogue
procedures, and 40 days for the open procedure, considering all circumstances. It is fair to exclude values
that are less than 10 days to ensure accuracy. Even for those contracts not subject to EU public procure-
ment directives, a response period of less than 10 days is too short to fully inform all potential bidders
and allow time for potential bidders to draft tenders or requests to participate. Unreported results show
that the 1st percentile for all procedures except for the two accelerated procedures is greater than 10
days, which confirms that such a filtering rule retains no less than 99% of the original data for those
procedures. No less than 95% of the original data for the accelerated restricted procedure are retained
and no less than 75% of the original data for the accelerated negotiated procedure are retained.
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period. The two periods are reported in combination because the cut-off date of the two
periods (i.e. the date when an award decision notice is dispatched) is not available.
Observations with a less than 10-day aggregate duration of the screening and standstill
periods are excluded from this summary statistics because the legally required standstill
period is no less than 10 days. Although the variation of the sample is relatively large,
the ranges of the 95% confidence intervals are generally acceptable, which is owed to the
reasonably large sample size. Since the means are larger than the corresponding medians,
the distribution is positively skewed.
The average duration of screening bids and awarding contracts is about four months
(126.21 days). Among the four benchmark award mechanisms, the competitive dialogue
has the longest average duration and the open procedure has the shortest. This is within
expectation because competitive dialogue is designed for the most complex contracts,
while the open procedure is for simpler contracts. However, it is striking that the restricted
procedure tends to have a longer average duration of screening and awarding contract
than the negotiated procedure, suggested by the larger mean and quartile values of the
restricted procedure. Moreover, the accelerated restricted procedure is also likely to be
longer than the accelerated negotiated procedure. These results are at odds with the
claim that the negotiation is responsible for lengthy screening periods.
Table 5.2 shows the chronological order of tCA and tPS. The values are calculated as
the tCA minus tPS. A positive value captures the number of days of delay in contract
award and a negative value represents the number of days of an early award. 9 To avoid
the significant impact of outliers and get relatively reliable estimates, the statistics are
generated after trimming the sample by 25%. The table shows that more than 75% of
contracts with the negotiated procedure and around 50% of contracts with the open,
restricted, or competitive dialogue procedures were awarded before or on ttPS . The 75th
percentile is 11.75 for the accelerated restricted procedure and zero for the accelerated
9This measure tends to underestimate the length of delay. When computing delays, the actual date
of contract award (tCA) should be compared the planned date of contract award, which is prior to the
planned contract start date (tPS). Because the planned date of contract award is not available, the
planned contract start date is used as a replacement. To alleviate underestimation, we interpret a value
of zero as an event of delay in later analyses.
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negotiated procedure. This indicates that a higher proportion of contracts awarded with
the accelerated restricted procedure were delayed than with the accelerated negotiated
procedure.
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5.3.3 Kaplan-Meier Curve
This subsection provides Kaplan-Meier curves as a supplement to the descriptive statis-
tics in the last subsection. The results from these two methods are consistent, i.e. the
decision speed predicted by the negotiated procedure is slower than that predicted by
the open procedure but is not slower (may even be faster than) that predicted by the re-
stricted procedure. The Kaplan-Meier curve is a nonparametric technique in the survival
analysis that is used for studies on event occurrence.
The survival analysis is suitable for this study because the interest of this study is
when a contract is awarded. Section 5.4.2, Appendix A and Appendix B explain the
survival analysis in detail. One advantage of nonparametric methods over parametric
methods is that that no assumptions about the distribution of event times are required
in the former.
Our data are closer to continuous-time type because they are recorded using a fine-
grained time metric of days. The attribute of continuous-time allows us to adopt the
Kaplan-Meier method to estimate the survival function and display the estimates using
the Kaplan-Meier curve.10
Figure 5.2 presents the Kaplan-Meier curves for all contracts in the dataset and takes
tCN as the beginning of time. Information about the overall duration of the award process
can be inferred from this figure. The percentage survival rate at time point t stands for
the proportion of contracts that are not awarded by time point t. At any given time,
the open procedure has the lowest percentage survival rate. The negotiated procedure
has a lower percentage survival rate than both the restricted procedure and competitive
dialogue until after 400 days of tCN , when the curves for the negotiated and restricted
procedures converge. The median lifetime is lowest for the open procedure (around 100
10See Appendix A for an introduction of nonparametric methods to describe event occurrence data.
The Kaplan-Meier method is more accurate and less affected by subjective judgement than the other two
nonparametric methods for describing continuous-time data. We do not provide the life table estimated
by the Kaplan-Meier method because the thousands of time intervals resulting from thousands of events
make the table too long to present.
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days), second lowest for the negotiated procedure (around 137 days), followed by a median
lifetime of about 190 days for the restricted procedure and about 330 days for competitive
dialogue. Figure 5.2 suggests that the average overall duration of the award process for
the negotiated procedure is longer than that for the open procedure but shorter than for
the restricted procedure and competitive dialogue.
Figure 5.3 plots the Kaplan-Meier curves for contracts with delayed awards and takes
tPS as the beginning of time. This figure reflects the duration of delay. Once the delay of
award occurs, the percentage survival rate is the lowest for the negotiated procedure in
the very early stage of delay. The survival rate for the negotiated procedure has a sharp
decline to 40% not long after tPS when the survival rates for the remaining procedures
are still quite high. This suggests that for the negotiated procedure 60% of contracts that
were not awarded before the planned contract start date were awarded shortly after the
planned contract start date. The survival curve for the negotiated and open procedures
intersect at around 17% after 100th days of delay when the survival rates for the restricted
procedure and competitive dialogue are just below 40%. This shows that the proportion
of contracts that were awarded within 100th days of delay was higher for contracts with
negotiated or open procedure (83%) than for contracts with the restricted procedure or
competitive dialogue (60%).
5.3.4 Variable Definition
This subsection introduces the variables used in the regressions. A summary of the
variables is exhibited in Table 5.3. The dependent variable varies according to the models
used to analyse the award decision speed. The log duration of award process is the
dependent variable in the OLS model. It is the natural logarithm of the number of days
between the date when the CN was dispatched and the date of award. In the Cox model,
the dependent variable is the instantaneous hazard of awarding a contract at a particular
time t, on the condition that the contract is not awarded before time t. The logit model
takes the probability of delaying contract award as the dependent variable. The probability
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of delaying contract award is the final cumulative outcome of the instantaneous hazard
of awarding contracts.
The explanatory variables included in the regressions are identified according to the
discussion in Section 5.2. The type of award mechanism, as a decision process character-
istic, is the explanatory variable of main interest.11 As a categorical variable, it contains
four values in the main regressions: the open, restricted and negotiated procedures and
competitive dialogue.
Variables classified as environmental, organisational and decision-specific factors are
possible confounders (i.e. variables that affect both the explanatory variable of interest
and dependent variable). These confounders are likely to be associated with type of award
mechanism, probability of delay and duration of delay, so they are controlled for to reduce
bias in the estimates for award mechanisms.
The environmental factors include response period, which is the difference in days
between the date when the CN was dispatched and the end date of application; and a
lots dummy, which is a binary variable where a value of 1 indicating that a contract
is split into multiple lots and a value of 0 for a contract does not use any lots. The
response period is used to account for competition. A longer response period exposes
a procurement request to more suppliers, so it is likely that more suppliers will bid.12
The lots dummy is an indicator of both the level of competition and the complexity of a
contract. Lots decompose a large contract into smaller sub-contracts. It is likely that more
suppliers are able to deliver a sub-contract than to deliver the overall contract. Morever,
the divisibility indicates that responsibilities in sub-contracts can be clearly separated, so
the overall contract becomes simpler.
11Gori et al. (2017) control for award mechanism in their analysis of the duration of delay in completing
public works contracts for local governments.
12Kenny and Crisman (2016) and Knack et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that the number of
bidders is positively correlated with contract advertising.
120
T
ab
le
5.
3:
V
ar
ia
b
le
D
efi
n
it
io
n
D
im
e
n
si
o
n
V
a
ri
a
b
le
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
P
ro
ce
ss
ou
tc
om
es
L
og
d
u
ra
ti
on
of
aw
ar
d
p
ro
ce
ss
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
in
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
a
ri
th
m
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
ay
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
d
a
te
w
h
en
th
e
C
N
w
a
s
d
is
p
a
tc
h
ed
a
n
d
th
e
d
a
te
o
f
aw
a
rd
.
H
az
ar
d
of
aw
ar
d
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
in
C
ox
P
H
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
th
a
t
a
co
n
tr
a
ct
is
aw
a
rd
ed
a
t
ti
m
e
t
(g
iv
en
th
a
t
th
e
co
n
tr
a
ct
is
n
o
t
aw
a
rd
ed
b
ef
o
re
ti
m
e
t)
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
of
d
el
ay
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
in
lo
g
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
d
el
ay
in
g
a
co
n
tr
a
ct
aw
a
rd
.
D
ec
is
io
n
p
ro
ce
ss
ch
ar
ac
-
te
ri
st
ic
s
A
w
ar
d
m
ec
h
an
is
m
T
y
p
es
o
f
aw
a
rd
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
.
F
o
u
r
va
lu
es
(t
h
e
o
p
en
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
,
re
st
ri
ct
ed
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
,
n
eg
o
ti
a
te
d
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
a
n
d
co
m
p
et
it
iv
e
d
ia
lo
g
u
e)
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
m
a
in
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
E
n
v
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
fa
ct
or
s
R
es
p
on
se
p
er
io
d
T
h
e
le
n
g
th
o
f
ti
m
e
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
d
a
te
w
h
en
th
e
C
N
w
a
s
d
is
p
a
tc
h
ed
a
n
d
th
e
en
d
d
a
te
o
f
a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
.
A
m
ea
su
re
o
f
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
.
L
ot
s
d
u
m
m
y
E
q
u
a
ls
to
1
w
h
en
a
co
n
tr
a
ct
is
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
m
u
lt
ip
le
lo
ts
a
n
d
0
w
h
en
lo
ts
a
re
n
o
t
u
se
d
.
It
is
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
a
n
d
ca
n
a
ls
o
b
e
v
ie
w
ed
a
s
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
co
m
p
le
x
it
y
p
er
ce
iv
ed
b
y
th
e
p
u
b
li
c
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
.
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
al
fa
ct
or
s
S
u
m
of
co
n
tr
ac
ts
E
q
u
a
ls
to
th
e
cu
m
u
la
ti
ve
su
m
o
f
C
N
s
is
su
ed
b
y
a
p
u
b
li
c
b
u
ye
r.
A
m
ea
su
re
o
f
p
ro
-
cu
re
m
en
t
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
.
O
n
b
eh
al
f
d
u
m
m
y
E
q
u
a
ls
to
1
if
th
e
p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t
is
co
n
d
u
ct
ed
b
y
a
ce
n
tr
a
l
p
u
rc
h
a
si
n
g
b
o
d
y
o
r
b
y
se
ve
ra
l
b
u
ye
rs
b
u
y
in
g
to
g
et
h
er
,
a
n
d
0
if
n
o
t.
A
u
th
or
it
y
ty
p
e
T
y
p
e
o
f
th
e
co
n
tr
a
ct
in
g
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
.
D
ec
is
io
n
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
fa
ct
or
s
L
og
co
n
tr
ac
t
va
lu
e
T
h
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
a
ri
th
m
o
f
th
e
co
n
tr
a
ct
va
lu
e
st
a
te
d
in
th
e
C
A
N
.
A
m
ea
su
re
o
f
co
m
-
p
le
x
it
y.
C
on
tr
ac
t
d
u
ra
ti
on
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
st
a
te
d
in
th
e
C
N
.
Q
u
al
it
y
cr
it
er
io
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
q
u
a
ls
to
1
fo
r
”
m
o
st
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
a
ll
y
a
d
va
n
ta
g
eo
u
s
te
n
d
er
”
a
n
d
0
fo
r
”
lo
w
es
t
p
ri
ce
”
.
A
m
ea
su
re
o
f
q
u
a
li
ty
co
n
ce
rn
s.
P
la
n
n
ed
aw
ar
d
p
er
io
d
T
h
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
d
a
te
o
f
d
is
p
a
tc
h
in
g
C
N
a
n
d
th
e
p
la
n
n
ed
co
n
tr
a
ct
st
a
rt
d
a
te
.
C
on
tr
ac
t
ty
p
e
T
y
p
e
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
.
C
o
n
ta
in
s
th
re
e
va
lu
es
:
w
o
rk
s,
su
p
p
ly
a
n
d
se
rv
ic
es
.
C
P
V
co
d
e
C
o
m
m
o
n
P
ro
cu
re
m
en
t
V
o
ca
b
u
la
ry
.
U
se
d
to
fu
rt
h
er
cl
a
ss
if
y
w
h
a
t
is
to
b
e
p
u
rc
h
a
se
d
.
121
We identify the sum of contract, on behalf dummy and authority type as organisational
factors for an award decision in public procurement. The sum of contract, as a measure
of authority experience, is the cumulative sum of CNs issued by a public buyer. Bajari
et al. (2008), Chong et al. (2012, 2014) and Gori et al. (2017) adopt the similar measure
of procurement experience of public buyers. Since experience is tied to individuals rather
than to an institution as a whole, employee mobility should admittedly be considered in
measuring the experience of an institution like a contracting authority. But it is likely
that more than one person within a contracting authority has been involved in previous
procurement and it is unlikely that all staffs with previous experience resign at the same
time. Furthermore, it is often the case that staff are required to give a notice period before
leaving the office so that they can hand over their work and transmit their experience to
their successors. As a result, it is credible to take procurement experience of a public
authority as a continuously accumulated factor over time.
The variable on behalf dummy indicates whether the procurement is conducted by a
central purchasing body (including the cases when several buyers buy collectively). The
value is 1 for collective purchasing and 0 otherwise. Authority type is a categorical variable
with 12 values, among which are the local authorities and central government.13
Data for several decision-specific factors are available. Contract value is the contract
value stated in the CAN and contract duration is the duration of the contract stated in
CN. They are frequently used as proxies of contract complexity in analyses of procurement
(Bajari et al., 2008, Chong et al., 2012, 2014, Gori et al., 2017). Because contract value
is positively skewed, the natural logarithm of contract value is used in the regressions.
We use contract values from CANs rather than estimated contract values from the
CNs. The estimated contract value is worked out by contracting authorities based on
the fundamentals of a procurement. The contract value is the outcome based on the
fundamentals of the procurement and the interactions between the contracting authority
13The 12 values are: central government; armed forces; local authorities; water, energy, transport
and telecommunications sectors; European Union institution/agency; other international organisation;
body governed by public law; other; not applicable; national or federal agency/office; regional or local
agency/office; and not specified.
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and bidders, such as competition, private information and outside opportunities. Since
the interactions help both the contracting authority and the winning bidder better under-
stand the contract, contract value may more accurately reflect the real level of contract
complexity than the estimated value.
The quality criterion dummy is a proxy for quality concerns as a decision-specific
factor. It is a binary variable, equal to 1 for using award criteria of “most economically
advantageous tender” and 0 for “lowest price”.14
The planned award period is calculated as the difference between the date of dispatch-
ing CN, tCN , and the planned contract start date, tPS. We expect this variable to reflect
the level of complexity, the buyer’s confidence or competence, the urgency of the procure-
ment, or any combination of these four factors. This measure seems have not been used
by previous studies.
Additional decision-specific factors are contract type and common procurement vocab-
ulary (CPV). Contract type defines the nature of a contract in three categories: works,
supply and services contracts. The CPV is an eight-digit code that further specifies the
goods or services purchased. In a CPV code, the latter digits describe the procurement
in greater detail. The first two digits indicate which of the 45 divisions (e.g. other trans-
port and equipment) a procurement belongs to, the third digit specifies the group (e.g.
ships and boats), the following digit shows the class (e.g. ships), the next digit codes the
category (e.g. ships and similar vessels for the transport of persons or goods), and the
last three digits reveal the sub-category (e.g. ferry boat).15
The year when the CN is issued and the region where the contracting authority is
located are controlled for to capture less observable factors that could be responsible for
the probability or duration of delay in awarding contracts.16
14The other attainable variable about criteria is the weight allocated to price in bid evaluation. This
variable is not introduced in the regressions, because it is not representative of all contracts. Criteria
weights are available only when the value of the criteria dummy is the “most economically advantageous
tender”.
15See the “Guide to the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV)” by European Commission (2008)
for details.
16We have run regressions that control for monthly fixed effects. The monthly fixed effects are not
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5.4 Estimation Methodology
The estimates reported here use both the OLS regressions and the split-population
survival time model to assess the impact of award mechanism on the timing of contract
award. This section explains the econometrics underlying the split-population survival
time model. Schmidt and Witte (1989) originally use the split-population survival time
model to predict whether an individual returns to prison after a certain period of release.
The model consists of two parts: (1) a logit model that estimates the probability of delay
for all contracts; (2) a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox PH model) that assesses
the hazard of award for contracts with delayed award only, from which the duration of
delay can be inferred. We also estimate a Cox PH model with data for all contracts,
irrespective of whether there are delays in awards or not. Estimates from this additional
Cox PH model are linked to the overall duration of the award process.
This section describes the logit model (Section 5.4.1), reviews the Cox PH model
within the background of survival analysis (Section 5.4.2) and integrates the logit model
and the Cox PH model as the split-population survival time model (Section 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Dichotomous Logit Model
We estimate the probability of delaying award, pi, by the logit model, which is a
generalised linear model with the logistic distribution. Detailed introduction of the logit
model can be found in Kleinbaum and Klein (2010) and Train (2009).
Regarding the probability of delaying award, contracts fall into two categories: those
that are awarded ahead of the scheduled contract start date (D = 0) and those that are
awarded on or after the scheduled contract start date, i.e. with delayed award (D = 1).
pi is a probability that D = 1 conditional on explanatory variables X1, X2, ..., Xk and is
confined by the range from 0 to 1 inclusive:
significant, so month is not included in the model as an explanatory variable.
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pi ≡ Pr(D = 1 | X1, X2, ..., Xk) ∈ [0, 1]. (5.1)
The logistic distribution Λ(z) = 1
1+e−z , which is bounded by 0 and 1, is used to fit a
nonlinear function to the data:
pi =
1
1 + e
−
(
α+
k∑
i=1
βiXi
) . (5.2)
Rearranging Equation 5.2 arrives at the log odds of delay:
loge
(
pi
1− pi
)
= α +
k∑
i=1
βiXi. (5.3)
The coefficient βi for Xi measures the effect of one unit change in Xi on the log odds of
delay. A positive (negative) βi suggests that a rise in Xi increases (decreases) the proba-
bility of delay.
5.4.2 Survival Analysis
Survival analysis (also known as duration analysis) evaluates questions about the “oc-
currence and timing of events” (Singer and Willett, 2003, p. 303). This study is concerned
about the timing of awarding a contract, so survival analysis fits the purpose of this study.
Specifically, we use a Cox PH model to estimate the impact of award mechanism on the
hazard of awarding a contract. We provide a comprehensive introduction to the essentials
of survival analysis before introducing the Cox PH model.
Based on Singer and Willett (2003) and Kleinbaum and Klein (2012), we firstly review
the three elements of a time-to-event analysis and then introduce the Cox PH model, a
semiparametric method. In addition, Appendix A introduces alternative nonparametric
methods (including the Kaplan-Meier method) and their underlying econometrics; Ap-
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pendix B illustrates alternative hazard models and justifies the use of the Cox PH model
in this study.
5.4.2.1 Basic Elements of Event Occurrence
The target event, the beginning of time and the metric for clocking time are the three
fundamental elements shared by all research questions about time-to-event occurrence
(Singer and Willett, 2003). Here we introduce the three elements as well as the concept
of “censored data” which is a common issue in survival analysis studies.
The target event is the event whose the occurrence is analysed. It is frequently referred
to as the “failure event”, because many events of interest are negative experiences under
epidemiologic and medical research, such as death, disease incidence and relapse of using
drugs. However, the target event is not necessarily negative. It can be positive events
such as “the time to get a job after graduation” in social science studies. In our case, the
target event is “a contract being awarded”. The date of event occurrence is recorded as
the award date.
The beginning of time is the starting point of the measurement window when all
individuals are at risk of target event but no one has experienced it. Survival time is
counted from the beginning of time to the occurrence of the target event. There may be
more than one choice of the beginning of time, but the choice must be justified by the
purpose of the study. For example, either a person’s age or his tenure on the job may be
a predictor of a decision to leave the job. In this case, either the “date of birth” or the
“first date of employment” is the beginning of time.
In this study, for the Cox PH model that assesses the overall duration of the award
process, we choose the time when a CN is dispatched, denoted as tCN , as the starting point.
Alternatively, people may be tempted to choose the end date of application, denoted as
tEA. Their reason is that tEA marks the start of the screening period, in which bids
are evaluated. However, tCN is superior to tEA as a candidate for the starting time of
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the award period when considering the impact of award mechanism. As illustrated in
Figure 2.1, the type of award mechanism determines the schedule of the procurement
after the publication of the CN. The type of award mechanism makes a difference in not
only whether negotiations are allowed during the screening period but also the minimum
duration of the response period, whether requests to participate or tenders are submitted
during the response period, and whether a prequalification stage is required. As a result,
the award process should include the response period.
As the second part of the split-population model, the Cox PH model for the duration
of delaying award takes the planned contract start date stated in the CN as the starting
point to count the number of days of delay. It should be noted that this model applies to
only those contracts with delayed awards.
The metric for clocking time is a unit to record time. It can be as fine as seconds or
days or as coarse as semesters, months or even years depending on the data collecting
mechanism. Since more precise measurement preserves more information than less precise
measurement, time should be recorded in the most precise units possible. The time metric
for data analysis and the time metric for data collection can be different. Rounding is
not allowed when transforming a more precise time metric into a coarser one; otherwise,
the hazard estimate may be biased. Hazard depends on the length of the time interval.
Rounding produces a rougher time measurement and increases the number of ties in a
certain time interval. For this study, time is recorded the number of days.
Censoring occurs whenever an individual’s event time is unobserved. There are three
reasons for this: (1) the target event never takes place; (2) the target event took place
outside the follow-up time window; (3) an individual is lost to follow-up during the study
period. Censoring provides partial information about individual survival time, but the
exact survival time is unknown. Right-censoring and left-censoring are two basic types
of censoring. Right-censoring is when the event occurrence is not observed during the
study time window, so the actual survival time is no less than the observed survival time.
Left-censoring occurs when it is known that the event took place between time 0 and t
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but the exact time of the event is unknown. For an observation that is left-censored at
time t, the actual survival time is no more than the observed survival time t. Right- and
left-censoring can co-exist in a single subject and lead to interval-censored data.
The validity of survival analysis relies on the assumption of noninformative censoring.
The noninformative censoring assumption states that censoring mechanism is unrelated
to the time-to-event distribution. In other words, censoring does not indicate either target
event occurrence or the risk of target event occurrence. By contrast, informative censoring
relates to the event occurrence. It may make the non-censored group unrepresentative of
the censored group and lead to a biased estimate of hazard. Noninformative censoring is
often true when censoring is independent or random.17
Our data are right-censored and are representative only for contracts that were success-
fully awarded. We produce this dataset by merging CN and CAN data through matching
the future CAN ID for CN data and the CAN ID for the CAN data. Although we are
unable to estimate the number of awards that failed during the period from 2009 to 2015,
the European Commission (2017b) estimates that 10% of lots were not awarded in 2016.
Public buyers deal with these failed awards by not publishing anything, advertising a
cancellation notice or releasing a CAN with no winner and no value. Because we exclude
CANs with no value in data cleaning, our analyses do not contain unsuccessful contracts.
Our data do not capture all contracts that were awarded. In our dataset, 7,870 out
of the 78,277 CNs have their corresponding CANs. For contracts that were awarded but
do not have a published CAN, we do not know when they were awarded or whether their
awards were delayed. Observations with no corresponding CANs are discarded because
no information (not even a vague range) of the time to target event is available.
Reasons (2) and (3) (see above) should mainly account for the unobserved event time
and right-censoring in this study. In the case of reason (2), a contract with its CN
published in late 2015 is more likely to be right-censored because its CAN is unlikely to be
17The concepts of noninformative censoring, independent and random slightly differ from each other.
Chapter 1 of Kleinbaum and Klein (2012) compares these three concepts in details.
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also published in 2015, which is the end of our observing time. For reason (3), contracts
with a value below the EU public procurement threshold are more likely to be right-
censored. Public buyers with these contracts may not bother to publish CANs because
they are not legally bound to do so. None of the two reasons should have any implications
that the hazard of award of the right-censored observations differs significantly from the
hazard of award of the observations without censoring.
5.4.2.2 Cox PH Model
We adopt the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox PH model) developed by Cox
(1992) to estimate the hazard of award. It is a popular model for estimating continuous-
time hazard. The logarithm of the hazard of award is treated as the dependent variable.
The model consists of a baseline function, log h0(tj), which is the baseline log hazard in
instant j when all predictors are 0, and a weighted linear combination of predictors:
log h(tij) = log h0(tj) +
k∑
i=1
βiXi. (5.4)
The antilog form of the model is
h(tij) = h0(tj)e
(
k∑
i=1
βiXi
)
. (5.5)
The Cox PH model makes no assumption about the distribution of the baseline hazard,
so it cannot be used to estimate the hazard function. However, the beauty of the model
lies in the fact that it can assess the impact of changes in the explanatory variables while
avoiding unrealistic assumptions about hazard distribution. Holding other explanatory
variables constant, the hazard ratio compares estimated hazards when X1 = c + 1 and
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when X1 = c, where c is a constant:
Hazard ratio =
h0(tj)e
[
β1(c+1)+
k∑
i=2
βiXi
]
h0(tj)e
[
β1c+
k∑
i=2
βiXi
] = eβ1 . (5.6)
Therefore, the coefficient βi for Xi measures the effect of one unit change in Xi on the
hazard ratio. A positive (negative) βi suggests that a rise in Xi is associated with a higher
(lower) hazard.
5.4.3 Split-Population Survival Time Model
The split-population survival time model developed by (Schmidt and Witte, 1989)
combines the logit and hazard models. It has the following structure:
h(t) = Pr(D = 1 | X1, X2, ..., Xk)× h∗(t | D = 1, X∗1 , X∗2 , ..., X∗k), (5.7)
where the hazard h(t) is the probability that a contract with delayed award is awarded
exactly at time t, Pr(D = 1) is the probability of delay, and h∗(t) is the conditional hazard
of award that exists only when D = 1. We estimate Pr(D = 1) by a logit model based on
covariates X1, X2, ..., Xk and h
∗(t) by a Cox PH model based on covariates X∗1 , X
∗
2 , ..., X
∗
k .
We could assume that Pr(D = 1) and h∗(t) are independently affected by different
factors. But in our case, it is unreasonable to believe that the probability of delaying award
and the probability of award are affected by different factors. Therefore X1, X2, ..., Xk and
X∗1 , X
∗
2 , ..., X
∗
k are identical in our case and our split-population model can be simplified
into:
h(t) = Pr(D = 1 | X1, X2, ..., Xk)× h∗(t | D = 1, X1, X2, ..., Xk). (5.8)
Gori et al. (2017) adopt a split-population survival time model with a similar structure in
their analysis on delaying completion of works contracts for Italian public procurement.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main Estimates
Table 5.4 shows the estimates for the duration of the overall award process with all
contracts using an OLS model (column (1)) and a Cox PH model (column (2)) and the
estimates for the two parts of the split-population survival time model (columns (3) and
(4)). The negotiated procedure is the baseline category. Estimates for the remaining
award mechanisms reflect their difference from the negotiated procedure.18
The OLS estimates show that, compared with the negotiated procedure, the open
procedure is associated with a shorter overall award process, while the restricted procedure
and competitive dialogue correspond to a longer overall award process. These results
are supported by the Cox PH model in column (2), It shows that compared with the
negotiated procedure, the open procedure has a higher hazard of award and the restricted
procedure and competitive dialogue have a lower hazard of award.
Compared with the negotiated procedure, column (3) shows that the open procedure
tends to have a lower probability of delay, while the restricted procedure and competitive
dialogue are associated with a higher probability of delay. The insignificant estimates for
the restricted procedure indicate that the probabilities of delay for the restricted procedure
and the negotiated procedure do not differ greatly.
The Cox PH model in columns (4) evaluates hazard when the award process is operated
with time-overruns. The duration of delay can be inferred because the beginning of
time is the date when delay started. Compared with contracts using the negotiated
procedure, contracts with the restricted procedure and competitive dialogue have a lower
18We have run regressions using the award mechanism as the only explanatory variable and adding
different combinations of the environmental, organisational and decision-specific factors as the control
variables. The vast majority of estimates are consistent and similar in sign and significance across these
regressions. The regressions in Table 5.4 are the preferred specifications, taking into account the number
of confounders that they control for, the sample size after controlling the confounders, and the fitness or
the explanatory power shown by the test statistics.
131
probability of being awarded at any instant, which indicates a longer duration of delay
on average. These two estimates are statistically significant. The difference between the
open procedure and the negotiated procedure is not significant.
To facilitate comparison between the negotiated procedure with other three benchmark
award mechanisms, the hazard ratio of each award mechanism to the negotiated procedure
is calculated, using the estimates from columns (2) and (4). The hazard ratios and the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are presented in Table 5.5. For example, during
the entire award process, the estimated hazard of award for the restricted procedure is
on average 34% (= 100% × (0.660 − 1)) lower than for the negotiated procedure; after
delays have occurred, the estimated hazard of award for the restricted procedure is on
average 30.9% (= 100% × (0.691 − 1)) lower than for the negotiated procedure. The
upper boundaries of the 0.95 confidence intervals are lower than one. This indicates that
the hazards of award for the restricted procedure are unlikely to be higher than for the
negotiated procedure. The two hazards of award for the open procedure are estimated
to be 1.61 times and 1.15 times those for the negotiated procedure. However, once delay
occurs, the hazard of award for the open procedure may not necessarily be higher than
for the negotiated procedure, because the lower boundary of the 95% interval (0.826) is
less than one.
The results offer evidence that the restricted procedure has a longer overall duration
of award process and a longer duration of delay than the negotiated procedure while
the probability of delay for the two award mechanisms do not differ significantly. These
findings undermine Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Next, we compare the accelerated restricted
procedure and the accelerated negotiated procedure to further check these findings.
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Table 5.5: Hazard Ratios of Alternative Award Mechanisms to the Negotiated Procedure
Cox model for duration of
award process
Cox model for duration of delay
exp(coef) lower .95 upper .95 exp(coef) lower .95 upper .95
Open procedure 1.610 1.293 2.003 1.150 0.826 1.601
Restricted procedure 0.660 0.532 0.820 0.691 0.502 0.950
Competitive dialogue 0.659 0.481 0.901 0.666 0.430 1.031
5.5.2 Additional Tests
We learn from the Kaplan-Meier Curves that the hazard of award is lower for the
accelerated restricted procedure than that the accelerated negotiated procedure. In both
the Kaplan-Meier Curves that describe the award process of all contracts (Figure 5.4) and
the award process after delay occurs (Figure 5.5), the lines for the accelerated negotiated
procedure always lie beneath those for the accelerated restricted procedure and reach 0%
more quickly.
The accelerated negotiated procedure is taken as the baseline category in the para-
metric estimates (Table 5.6). No significant difference is found in the estimates for the
two accelerated procedures.
5.5.3 Interpretation of Confounders
Table 5.4 also reflects features of control variables that are of interest. Estimates for
the response period and lots dummy show that a greater number of bidders implies a
longer overall award process (columns (1) and (2)), a higher probability of delay (column
3) and a longer duration of delay (column 4). Estimates for the log contract value, contract
duration and quality criterion dummy suggest that complex contracts and higher concerns
about quality are significantly associated with a longer overall award process, a higher
probability of delay and a longer duration of delay.19
19Reeves et al. (2015) find that the length of the overall process is positively but not strongly associated
with the capital value of PPP projects.
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Figure 5.4: Kaplan-Meier Curves for All Contracts (Accelerated Procedures)
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Centralised purchasing is likely to have a quicker award process. This prediction is in
accordance with the theoretical implication of a centralised decision making structure.
A counterintuitive finding is that more experience (measured by the sum of contracts)
corresponds to a longer award process, a higher probability of delay and a longer dura-
tion of delay. Experience may foster both actual capability and self-belief. However, an
individual may become over-confident when self-belief is disproportionately higher than
actual capability. Over-confidence makes people set a tight deadline that is unlikely to
be met. Moreover, over-confident people may devote insufficient effort to their work. The
estimates for experience suggest that UK public authorities may become over-confident as
they gain increasing experience with the negative impact of over-confidence dominating
the positive impact of more developed skills on decision speed.
The negative relationship between the planned award period and the probability of
delay support the speculation about over-confidence and competence. When a buyer sets
a more flexible deadline of award, time-overruns occur less frequently and the duration of
delay becomes shorter. The planned award period also reflects competence, as it is posi-
tively related to the duration of the overall award process. It is unlikely that the planned
award period represents the level of complexity because it has a negative correlation with
the probability of delay, while the traditional complexity measures (i.e. contract value
and duration) and quality concerns are positively correlated with the probability of delay.
The planned award period may also reflect the urgency of procurement because the result
shows that a shorter planned award period corresponds to a shorter award period.
5.6 Conclusions
Practitioners (e.g. Lynch, 2015 and Yescombe, 2007) and policymakers (e.g. UK
National Audit Office, 2007) tend to blame negotiation for a lengthy award process and
delays in contract award, but their claims are not supported by robust empirical evidence.
This is a motivation for the examination here of the relationship between award mech-
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anisms and decision speed in awarding UK public contracts. The empirical modelling
utilises the logit model and survival analysis, which are two complementary methods for
event analysis. We refer to the strategic management literature in identifying explanatory
variables and examine multiple factors in addition to the award mechanism.
Our results show that negotiations do not appear to slow down decision speed. Al-
though the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue both contain negotiation and
competitive dialogue is less tolerant of negotiation than the negotiated procedure, the
latter performs better than competitive dialogue regarding decision speed. With respect
to award decision speed and the probability of delay, the negotiated procedure dominates
the restricted procedure (which does not allow any negotiation) while the restricted pro-
cedure outperforms the competitive dialogue. We also highlight that the open procedure
(which does not allow negotiation either) is the most efficient award mechanism in both
saving time and preventing award delays.
According to our descriptive statistics, the award process (the total duration of the
response period, screening period and standstill period) is on average 122.98 days for the
open procedure, 217.25 days for the restricted procedure, 163.23 days for the negotiated
procedure, and 364.22 days for competitive dialogue (Table 5.1). More than 75% of
contracts with the negotiated procedure were awarded before or on the planned contract
start date, whereas the number is 50% for contracts awarded through the open procedure,
restricted procedure or competitive dialogue (Table 5.2).
When controlling for other determinants of decision speed, the more sophisticated
models in Table 5.4 generate results consistent with the descriptive statistics. The open
procedure is on average associated with the shortest duration of the overall award process
and the shortest duration of delay, followed by the negotiated procedure, the restricted
procedure and competitive dialogue. The probability of delay for the open procedure tends
to be the lowest followed again by the negotiated procedure, the restricted procedure and
competitive dialogue.
Results in Table 5.4 also imply that including more bidders, as suggested by a longer
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response period and the use of lots (and therefore considering more alternatives) may
slow down the award process. We show strong evidence that greater complexity and
higher quality concerns may reduce the award decision speed. We suggest public buyers
allocate more time to the overall award process when they intend to split a contract
into subcontracts or to advertise the planned procurement for a long time or when they
anticipate complex contracts.
Moreover, it is suspected that over-confidence grows with increasing experience and
imposes a negative impact on decision speed. The empirical models show that more
experience corresponds to a longer award process, a higher probability of delay and a
longer duration of delay. Competence, which is also likely to increase with accumulating
experience, would exhibit the opposite correlations with these decision speed measures.
It is a caveat that more experienced public buyers should be cautious about being over-
confident.
This study reveals several issues for future studies on decision speed in awarding
public contracts. First, this study analyses contracts that were successfully awarded but
what are the factors that lead to failure in awarding contracts? Second, the restricted
procedure differs from the open procedure by allowing for an additional prequalification
and differs from the negotiated procedure by not allowing for negotiation. However, the
restricted procedure underperforms the open procedure and the negotiated procedure. It
would be interesting to investigate the cause of this phenomenon. Lastly, compared with
the negotiated procedure, competitive dialogue replace negotiations in the final stage with
competitive bidding. The purpose of this change is to curb endless haggling in negotiation.
However, why is it the case that competitive dialogue is on average lengthier than the
negotiated procedure?
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Appendix A: Non-parametric Methods to Describe Event Occur-
rence Data
Appendix A introduces the life table and its components, which are fundamental
nonparametric techniques to describe event occurrence data. Methods to construct a life
table for discrete- and continuous-time event occurrence data are discussed in sequence.
This appendix is based on Singer and Willett (2003) and Kleinbaum and Klein (2012).
A.1 Life Table
The life table is a fundamental tool for describing both discrete- and continuous-time
data. The hazard function, the survival function and the median lifetime are the three
essential components of a life table. The methods to estimate the hazard and survival
functions are relatively straightforward for discrete-time data. For continuous-time data
the estimation is more complicated. The approaches include the grouped strategies rep-
resented by the discrete-time method and the actuarial method and ungrouped strategy
represented by the Kaplan-Meier method.
To construct a life table and to estimate the hazard function, survival function and
median lifetime, we need information on the time intervals, the number of individuals
in the risk set at the beginning of each time interval, the number of events during each
time interval and the number of censored observations during each time interval. The
time interval is the key to hazard estimation. Hazard is a conditional probability of event
occurrence defined within a specific time interval. Whenever stating a hazard, the time
interval of the hazard must be provided. In a life table, the lengths of all time intervals
need not be the same. The intervals in later stages may be greater to accommodate
sufficiently large risk sets.
The risk set is a collection of individuals who have not encountered the target event
by the beginning of the current time interval and who are at risk of experiencing the
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target event during the current time interval. In most studies, including this one, data
are right-censored. The right-censored observations are those that have not encountered
the target event during the observed time and that are not tracked thereafter.
A.2 Methods for Discrete-Time Data
When describing discrete-time data, the widths of time intervals are determined sub-
jectively and are subject to constraints of the metric for time recording. The width of
the time interval can be the same as the metric for time recording or be coarser than the
recording metric.
The discrete hazard rate is defined as the conditional probability that individual i
experience the event in interval j, on condition that the individual has not experienced
the event in any past interval. Mathematically, the statement is expressed as
h(tij) = Pr [Ti = j|Ti ≥ j] , (5.9)
where T indicates event time and t is an arbitrary division of time. The estimate of the
discrete time hazard in interval j is computed as the number of events that took place in
interval j divided by the number of individuals at risk during interval j:
hˆ(tj) =
n eventsj
n at riskj
. (5.10)
Hereafter, n stands for “the number of individuals”. Since the discrete-time hazard is a
probability, it is bounded between 0 and 1 inclusively.
The survival probability for discrete-time data is the probability that individual i
survives past interval j:
S(tij) = Pr [Ti > j] . (5.11)
If the data are not right-censored, the estimates of survival probability at the end of
interval j can be expressed as the number of individuals who have not experience the
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event by the end of interval j divided by the number of individuals in the risk set at the
starting point of the study time window:
Sˆ(tj) =
n who have not experienced the event by the end of interval j
n at the starting point
. (5.12)
If the right-censoring appears in interval k, Equation 5.12 cannot be used to estimate the
survival probability from interval k onwards (including interval k). The reason is that the
event times of the censored individuals are unknown. This problem can be circumvented
by applying the formula below:
Sˆ(tj) = Sˆ(tj−1)
[
1− hˆ(tj)
]
. (5.13)
The estimated survival probability in interval j is the product of the estimated survival
probability in the previous interval and the difference between one and the estimated
hazard probability in interval j. The formula can be rewritten as:
Sˆ(tj) =
[
1− hˆ(t1)
] [
1− hˆ(t2)
]
...
[
1− hˆ(tj)
]
. (5.14)
The median lifetime can be estimated by linear interpolation using the two sample
survival probabilities that are immediately adjacent to 0.5 (Miller, 1981). Denote p as
the lower bound of interval m which has a sample survival probability Sˆ(tm) just above
0.5 and q as the lower bound of interval m + 1 which has a sample survival probability
Sˆ(tm+1) just below 0.5 (q is the upper bound of interval m), then
Estimated median lifetime = p+
[
Sˆ(tm)− 0.5
Sˆ(tm)− Sˆ(tm+1)
]
(q − p) (5.15)
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A.3 Comparing Discrete- and Continuous-Time Hazard and Survival Func-
tions
Continuous-time data can be taken as the limit of discrete-time data by assuming that
each interval becomes infinitesimal, giving innumerable continuous instants t1, t2, ..., tj. As
each interval approaches 0, the probability that an event is observed at a particular instant
and the probability of ties also infinitely approaches 0.
Letting Ti represents the event time for individual i, individual i’s the hazard at time
tj is:
h(tij) = lim
∆t→0
{
Pr [Ti is in the interval(tj, tj + ∆t)|Ti ≥ tj)]
∆t
}
. (5.16)
In contrasting to discrete-time hazard, which is a conditional probability, the continuous-
time hazard is a rate. A hazard rate is obtained by dividing a given hazard probability by
a period of time. While a hazard probability is bounded by 0 and 1 inclusively, a hazard
rate has a lower limit of 0 and has no upper limit.
The definition of the survival function in continuous time is similar to that in discrete
time (Equation 5.12), but the survival probability is defined at an instant of time tj
instead of over a period of time, interval j:
S(tij) = Pr [Ti > tj] . (5.17)
A.4 Methods for Continuous-Time Data
This section introduces the grouped and ungrouped approaches to describe continuous-
time data. The grouped estimation strategies include the discrete-time method and the
actuarial method. They allow dividing continuous time into arbitrary time intervals.
The ungrouped strategy, i.e. the Kaplan-Meier method, is superior to grouped strategies
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because it constructs time intervals using the actual event times. We also introduce the
cumulative hazard function which overcomes the limitation of the continuous-time hazard
function.
Discrete-time method. The discrete-time method to describe continuous-time data
shares an identical computational algorithm with the method to describe discrete-time
data. The discrete-time method evolves from the definition of discrete-time hazard. Here
we denote the discrete-time hazard as pˆ(tj) to distinguish it from the continuous-time
hazard rate.
pˆ(tj) =
n eventsj
n at riskj
. (5.18)
pˆ(tj) is a conditional probability of event occurrence in interval j.
Denoting widthj as the width of interval j, then the continuous-time hazard rate,
hˆ(tj), which is expressed in per unit of time, is:
hˆ(tj) =
pˆ(tj)
widthj
. (5.19)
The estimated continuous-time survival probability at the end of interval j is:
Sˆ(tj) = [1− pˆ(t1)] [1− pˆ(t2)] ... [1− pˆ(tj)] . (5.20)
The discrete-time method assumes that all events and censoring take place at the endpoint
of each interval.
Actuarial method. The actuarial method (also known as the life-table method) is
similar to the discrete-time method. However, it posits different assumptions about event
occurrence and censoring. It assumes that events and censoring occur randomly and
evenly in each interval. For the survival function, the number of individuals at risk of
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surviving past the end of interval j is:
n′ at riskj = n at riskj − n censoredj
2
. (5.21)
The estimated continuous-time survival probability under the actuarial method is ob-
tained by replacing n at riskj with n
′ at riskj in equation 5.18 and applying this equation
into equation 5.20.
For the hazard function, the number of individuals at risk of event occurrence during
the interval j is:
n′′ at riskj = n at riskj − n censoredj
2
− n eventsj
2
. (5.22)
This demonstrates that both the occurring events and censoring would diminish the risk
set. The actuarial estimator of the continuous-time hazard rate is produced by replacing
n at riskj with n
′′ at riskj in Equation 5.18 and applying this equation into Equation
5.19.
Kaplan-Meier method. The Kaplan-Meier method (also known as the product-limit
method) develops the discrete-time method by breaking down the observed time horizon
into intervals using the actual event time so that each interval contains only one observed
event. Each interval is closed at the left and open at the right. The first interval starts
from time interval 0 and ends at the first event time. For the subsequent intervals,
the upper limit is one observed event time, and the lower limit is the immediate next
observed event time. If a censoring and an observed event time coincide, the Kaplan-
Meier method assumes that the event occurred ahead of censoring and includes the tied
censored observation and the observed event in the same time interval. The Kaplan-Meier
hazard and survival functions are estimated by applying Equations 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20 in
the discrete-time method.
The hazard function is not as informative for continuous-time data as for discrete-time
data. The hazard estimates derived by the grouped methods depend on an artificial time
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intervals and may be too coarse to reveal more detailed insights. The hazard estimates
from the Kaplan-Meier method are not directly comparable with one another because the
width of each interval varies greatly.
The cumulative hazard function aggregates the hazard over time and is not subject
to either of the two problems mentioned above. The cumulative hazard function is the
integral of the hazard function between integration limits of t0 and tj:
H(tij) =
∫ tj
t0
h(tij)dtij. (5.23)
Since a hazard function is the first derivative of its cumulative hazard function, the level
of unique risk at each instant can be deduced by examining the shape of the cumulative
hazard function. For instance, the slope of the cumulative hazard function is constant.
Appendix B: Hazard Models
As a supplement to Section 5.4.2, this appendix introduces the hazard models that
explore whether and how the risk of event occurrence can be predicted by or attributed
to particular factors. We start from the simpler discrete-time hazard model and move
to the Cox (semi-parametric) and parametric models for continuous-time data. After
introducing of these models, we justify the use of the Cox proportional hazard model in
this study. Appendix B is based on Singer and Willett (2003) and Kleinbaum and Klein
(2012).
The models are presented in the context of public procurement, which takes awarding a
contract as the event of interest, the dispatch date of CN denoted by tCN as the beginning
of time, and days as the metric of time. For the simplicity of demonstration, a dummy
variable X1 indicating the type of award mechanism is introduced as the single substantive
predictor in the models (X1 = 0 for the negotiated procedure and X1 = 1 for the remaining
procedures). Additional time variant and invariant substantive predictors can be added
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into the models easily.
B.1 Discrete-Time Hazard Models
The basic discrete-time hazard model transforms the hazard function using a logit (log
odds) link, which is the natural logarithm of odds:
logit = loge(odds) = loge
(
probability
1− probability
)
. (5.24)
Such transformation addresses the bounded nature of the discrete-time hazard, which
must lie between 0 and 1.
The hazard for contract i to be awarded in interval j is denoted as h(tij). Use
D1ij, D2ij, ..., DJij to represent J intervals that consist of the observation period. Each
time indicator DJij takes the value 1 for the interval it represents and 0 for other intervals.
The discrete-time hazard model is written as:
logit h(tij) = [α1D1ij + α2D2ij + ...+ αJDJij] + β1X1ij. (5.25)
Each intercept parameter αJ represents the baseline logit hazard in interval J . The slope
parameter β1 assesses the per unit partial effect of the change in predictor X1, i.e. the
difference between using and not using the negotiated procedure. The shapes of the logit
hazard functions for contracts with and without the negotiated procedure are identical
because they both are based on the baseline logit hazard with an additive value β1X1ij.
The basic discrete-time hazard model postulates the proportional odds assumption.
Since odds = elogit, the estimated odds ratio of non-negotiated procedure (X1ij = 1) to
negotiated procedure (X1ij = 0) for interval j is:
Estimated odds ratio for interval j =
eαˆjDj+β1
eαˆjDj
= eβˆ1 , (5.26)
which is independent of time. The hazard function can be obtained by applying the
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inverse transformation probability = 1
1+e−logit :
h(tij) =
1
1 + e−{ [α1D1ij+α2D2ij+...+αJDJij]+β1X1ij}
. (5.27)
An alternative transformation link to overcome theoretically impossible fitted hazard
values (those below 0 or above 1) for discrete-time data is the complementary log-log
transformation, often denoted as clog − log:
clog − log = log(−log(1− probability)). (5.28)
The general model using the clog-log link is:
clog − log h(tij) = [α1D1ij + α2D2ij + ...+ αJDJij] + β1X1ij. (5.29)
The inverse transformation is probability = 1− e(−e(clog−log)). Unlike the logit model, the
clog-log model proposes the proportional hazards assumption that the hazards ratio of
non-negotiated procedures (X1ij = 1) to the negotiated procedure (X1ij = 0) for interval
j is eβ1 , which is time invariant.
Compared with the logit model, the clog-log model is most helpful when the data are
truly continuous-time but measured in discrete-time (Hosmer et al., 2013, Prentice and
Gloeckler, 1978). If data are truly discrete time, then the clog-log transformation offers
no advantages over the simpler logit transformation. However, the Cox regression model
for continuous data (which is discussed in Appendix B.2) and the clog-log model share
the proportional hazard assumption. This identical assumption makes the clog-log model
a discrete analogue of the Cox regression model (Allison, 1982).
B.2 Semi-parametric Cox Regression Model
The Cox proportional hazard model (Cox PH model) initiated by Cox (1992) is a pop-
ular model for continuous-time survival analysis. Unlike a probability that is bounded
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between 0 and 1, the continuous-time hazard is a rate that is greater than 0. The Cox
PH model uses the logarithm, which is defined over values greater than 0, as the trans-
formation link. The model consists of a baseline function, log h0(tj), which is the baseline
log hazard when all predictors are 0, and a weighted linear combination of predictors. A
Cox PH model with a single predictor is
log h(tij) = log h0(tj) + β1X1ij. (5.30)
and the antilog form of the model is
h(tij) = h0(tj)e
β1X1ij (5.31)
The Cox PH model imposes no assumption about the distribution of event occurrence
over time. In this sense, the Cox PH model is not strictly parametric. It generalises the
Kaplan-Meier approach and relies on only the ranks of observed event times (Kalbfleisch
and Prentice, 2011). Therefore, the baseline hazard and survival functions are not speci-
fied.
The Cox PH model is also not strictly nonparametric. It is better to label the model
as “semi-parametric”. The model involves parametric assumptions that establish links
between predictors and hazard. Among those assumptions, the most notable is the pro-
portional hazards assumption, which states that the per unit effect of each predictor on
the baseline hazard function remains the same over time. The hazard ratio comparing
the estimated hazards when X1 = c and when X1 = c+ 1, where c is a constant, is always
eβ1 :
Hazard ratio =
h0(tj)e
β1(c+1)
h0(tj)eβ1c
= eβ1 . (5.32)
Estimates from the Cox PH model are not reliable if the proportional hazards assump-
tion is not met. A caveat for using the Cox PH model is to evaluate the proportional
hazards assumption. It is worth noting that the proportional hazards assumption can
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be relaxed and the Cox PH model can be extended to data in which the proportionality
assumption does not hold. When a predictor violates the proportional hazard assump-
tion, there are two standard solutions for acknowledging the multiple baseline hazard
functions: (1) to apply a stratified model that uses the predictor to define multiple strata
if the predictor is not of research interest; (2) to fit a model that includes the interaction
between the predictor and time if the predictor is of research interest.
Making no assumptions about the distribution of the baseline hazard function involves
tradeoffs. The Cox regression provides no estimate of the hazard function. However, this
cost is bearable as the effects of predictors on the hazard function rather than the hazard
function are of primary interest for most studies. The Cox regression model can be
used to evaluate the effects of predictors on the hazard rate without invoking unrealistic
assumptions on the distribution of the baseline hazard function.
The shape of the baseline hazard function h0(tj) is in effect irrelevant because h0(tj)
is eliminated in the partial likelihood estimation process to estimate the coefficients of
predictors. Contract i’s contribution to the partial likelihood at t∗ij is
h(t∗ij)∑
risk set at t∗
ij
h(t∗ij)
.
The partial likelihood represents the probability of observing the actual event data as a
function of unknown population parameters. The partial likelihood can be obtained by
multiplying all the contributions of all contracts:
Partial likelihood =
∏
noncensored individuals
h(t∗ij)∑
risk set at t∗ij
h(t∗ij)
=
∏
noncensored individuals
h0(tj)e
β1X1ij∑
risk set at t∗ij
h0(tj)eβ1X1ij
=
∏
noncensored individuals
eβ1X1ij∑
risk set at t∗ij
eβ1X1ij
.
(5.33)
Equation 5.33 shows that the baseline hazard function h0(tj) has been taken into account,
but its effect is cancelled out.
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B.3 Parametric Continuous-Time Hazard Model
Unlike the Cox regression model, which imposes no assumption about the distribution
of hazard, the parametric models assume that the hazard follows some family of distri-
butions. The popular distributions for parametric survival models are the Weibull, the
exponential (which is a special case of Weibull), the log-logistic, the log-normal, and the
generalised gamma. Because this research uses only the Cox PH model, we do not go
further about the parametric models.20
B.4 Justification for Using the Cox PH Model
The discrete-time hazard model is not ideal for this study because the data are recorded
using a fine-grained time metric of days and should be taken as continuous-time data.
We adopt the Cox model instead of the parametric models because we are not concerned
about estimating the absolute level of hazard. By doing so, we avoid making assumptions
about the shape of the hazard functions and are still able to estimate the relationship
between the hazard and different factors.
The Schoenfeld residual (Schoenfeld, 1982) is used to test the appropriateness of the
proportional hazard assumption. A Schoenfeld residual for a predictor, X, is computed as
the difference between contract i’s value of X and the expected value of X among other
contracts that are in the risk set when i experiences the event:
Sˆi(X) = xi − expectedi(X). (5.34)
If the proportional hazards assumption holds, the Schoenfeld residuals are unrelated to
time so that a plot of Schoenfeld residual against time should be generally horizontal and
reveal no consistent trend. Because these features are true for both our Cox PH models for
the duration of delay and the overall award process, the proportional hazards assumption
20Details of the parametric models are covered in Chapter 7 by Kleinbaum and Klein (2012).
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is likely to hold in our models. Therefore, we stay with the Cox PH models and do not
relax the proportional hazards assumption.
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Chapter 6
Study 3: Discretion, Corruption and Competition in
Public Procurement: a Cross-country Analysis
6.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the association between discretion, corruption and competition
in EU public procurement contracts. According to the World Bank, the annual bribe
costs over the globe is $1.5 trillion, which is equivalent to around 2% of the global GDP.1
Corruption is a principal-agent problem (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002, Lambert-Mogiliansky
and Sonin, 2006, Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Procuring authorities (i.e. contracting authori-
ties or public buyers) appoint internal officials or external companies as procuring agents
to select contractors. Corruption occurs when a procuring agent misuses its discretion in
exchange for bribe payment rather than acting on behalf of the interest of the procuring
authority. Previous chapters assume that the procuring agent’s interest is in line with the
procuring authority and do not differentiate the procuring agent from the procuring au-
thority because the principal-agent problem is not a focus in these chapters. This chapter
treats the procuring authority and agent as different subjects.
A well-established theoretical literature indicates that causation goes both ways be-
tween corruption and competition. Bliss and Di Tella (1997), Burguet and Che (2004),
Compte et al. (2005) and Romer (1994) examine how corruption affects competition; Ades
and Di Tella (1999), Bliss and Di Tella (1997), Celentani and Ganuza (2002) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) analyse how competition affects corruption. Most relevant empirical
1See the World Bank webiste http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/
anti-corruption.
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studies focus instead on how corruption affects economic growth and investment (Mauro,
1995, Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda, 2006, Me´on and Sekkat, 2005). Coviello et al. (2018) and
Knack et al. (2017) are among the very few empirical papers that have systematically
explored the relationship between corruption and competition in the context of public
procurement.
Public procurement may be particularly revealing about the economic impact of cor-
ruption. On the one hand, the choice of an award mechanism that allows high discretion
(e.g. negotiation, prequalification or debarment, and scoring auctions) may be an indica-
tor that the procuring agent is not acting solely to obtain best value for money in public
procurement. On the other hand, to mitigate corruption, regulators are likely to impose
more rigid award mechanisms (e.g. price-only auctions) (Chong et al., 2012).
This study makes the following contributions. First, based on the revenue equivalence
theorem and the extensive form game, we model a mechanism of the interaction between
discretion and corruption, which in turn drives honest bidders out. Although many stud-
ies on discretion or corruption have described this link between discretion and corruption,
few formal models exist. Second, this study augments the recently growing literature
on procurement outcomes (Albano et al., 2017, Baldi et al., 2016, Coviello et al., 2018,
Hyytinen et al., 2018, Lewis and Bajari, 2011, Spagnolo, 2012). Using data for the 28
EU member countries, Iceland and Norway over the period 2012–2015, we conduct a sys-
tematic study on the links between discretion, corruption and competition in EU public
procurement. We separately analyse discretion and corruption levels by measuring dis-
cretion with award mechanism and a quality criterion dummy and measuring corruption
with a corruption perception index (CPI). While many studies on procurement outcomes
proxy discretion by award mechanisms, we find that only Coviello et al. (2018) and Knack
et al. (2017) have considered discretion and corruption simultaneously. Third, we compare
the four benchmark award mechanisms in the EU public procurement and their links to
procurement outcomes (e.g. the number of bidders and rebates).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 is a review of relevant
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literature of corruption separate and in addition to the literature of award mechanism in
Chapter 3. Section 6.3 proposes a game theory model that shows the links between discre-
tion, corruption and competition. Section 6.4 puts forward the hypotheses and describes
the data. Section 6.5 presents the results. Section 6.6 is the conclusion. The Appendix
discusses the presentation of an extensive-form game and the distinctions between the
imperfect information game and the incomplete information game.
6.2 General Consideration and Literature Review
This section is a literature review on corruption and competition that is linked and
additional to the literature review on award mechanism in Chapter 3. Section 6.2.1
discusses the general terms why we expect a relationship between award mechanism and
corruption. It explains how award mechanisms allow for various levels of discretion and
thus various possibility of corruption and why corruption is inherently difficult to research.
The subsequent subsections review the factors that may interact with or influence
competition in public procurement. Section 6.2.2 explains when and why discretion for
procuring agent should be allowed. Section 6.2.3 discusses how corruption is related to
competition. Section 6.2.4 discusses other determinants of competition and thus provides
clues of the variables that we should control for in the empirical analysis. Readers may
wish to skip Section 6.2.4.
The discussions in Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 show that influential factors on com-
petition (i.e. the number of participants and price) include discretion of the procuring
agent, corruption, contract complexity, demand, transparency and collusion, market open-
ness, and legal origin. The discussions highlight discretion and corruption as important
interacting factors. These two intertwined factors closely link not only to the competition
but also to many of the other factors.
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6.2.1 Award Mechanisms with Considerations of Corruption
Award mechanisms can be designed to combat corruptions, but they can also be
channels for corruption. In public procurement, the award procedure may contain a pre-
selection process, which allows discretion of the procuring agent. The EU allows four
benchmark award mechanisms: the open, restricted, negotiated and competitive dialogue
procedures.2 All these benchmark award mechanisms, except for the open procedure,
contain a process of pre-selection. The pre-selection entitles the procuring agent to apply
additional (subjective) selection criteria, which are supposed to be tailored to the unique
requirements of the purchase, to exclude bidders with(out) certain attributes and to limit
the number of bidders.
Negotiations offer additional room for discretion. The negotiated procedure and the
competitive dialogue allow negotiations on non-verifiable quality aspects. Corruption
may still be possible even in cases of the open and restricted procedures where there is no
negotiation if the award criteria are not purely price-based. The procuring agents have
discretion in scoring auctions, which takes into account more subjective criteria than price,
such as supplier reputation and technical design. In these cases, the procuring agents can
tilt the award criteria towards the subjective criteria and put less weight on price.
A biased procuring agent may exert his discretion in favour of the groups that have
close relationships with him in exchange for monetary or non-monetary benefits paid
in advance, on the spot or in the future. As this chapter argues, whichever the form
of benefits that the procuring agent receives and whenever the benefits are received,
the economic consequences of fraudulent conduct on procurement are the same: the
competitive environment is compromised and a bidder who has offered any benefits to the
procuring agent is more likely to win the contract; the public buyer pays a higher price
for worse quality.
Although it is a widely accepted idea that corruption adversely affects the entry and
2See Chapter 2 for detailed comparison of these four benchmark award mechanisms.
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therefore the contract rebates, little direct empirical evidence has been offered. This is
because corruption, as a hidden action, is inherently difficult to measure. Instead, the lit-
erature inclines to uncover the relationship between procurement outcome and discretion,
which is usually measured by award mechanisms (Baldi et al., 2016, Lewis and Bajari,
2011, Spagnolo, 2012).
6.2.2 Discretion
Rule-based award mechanisms (e.g. price-only auctions) usually include a large num-
ber of bidders to strengthen competition. However, Samuelson (1985) demonstrates that
when there are entry costs and the number of bidders becomes very large, it is likely
that an additional bidder brings little or no social welfare because the probability that an
additional bidder shares the similar profile with an existing bidder becomes higher. In the
meanwhile, more bidders incur bid preparation costs and opportunity costs. As a result,
the discretion to limit the number of bidders may improve the net social welfare.
When the contract is complex, the advantages of discretion over rule-based award
mechanism are greater. Even when quality is verifiable, it may be expensive for the
public buyer to specify the award rules and the costs of screening bids is high. When
quality cannot be easily verified, pure price competition cannot attract competent bidders
(Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). More competent bidders usually have more opportunities
and can acquire a better rate of return from alternative businesses, so they are likely
to withdraw from fierce price competition, which they deem to be unprofitable. In this
latter case, pure price competition chooses a winner who asks for the lowest price but
provides the lowest level of non-contractible quality (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Manelli
and Vincent, 1995).
These quality concerns often justify the discretionary power of procuring agents in
awarding contracts (Compte et al., 2005). To limit participation by prequalifying bidders
would motivate bidders to work towards higher quality, even when the quality is non-
contractible (Albano et al., 2017, Branco, 1997, Che, 1993, Cripps and Ireland, 1994,
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Spagnolo, 2012). In addition, negotiation with a limited number of reputable bidders
fosters understanding of a complex contract and improves contract design (Bajari and
Tadelis, 2001, Manelli and Vincent, 1995). Also, negotiation is compatible with the cost-
plus compensation rule, which accommodates ex post renegotiation well.3
The benefits introduced by the discretionary power are not without costs. Abuse of
discretion induces corruption (i.e. exchanging a biased decision for bribes) which is often
accompanied by collusion between suppliers (Burguet and Che, 2004, Compte et al., 2005,
Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin, 2006).
6.2.3 Corruption and Competition
Corruption of public officials does not appear as a central topic of academic study
until the late twentieth century. It emerged as a political or philosophical concept and
was later coded in laws and was subsequently and successively analysed by sociologists,
anthropologists and economists (Williams, 2000).4
Rose-Ackerman (1975) started the modern research into the economics of corruption
by discussing penalties to dispel incentives of firms to offer bribes and incentives of public
officials to accept bribes. Rose-Ackerman (1978) is among the first studies that link
corruption with competition. In her case of distributing a scarce government good when
inter-official (political) competition is possible, she contends that the existence of a small
number of honest officials forces all public officials to behave honestly.
Corruption can be considered as a cost of doing business. For suppliers, corruption is
similar to tariff and non-tariff barriers, tax rate, restrictions on ownership and regulation
requirements in the sense that they all reduce the revenue stream and discourages firms
from making an initial fixed investment (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005, Romer, 1994).
3See Section 3.4.2 for detailed discussion of the relationship between award mechanism and compen-
sation rules.
4Williams (2000) keeps track of the development of studies in corruption. It is a collection that contains
selected papers since 1961 and consists of four volumes entitled “Explaining Corruption”, “Corruption
in the Developing World”, “Corruption in the Developed World” and “Controlling Corruption”.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) take bribes as an analogue of tax which is a markup on price
but show that uncoordinated bribe taking schemes are much more costly than taxation.
In addition to the relationship between corruption and competition, the literature
also examines how administrative decentralisation is related to corruption (Fan et al.,
2009, Fisman and Gatti, 2002, Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010, Rose-Ackerman, 1975,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) and how corruption facilitates collusion (Compte et al., 2005,
Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin, 2006).
The consensus of the literature is that two-way causality exists in the relationship
between corruption and competition. The theoretical impact of corruption on competition
almost uniformly refers to competition among bidders. Corruption suppresses the number
of potential bidders by affecting the amount of gains and it softens price competition. By
contrast, the effects of competition on corruption arise for several reasons. The rest
of this section reviews the literature on how corruption influences competition and the
literature on the impacts of different competitions among bidders, contracting authorities,
and government servants on corruption.
6.2.3.1 Corruption as a Determinant of Competition
Corruption is a principal-agent problem (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002, Lambert-Mogiliansky
and Sonin, 2006, Rose-Ackerman, 1975). An agent is hired to operate on behalf of a
government or non-government organisation to make decisions. However, the procuring
agent’s discretionary power nurtures corruption, which would never be an issue without
delegation (Burguet and Che, 2004, Rose-Ackerman, 1975). A corrupted agent places his
own interest ahead of the interest of the organisation when he exchanges discretion for
bribes. Corruption may take place in the cases of dispensing government goods, such as
construction licences (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), and purchasing goods and services, i.e.
public procurement (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002, Compte et al., 2005).
Without corruption and under perfect information, a procurement contract is awarded
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to an efficient firm that offers the best price-quality combination (Burguet and Che,
2004, Compte et al., 2005). With corruption, the efficient allocation is compromised.
Inefficient firms get a higher chance to win on favourable terms at the cost of public
buyers. This is the case whether contract and bribe competitions take place sequentially
or simultaneously.5 Bribe competition can affect the participation of the bidders (and
therefore the identity of the winner) and the extent of competition (and thus the terms
of the contracts) (Rose-Ackerman, 1975).
Price and quality are two fundamental elements of a procurement contract. A procur-
ing agent may favour a briber by accepting the briber’s bid with a higher price or poorer
quality than the best possible price-quality combination. Allowing price to change for a
given quality is essentially the same as allowing quality to change for a given price (though
varying quality for a given price is a more complicated case to analyse) (Rose-Ackerman,
1975).
In the context of procurement, for suppliers, paying bribes is a cost in addition to
the cost of production and overhead costs. It is likely to have impacts on competition
from two aspects. First, grafts (i.e. the expected bribe payment) may reduce the number
of participants. Graft acts as a tax on ex post profits and the diminished profitability
makes it less attractive to make initial fixed cost investment and pay for overhead costs
(Bliss and Di Tella, 1997, Romer, 1994). This is especially likely to expel small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) because SMEs tend to have fewer resources to establish
a connection with the procuring agent and make initial investments (Davoodi and Tanzi,
2002). According to Bliss and Di Tella (1997), corruption generates surpluses from cost
structure of firms. Because efficient firms have a greater surplus than inefficient firms do,
a corrupt procuring agent has an incentive to drive out inefficient firms so that it can
milk more bribes from efficient firms. Moreover, corruption can aggravate the opaqueness
of the selection process, which in turn hampers the ability of bidders, especially foreign
5Compte et al. (2005) analyse the effect of corruption on competition in procurement in a situation
when contract competition is followed by a bribery competition, the winner of which is given a chance
to modify its initial bid and undercut its rivals. Burguet and Che (2004) show that procuring agent is
biased towards the bribe competition winner in tender assessment when bidders are in a competition that
evaluates prices, quality and bribes simultaneously.
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bidders, to bid (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005).
The second impact of corruption is to soften price competition. Firms with a close
connection with the procuring agent often hope to gain protection in public procurement
and discourage competition (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999). With protection, a seller
would bid at a higher price so that his increased cost due to bribe would be compensated by
the higher payment (Burguet and Che, 2004). However, this compensation transfers cost
from the briber to the public buyer. Compte et al. (2005) show that in procurement where
the firm offering the highest bribe can be allowed to resubmit its bid, the competing firms
share a joint interest to set initial offer prices to a high level. Such collusion between
competing firms inflates the price by more than the amount of bribe received by the
procuring agent.
If the the procuring agent’s discretionary power is limited, the existence of honest
efficient firms may restore price competition (Burguet and Che, 2004, Compte et al.,
2005). To win a contract, an honest efficient firm has to compete with bribe payers by
offering a sufficiently low price in order to overcome its comparative disadvantage in bribe
competition. The sufficiently low price is high enough to make the efficient firm stay
profitable but low enough to leave no profits for less-efficient firms who have a higher
tendency to bribe procuring agents.
However, when the government agent has substantial discretionary power (awarding
a contract to a firm who did not offer the lowest price), more cost-efficient firms face a
lower probability of winning (Burguet and Che, 2004). To secure a win without paying
bribes, a firm has to bid at a price that is unprofitable (Compte et al., 2005). Indeed,
a more efficient firm can choose to outbribe inefficient firms, but outbribing would not
ensure a more efficient firm to win all offers (Burguet and Che, 2004). Less efficient firms
could response by randomising the bribes to make it very costly (if not impossible) for
the more efficient firms to be an ever-victorious winner.
One should note that a more efficient firm can also benefit from the softened price
competition by colluding with less efficient firms (Burguet and Che, 2004). In this case,
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when the procuring agent has large discretionary power, corruption facilitates collusion.
The more efficient firm remains in the market but it no longer hardens price competition.
In sum, corruption as an additional transaction cost affects competition through three
paths. First, a bidder who may act dishonestly and will internalise its cost of the bribe is
discouraged from entering the tender because they expect lower net profits after paying
bribes (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997, Davoodi and Tanzi, 2002, Romer, 1994, Rose-Ackerman,
1975). Second, a corrupt procuring agent is motivated to drive inefficient bidders out so
that it can ask for higher bribes from more efficient bidders who tend to have a larger
surplus (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). Third, bidders build the costs of bribe into their bids,
which inflates the price paid by the public buyer (Burguet and Che, 2004, Compte et al.,
2005). The direct impact through the first and second path is shrinking the number of
bidders.6 The direct impact through the third path is softening price competition.
6.2.3.2 Competition as a Determinant of Corruption
Competition (in this context of competition as a determinant of corruption) has several
meanings. It can refer to competition among bidders, to inter-jurisdictional competition
among different authorities and to competition for the position of procuring agent. Here
we briefly review how these three forms of competitions affect corruption.
The theoretical impact of competition of bidders on corruption is inconclusive. Bliss
and Di Tella (1997) propose that the equilibrium number of firms and the level of the
graft are endogenously determined by what they call deep competition parameters such
as overheads costs and fixed costs of suppliers. According to them, an increase in the
deep competition parameters has uncertain effects on the level of graft per firm. In-
creasing competition drives out the least efficient firms and makes the remaining firms
more profitable. Therefore, the remaining firms are more able to pay bribes. However,
when the competition becomes very intensified, only a small proportion of firms remain
6The revenue equivalence theorem (see Section 3.4.1) show that a reduction in the number of bidders
will ultimately increase the prices charged by the remaining bidders if the remaining bidders expect such
reduction in the number of participants.
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and those firms are likely to have similar production functions with close overhead costs.
None of the remaining firms may meet additional graft request. Ades and Di Tella (1999)
emphasise the interaction of bidders’ competition with public sectors’ incentive scheme.
Softer competition leaves firms with higher rents, which induce the procuring agent to
manipulate the selection to obtain bribes. However, in the meanwhile, the public sector
has a higher incentive to strengthen supervision on the procuring agent and to increase
penalties for corruptive conducts.
Increased inter-jurisdictional competition predicts lower levels of corruption across
localities. Rose-Ackerman (1978) proposes that when allocating a scarce resource, the ex-
istence of a few honest procuring agents who refuse to accept bribes rebuilds honesty in all
bureaucracies because applicants have alternative choices if they are asked to pay bribes.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) note the similarities between inter-jurisdictional competi-
tion and competition in the product market and argue that the competition reduces the
room for rent extraction by procuring agents. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) compare joint
monopoly (i.e. centralised or cooperated) corruption, independent monopolistic corrup-
tion and competitive corruption and demonstrate that the level of bribes is the lowest in
the third case, where competition between bureaucracies drives bribe levels to zero.
Celentani and Ganuza (2002) discuss the cases when increased competition for the
position of procuring agent may lead to a higher probability of corruption and when it
may have no impact on corruption. Public sectors rely on the expertise of procuring
agents to verify quality and feasibility. It is likely that the increased competition for the
position leads to employing procuring agents with higher ability. More capable procuring
agents have a lower marginal cost of evaluating bids and verifying the surplus retained
by bidders. With better knowledge of bidders’ production functions, procuring agents
are able to extract a greater proportion of surplus through corruption so the probability
of corruption is higher. The probability of corruption and level of the bribe may also
be higher if the increased competition implies a lower wage differential between more
capable and less capable procuring agents.7 In this case, procuring agents may have
7Ades and Di Tella (1999) summarise that businesspeople hold a point of view that to raise the wages
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an incentive to make up for the relatively low wage through receiving bribes. However,
when the competition causes wage differentials, the procuring agents become less prone
to corruption. Once the criminal malfeasance is exposed, the guilty procuring agent is
punished through dismissal. Deprivation of job and loss of wages are potential costs of
corruptive actions (Treisman, 2000). Higher salaries suggest a higher cost of misconducts
and are more likely to align procuring agents’ behaviour with the objectives of the public
sector (Becker and Stigler, 1974).
6.2.4 Other Determinants of Competition in Public Procurement
In addition to corruption, contract specific factors, e.g. complexity and demand, and
macro factors, e.g. information barriers, market openness and a nation’s legal framework,
also affect competition in public procurement. This subsection reviews research on these
additional determinants of competition.
This literature review helps identify control variables in our empirical regressions. It
also further highlights the important roles of discretion and corruption in competition by
showing the links between discretion, corruption and these other factors. Readers may
skip the detail in the remainder of this subsection.
6.2.4.1 Complexity
More complex contracts are likely to have more non-contractible qualitative consider-
ations (Tadelis and Bajari, 2006). Bidders incur more costs to evaluate the profitability to
carry out a complex contract and to prepare tendering documents, i.e. high entry costs.
The entry costs are a component of the total costs. Bidders will keep entering into the
competition until the intensified competition drives their expected profit down to their
expected costs (French and McCormick, 1984).
of public officials is likely to dismiss the incentives of corruption.
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Fewer bidders may compete for a complex contract when the contract is awarded
through a rule-based award mechanism (e.g. the open procedure). Since bidders have to
clearly specify many potential scenarios, it is very burdensome for them to prepare the
tendering documents (Hyytinen et al., 2018).
6.2.4.2 Demand
Demand influences the attractiveness of contract to the suppliers (Caldwell et al.,
2005). More bidders will compete for a contract with potentially large demand.8 If the
public buyers do not coordinate their demand, e.g. conducting many separate one-off
purchases, the transaction costs for both the public buyer and suppliers are higher.
Public contracts would attract more suppliers if public buyers can reduce fluctuations
in demand and to set up a responsible budget schedule (Caldwell et al., 2005). However,
the spending scheme in some areas has been observed to be cyclical (Bayens and Martell,
2007). The budget is often loose at the beginning of a fiscal year, becomes tight to prevent
over-spending during the year and ends up with a “panic” spending in the year-end in
order to exhaust the budget allocated for a certain fiscal year.
6.2.4.3 Information Barriers
Procurement information is transmitted between different public sectors and between
public sectors and potential suppliers. Timely and accurate information makes a difference
in competition.
Transparency refers to how easily potential bidders can access and understand what is
going on about a contract (Amaral et al., 2009). Transparency in public procurement is
featured with a clear definition of award criteria and accurate and easily accessible records
8For example, based on Japanese data, the empirical results by Hattori (2010) indicate that electricity
suppliers are more likely to competing for contracts in large city areas, which are supposed to have higher
electricity demand.
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of the award process. Opaque procurement practice may arise from administrative inef-
ficiencies, such as not making the necessary investment in developing a transparent pro-
curement regime, favouritism to domestic firms, or rent-seeking and corruption (Evenett
and Hoekman, 2005).
Transparency does not have a clear-cut impact on competition. On the one hand,
non-transparency discourages potential suppliers from bidding because the contract is
surrounded by greater uncertainties (Amaral et al., 2009, Evenett and Hoekman, 2005).
On the other hand, publicising bidders’ identities and their price signals may facilitate
collusion, whereas full opaqueness that leaks no information about bidders’ identification
and signals would effectively prevent collusion (Albano, Buccirossi, Spagnolo and Zanza,
2006, Stigler, 1964). Bidders in a collusive cartel bid cooperatively so as to undermine
the competition.
Public authorities cannot adopt a fully opaque procurement process, because they
are accountable to the general public (Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2006).9 Based on a
regression discontinuity design analysis on Italian procurement auctions, Coviello and
Mariniello (2014) find that the increased publicity requirement attracts more participation
and leaves less economic rent for the winning supplier.
E-procurement, which applies e-commerce in procurement, helps communication be-
tween public buyers and suppliers. Purchasing goods and services online increases the
accuracy and timeliness of information. It also reduces the time-consuming administra-
tive paperwork (Dimitri et al., 2006, Jullien, 2006).
Cross-departmental dialogues between public buyers also benefit information transmis-
sion (Caldwell et al., 2005). Establishing regular conversation channels facilitates public
authorities to exchange procurement information in time. Moreover, cross-departmental
dialogue contributes to cooperation that smooths demand across public sectors.
9Amaral et al. (2009) discuss several empirical studies that highlight transparent procedures adopted
by procuring authorities.
166
6.2.4.4 Market Openness
The literature of market openness discusses the favouritism to domestic firms under
different market structures. Trionfetti (2000) provides a concise theoretical review with
illustrations on two market structures: the constant returns to scale and perfect competi-
tion paradigm and the increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition paradigm.
There are two forms of discriminations that affect foreign firms’ participation in the do-
mestic market: 1) an outright restriction or a ban on purchases from foreign suppliers and
2) adding a price preference margin to foreign goods and services (Evenett and Hoekman,
2005, Trionfetti, 2000). Although an explicit ban on foreign suppliers is rare, it is a widely
existing de facto practice (Trionfetti, 2000).
The impact of discriminatory policy on trade against foreign suppliers is conditional
on the relative size of government demand and domestic output (Evenett and Hoekman,
2005, Trionfetti, 2000). A ban on public procurement from foreign suppliers does not
affect equilibrium price, the volume of trade, or domestic output when domestic output
is more than the government demand and less than the total domestic demand (Baldwin,
1970, 1984, Evenett and Hoekman, 2005, Trionfetti, 2000). This is because foreign supply,
though not taken up by domestic government demand, is met by domestic private demand.
When government demand is greater than domestic supply at a unanimous world price,
exclusion of foreign supplier would lead to a fall in total import and, in the short run,
a higher domestic price (Baldwin, 1970, 1984, Evenett and Hoekman, 2005, Trionfetti,
2000). In the long run, the price inflation disappears because the increased profit induces
new domestic entry in the industry until the domestic price equals the world price (Evenett
and Hoekman, 2005).
Evenett and Hoekman (2005) elaborate the case of price discrimination under free
trade. Price discrimination that favours domestic firms adds a percentage inflation factor
ρ% to the price of foreign goods, Pf . Thus, the buyer compares the preference inflated
price of foreign goods, (1 + ρ)Pf , and the actual price of domestic goods, Pd. When
government demand is less than or equal to domestic supply, imposing price discrimination
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has no impact on prices, imports, domestic output or national welfare. While the public
sector shifts from the foreign supply to the domestic supply, the released foreign supply
is met by domestic private buyers. Those domestic private buyers will purchase from
foreign suppliers at Pf . When government demand is greater than domestic supply, the
short-run and long-run impacts of price discrimination are complicated. However, the
price discrimination will at least drive out a proportion of foreign suppliers.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) use the ratio between
imports and GDP as one of the independent variables to predict corruption. Ades and
Di Tella (1999) find that countries with a higher share of imports in GDP correspond
to a lower level of perceived corruption, but results from Laffont and N’Guessan (1999)
show that greater openness of economy does not always indicate a lower level of perceived
corruption.
6.2.4.5 Legal System
A substantial literature has been developed in the past decades regarding the impli-
cations of different legal systems to the economic outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008).10
The legal theories emphasise two interrelated channels: the political channel and the
adaptability channel.
The political channel describes how the protection of private property rights affects
financial development (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, La Porta et al., 1999). In history,
compared with the French and German civil laws, the English common law was more
concerned about confining the king’s power over the adjudication of private properties.
This was because the English monarch was quite powerful. By contrast, the French and
German civil law entitled the crown greater power in order to stabilise the country (Hayek,
10The legal origin is correlated with financial development (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, Levine, 1998,
1999), ownership concentrations (La Porta et al., 2002), the burden of entry regulations (Djankov et al.,
2002), firms’ debt maturity and access to external finance (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999),
capital allocation across firms and industries (Beck and Levine, 2002, Claessens and Laeven, 2003, Wur-
gler, 2000), informational efficiency of stock price (Morck et al., 2000), and financial crisis (Johnson et al.,
2000).
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2013). The legal traditions of the civil laws are biased towards the power of the state and
focused less on the rights of individual investors (Mahoney, 2001). Overall, the state has
greater controls of the judiciary and the private property right are less protected under
the civil law than under the common law (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002).
The adaptability channel suggests that legal systems, e.g. the common law, that
depend on jurisprudence (i.e. legal provisions created by judges in the process of case
settlement) adapt to the current condition more quickly than legal systems, e.g. the civil
law, that rely on statutory law modifications. Bailey and Rubin (1994), Priest (1977)
and Rubin (1977, 1982) contend that the substantial discretionary power of judges makes
it possible to challenge inefficient laws through case-by-case discussions and to replace
inefficient provisions with more efficient ones. However, some people cast doubt on the
argument for evolution towards more efficient law. Blume and Rubinfeld (1982) argue that
keeping legislations consistent with rapidly changing social, economic and technological
conditions incurs transition costs. They show that the legal system may not necessarily
be efficient over time due to the unwillingness to bear the transition costs of approaching
a more efficient legal system.
It is difficult to separate the political and adaptability channels entirely although they
emphasise different aspects. The political channel focuses on the power of the state and
the adaptability channel focuses on the ability of the legal system to adapt to changing
conditions. It is less likely to realise jurisprudence in a legal system in which the govern-
ment controls judiciary than in a legal system in which the judiciary is entitled to greater
independence (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). These two channels imply that the common
law system is likely to be more effective than the civil law system in combating corruption
(David and Brierley, 1978, La Porta et al., 1999).
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6.3 The Model
The last section shows that the literature takes discretion and corruption as two dis-
tinct interacting factors that are closely related to competition. The purpose of this section
is to present a model that establishes the connections between discretion, corruption, and
the entry of honest bidders. The model contributes to the literature by demonstrating a
mechanism that shows the interaction between discretion and corruption. It is a mecha-
nism that many studies have verbally argued for but few studies offer formal models as
supporting evidence.
To allow for endogenous corruption decisions, this section models the procurement
process as an extensive-form game, which consists of a sequence of possible moves by
players.11 The amount of bid is derived from the revenue equivalence theorem that ex-
presses the value of bids by the number of bidders and bidders’ true valuations (Myerson,
1981, Riley and Samuelson, 1981, Vickrey, 1961, 1962). With this expression of bid, we
are able to link the procuring agent’s discretion with bidders’ expected profits and the
procuring agent’s expected corruptive gain.
This section treats both dishonest conducts for monetary and non-monetary bribes as
equivalent. A non-monetary benefit has a monetary equivalent value. Following Rose-
Ackerman (1975), we keep quality offered by each bidder at the same level and allow
changes in price.
The model is based on the following assumptions, which are inherited from the liter-
ature on the revenue equivalence theorem12:
1. Bidders’ type (based on bidders’ true costs of delivery) is drawn from a distribution,
the cumulative distribution function of which is strictly increasing and continuous;
2. Risk neutrality holds for each bidder and procuring agent;
11The Appendix reviews the basics of the extensive-form game.
12Section 3.4.1 reviews the literature on the revenue equivalence theorem in detail.
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3. The contract must be awarded to one of the bidders; when there is no bribe transfer,
the bidder with the highest type (i.e. delivering the contract at the lowest cost) wins;
when there is bribe transfer, the bidder who offers the bribe wins;
4. The expected payoff for the bidder with the lowest type is zero.
The revenue equivalence theorem was initially discussed in a single-seller-many-buyer
context. It states that in a case of N bidders whose types are drawn from a uniform
distribution defined over an interval [v, v¯], the Nash equilibrium is that each bidder bids
N−1
N
vi, where vi is bidder i’s actual valuation.
N−1
N
is called the bid shading factor, which
represents the fraction that a bidder is willing to pay out from his actual valuation and
is defined over (0,1). As the number of buyers increases, the bid shading factor increases
from nearly zero to one and each buyer bids closer to his true valuation.
The bid shading factor in a single-buyer-many-seller context, i.e. procurement, follows
a logic similar to the one in the single-seller-many-buyer context. The presence of more
number of sellers makes bidder i bid an amount bi that is closer to his true valuation, i.e.
cost of delivery ci. The bid shading factor is a decreasing function with respect to the
number of bidders. As the number of sellers increases, the bid shading factor bi
ci
decreases
from some high level to one. The bid shading factor with one buyer and N sellers can be
represented by N+k
N
, where k is a constant greater than 0 that measures the markup over
ci and lim
N→+∞
N+k
N
= 1. The equilibrium offering price by seller i is N+k
N
ci.
Expressing bids by the bid shading factor, this section constructs a model on the
extensive form game when the procuring agent has a high discretionary power of restricting
the final participants and a potentially dishonest bidder exists. It shows that the dishonest
bidder may align his interest with the interest of the procuring agent by offering a bribe.
The expected profit of the dishonest bidder and the expected gain of the procuring agent
would increase if the procuring agent accepts the bribe and retains a fewer number of
final bidders. The honest bidder cannot win when corruption takes place. Therefore, the
honest bidders have lower expected payoffs of bidding and are less likely to participate
when the procuring agent’s discretionary power of restricting the final participants is high
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and a bidder may bribe the procuring agent, i.e. when the likelihood of corruption is high.
Also, the honest bidders are more likely to opt out when the participation costs (e.g. costs
of preparing tendering documents or opportunity costs) are high.
The model is a partial analysis that assumes the probability of detecting the corruption
and the intensity of punishment for corruption are static and independent from the amount
of bribe. In reality, both the probability of detection and intensity of punishment are
likely to increase as the amount of bribe goes up. However, we may expect that these
two numbers stay stable or increase marginally at low levels, so the expected illegal gains
of both the procuring agent and the dishonest bidder do not dramatically decrease. The
conclusion from this model should still hold in this case.
In the rest of this section, Section 6.3.1 describes the model in the simplest case that
involves two players; Section 6.3.2 extends the model to a case with three players and
Section 6.3.3 generalises the conclusion from the case with three players to a case with
multiple players.
6.3.1 Case 1: A Game of a Potentially Dishonest Bidder and a Potentially
Dishonest Procuring Agent
We start with a simple procurement in a world with only a bidder i, Bi and a procuring
agent, G (see Figure 6.1). At the initial stage, Bi has to choose whether to bid for the
contract (E) or not (O). The bidder and procuring agent may act dishonestly under
certain circumstances. Having entered the procurement, the bidder may offer a bribe (B)
or act honestly (H). The procuring agent may accept a bribe (a) or refuse a bribe (h).
The procuring agent knows whether the bidder chooses to participate in the procurement
and whether any bidder offers a bribe. However, the bidder knows nothing about whether
the procuring agent would accept a bribe. Because Bi is the only bidder, he will win the
contract as long as he bids for it.
Bi has two information sets and four pure strategies, i.e. SBi = {EB,EH,OB,OH}.
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Bi
Bi
G
(1) Deal with bribery
a
(2) Deal with no bribery
h
B
(3) Deal with no bribery
H
E
(4) No deal, no bribery
O
Figure 6.1: A Procurement with a Potentially Dishonest Bidder and a Potentially Dis-
honest Procuring Agent
The procuring agent has one information set and two pure strategies, i.e. SG = {a, h}.
Different combinations of pure strategies of Bi and the procuring agent arrive at different
outcomes of trading. For example, a strategy pair of (EB, h) leads the procurement to a
transaction without bribery transfer, i.e. terminal node (2).
For Bi, preparing the tendering documents incurs a cost of pi and offering a bribe has
a monetary cost of b. Let θ be the probability that corruption is detected, the monetary
equivalent penalty to Bi is t and the monetary equivalent penalty to the procuring agent
is m. Since Bi is the only bidder, the bid shading factor is
1+k
1
= 1 + k. Bi will offer a
price of (1 + k)ci, where ci is his cost for delivering the contract.
Proposition 1. In a world with a bidder and an procuring agent, if kci > pi, the
outcome is a deal with no bribery; if kci < pi, the bidder will not participate and no deal
will take place. A deal with bribery will never take place.
The matrix form of the game and the payoff of each party are shown in Figure 6.2.
Each cell shows one pair of payoff. For each pair of payoffs, the payoff of Bi is on the left
side and the payoff of the procuring agent is on the right side. For instance, a strategy
pair of (EB, a) is concluded as a deal with bribery (terminal node (1)). In this case, Bi
has an expected payoff of kci−pi− b− θt (= (1 +k)ci− ci−pi− b− θt) and the procuring
agent has an expected payoff of b− θm.
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Procuring Agent
a h
Bi
EB kci − pi − b− θt, b− θm kci − pi, 0
EH kci − pi, 0 kci − pi, 0
OB 0, 0 0, 0
OH 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 6.2: Expected Payoffs of a Procurement with a Potentially Dishonest Bidder and
a Potentially Dishonest Procuring Agent
Notes. Each cell shows one pair of payoffs. For each pair of payoffs, the payoff of Bi is on the
left side and the payoff of the procuring agent is on the right side.
It is for sure that kci − pi is no less than kci − pi − b− θt, so EH dominates EB for
Bi. Therefore, as long as kci − pi is greater than 0, EH is the best response for Bi once
he chooses to participate, regardless of the strategy chosen by the procuring agent, i.e.
Bi will bid for the contract and does not offer any bribe. When kci − pi is less than 0,
the best response for Bi is not to participate.
6.3.2 Case 2: A Game of a Potentially Dishonest Bidder, a Potentially Dis-
honest Procuring Agent and an Honest Bidder
Having discussed the procurement in a world with one potentially dishonest bidder
and one potentially dishonest procuring agent in Section 6.3.1, we introduce an honest
bidder into the world. We assume the costs of offering a bribe vary across bidders. The
honest bidder is the extreme case where this cost is infinitely high and discourages him
from offering any bribes.
Figure 6.3 is a game tree that depicts this extensive form game with a potentially
dishonest bidder i, Bi, a potentially dishonest procuring agent G and an honest bidder
j, Bj. At the beginning, the potentially dishonest bidder and the honest bidder have to
decide to compete for the contract (E) or not participate (O). Neither of bidders knows
whether the other has chosen to participate. Once Bi chooses E, he needs to decide
whether to bribe the procuring agent (B) or not (H). The procuring agent would choose
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to accept (a) or decline a bribe (h). The choice of the procuring agent is unknown to
either of the bidders. The procuring agent knows which bidder has chosen to bid for the
contract and whether Bi offers a bribe. Let the perceived probability for Bi to enter the
competition be α and to bribe be γ, the perceived probability for Bj to participate in the
competition be β, and the perceived probability for G to accept a bribe be λ.
Without loss of generality, we can expect that λ is an increasing function with the
procuring agent’s expected payoff from taking bribes, E(piG). If the procuring agent does
not accept any bribe, he has a payoff of zero. If he accepts a bribe that is offered to him,
he faces an expected payoff function
E(piG) = b− θm. (6.1)
Therefore, it can be inferred that λ increases with b.
Lemma 1. λ increases with b.
Bi has two information sets and four pure strategies, i.e. SBi = {EB,EH,OB,OH}.
The procuring agent has two information sets and four pure strategies, i.e. SG = {aa, ah, ha, hh}.
Bj has one information set and two pure strategies, i.e. SBj = {E,O}. Combinations of
these pure strategies lead the game to eight terminal nodes. For example, a combination
of (EB, aa,O) ends up with terminal node (4): the contract is awarded to Bi after he
bribes the procuring agent, while Bj opts out.
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Let 1− µ be the probability that Bi wins, µ be the probability that Bj wins at each
terminal node, and N be the total number of bidders. Let n be the number of bidders
who are not considered by the procuring agent if he accepts the bribe from Bi. Since
Bi knows n, he would ask for a price that is
(N−n)+k
N−n times of his delivery cost ci. The
general expected payoff function for Bi at each terminal node is expressed as a probability
weighted average
E(piBi) = (1− µ)
[
(N − n) + k
N − n ci − ci − pi − b− θt
]
+ µ(−pi)
= (1− µ)
[
k
N − nci − b− θt
]
− pi.
(6.2)
Rearranging Equation 6.2, we can find that the maximum possible amount of b is confined
by
k
N − nci − θt−
E(piBi) + pi
1− µ . (6.3)
Therefore, b is likely to increase with n. Combining this inference with Lemma 1, we can
further infer that λ increases with n.
Lemma 2. λ increases with n.
If Bi has successfully paid the bribe, Bi knows that he will certainly win. For Bi, the
game is reduced to a game with only two players: Bi and the procuring agent. In this
case, (1−µ) = 1, n = N−1 and Bi will ask for (1+k)ci. The expected payoff function for
Bi is kci− pi− b− θt. If Bi does not offer a bribe or the procuring agent does not accept
a bribe, then n = 0, b = 0, θ = 0 and (1 − µ) is a variable between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
The expected payoff function for Bi is (1− µ) kN ci − pi.
Bj knows only the total number of N bidders and does not know n or whether his bid
will be discarded without being evaluated. He would ask for a price of N+k
N
cj and incur a
preparation cost of pi.
When Bj chooses to participate, the general expected payoff function for Bj at each
177
terminal node is
E(piBj) = µ
(
N + k
N
cj − cj − pj
)
+ (1− µ)(−pj)
= µ
k
N
cj − pj.
(6.4)
If Bi successfully paid a bribe, then µ = 0 and Bj has a payoff of −pj. If a bribe is not
offered or not accepted, the expected payoff of Bj is µ
k
N
cj − pj.
Figure 6.4 is the payoff matrix when N = 2 and Bj chooses to bid for the contract.
Figure 6.5 is the payoff matrix when N = 2 and Bj chooses to not to bid for the contract.
Among the three payoff functions in each cell, the payoff function on the left is for Bi,
the one in the middle for the procuring agent and the one on the right for Bj. In a
combination of strategies (EB, ah,E), EB means that Bi enters the competition and
bribes the procuring agent, E stands for that Bj chooses to enter the competition, and ah
represents that the procuring agent chooses to accept a bribe when both bidders i and j
bid for the contract and that the procuring agent would behave honestly when Bi bids for
the contract but Bj does not. A combination of strategies (EB, ah,E) leads to terminal
node (1): Bi wins the contract with bribery.
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Proposition 2. The expected payoff for Bj to participate decreases as n increases.
The expected payoff for Bj when he chooses not to compete for the contract is the
probability weighted average of payoffs from terminal nodes (4), (5), (6) and (8). Thus,
E
(
piBj | O
)
= 0. The expected payoff for Bj when he chooses to compete for the contract
is the probability weighted average of payoffs from terminal nodes (1), (2), (3) and (7),
which is
E
(
piBj | E
)
= αγλ(−pj) + αγ(1− λ)
(
µ
k
2
cj − pj
)
+ α(1− γ)
(
µ
k
2
cj − pj
)
+
(1− α)(µk
2
cj − pj)
= µ(1− αγλ)k
2
cj − pj.
(6.5)
Because α and γ are positive, E
(
piBj | E
)
is negatively related to λ. By Lemma 2,
E
(
piBj | E
)
is negatively related to n. Accordingly, as n increases, E
(
piBj | E
)
becomes
more likely to be smaller than E
(
piBj | O
)
, and for Bj the strategy of not bidding be-
comes more likely to dominate the strategy of bidding. The economic implication for
the procurement is that an honest bidder is less likely participate in procurement when
the procuring agent has high manipulation power of selecting the final participants and a
potentially dishonest bidder exists, especially when the entry cost is high.
6.3.3 Case 3: A Game of a Potentially Dishonest Bidder, a Potentially Dis-
honest Procuring Agent and Multiple Honest Bidders
We extend Case 2 into a world with one potentially dishonest bidder Bi, one potentially
dishonest procuring agent G, and a group of honest bidders BH = {B1, B2, ..., Bl} (l ≥ 2).
Let TBj be the type of Bj (Bj ∈ BH) and F (·) be the cumulative distribution function
of the type of honest bidders. F (TBj) is equal to the probability that Bj has the lowest
delivery cost among the honest bidders. When Bj chooses not to participate, his expected
payoff is zero.
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The event that Bj wins is equivalent to two events that hold simultaneously: (1) Bj
enters the competition and becomes the winner among BH ; and (2) Bj defeats Bi. Figure
6.6 is a simplified game tree that elaborates the case when Bj is the winner among all
honest bidders and omits the details of the cases when Bj is not the winner among the
honest bidders and when Bj chooses not to participate in the procurement. The expected
payoff for Bj when he decides to bid for the contract is the probability weighted average
of payoffs from terminal nodes (1), (2), (3) and (4) plus payoffs from child nodes of node
(5):
E
(
piBj | E
)
= F (TBj)αγλ(−pj) + F (TBj)αγ(1− λ)
(
µ
k
N
cj − pj
)
+
F (TBj)α(1− γ)
(
µ
k
N
cj − pj
)
+ F (TBj)(1− α)(
k
N
cj − pj)+[
1− F (TBj)
]
(−pj)
= F (TBj)µ(1− αγλ)
k
N
cj − pj.
(6.6)
E
(
piBj | E
)
decreases as λ increases, all else equal. Proposition 2 is still valid in this
case.
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6.4 Hypotheses and Data
In the empirical part of this chapter, we test four hypotheses regarding the implications
of discretion and corruption to the number of bidders and to contract price, with data
from the 28 EU member countries, Iceland and Norway.13
Hypothesis 1. The number of bidders decreases as corruption increases.
Hypothesis 2. A higher corruption is associated with lower contract rebates.
Hypothesis 3. The number of bidders decreases as the procuring agent’s discretion
increases.
Hypothesis 4. Higher discretion is associated with lower contract rebates.
We use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) released by Transparency Interna-
tional to measure corruption.14 This measure is widely adopted in the literature (e.g.
Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010, Diaby and Sylwester, 2015, Swaleheen, 2011). The CPI
has a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). We limit our use of the CPI to the
time horizon 2012–2015 because CPI scores before 2012 are not comparable over time.
The CPI enables us to separately analyse corruption and discretion because it is con-
structed based on many indicators of corruption. However, as an index for country level
corruption, the CPI may be too broad relative to our measures of competition, which are
contract specific variables.
Our data constrain us from constructing a contract level corruption index (Coviello
et al., 2018) or adopting various measures that are correlated with corruption (Knack
et al., 2017). Since the theoretical literature has suggested a strong connection between
13The European Economic Area includes the EU member countries, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.
Liechtenstein is excluded from the analysis because the sample size of its contract level data is very small
and information in many observations is incomplete or inaccurate.
14For information on Transparency International and the CPI, see the webpage of Transparency Inter-
national: https://www.transparency.org/.
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corruption and competition, we still hope to uncover some significant correlation between
the CPI, competition and rebates in public procurement.
The contract level data are from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). TED is the
digital version of the Official Journal of the European Union, where public procurement
contracts above the EU thresholds must be advertised. The EU also encourages under-
threshold contracts to be published in the TED. As a result, this database contains
both above- and under-threshold contracts. The contract rebate is measured by the ratio
between the contract value and estimated value. The discretion is measured by the choice
of award mechanism and a dummy variable of quality concerns.
Table 6.1 provides detail on the main variables. The contract specific variables are
the number of offers received, contract value, estimated value, award mechanism, qual-
ity criterion dummy, and contract type. The ratio between contract value and estimated
value is used as a measure of contract rebates. Following Bajari et al. (2008), Chong et al.
(2012, 2014) and Gori et al. (2017), we use contract value and estimated value as proxies
for contract complexity. Among the four benchmark award mechanisms, the negotiated
procedure and the competitive dialogue allow for higher discretion of the procuring agent
than the restricted procedure and the open procedure do. The procuring agent has a
higher discretion in the restricted procedure than in the open procedure. The quality
criterion dummy indicates whether quality is an important factor in bid evaluation. As-
sessing the quality of bids also calls for more discretion than only comparing bid prices
(Compte et al., 2005). We control for contract type to capture unobservable contract type
specific factors.
In addition to CPI, other country level variables are controlled for. We use population
for measuring country size; GDP per capita for demand; imports as a percentage of
GDP for market openness. GDP per capita and imports as a percentage of GDP are
highly correlated with corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999, Laffont and N’Guessan, 1999,
Montinola and Jackman, 2002). We obtain data of these three country level variables
from the World Bank Open Data. Legal origin, which is related to decentralisation and
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corruption, is also introduced in the regressions. We classify the legal origins based on
Djankov et al. (2004) and La Porta et al. (2008).
Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of CPI from 2012 to 2015. The level of corruption
perception varies across countries and is generally stable within each country during this
window of time. The lowest CPI score is 40 (France in 2012 and 2013) and the highest
CPI score is 92 (Cyprus in 2014). Bulgaria (average CPI = 62.5), Portugal (average CPI
= 62.75) and Czech Republic (average CPI = 68.75) have CPI scores that are closest to
the cross-country mean CPI (65.58). Figure 6.8 presents the level of GDP per capita and
imports as a percentage of GDP in each country.
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Figure 6.7: Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics of variables. Panel A describes the contract
level variables. While the number of offers received, contract value and estimated value
are positively skewed, the ratio between contract value and estimated value is roughly
symmetrically distributed around the mean. The 95% confidence intervals for mean es-
timates are narrow, due to the large data size. For categorical variables, the number of
observations in each category and the proportion of contracts that each category takes up
are presented. Panel B is a summary of the country level variables for the 30 countries in
the years 2012–2015.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Contract Level Variables
Continuous Variables No. of Obs. Mean CI (lower) CI (upper) S.D.
No. of offers received 343688 3.719 3.703 3.735 4.792
Contract value/Estimated value 323066 0.919 0.919 0.920 0.194
Contract value 343688 219940 218545 221335 417323
Estimated value 343688 263104.6 261473 264736 487926
Min. 25th 50th 75th Max.
No. of offers received 0 1 2 4 50
Contract value/Estimated value 0.374 0.833 0.980 1 2.191
Contract value 1749 10800 48445 222273 2906287
Estimated value 2062 12997 59418 270156 3634711
Categorical Variables No. of Obs. Proportion
Contract type
Works contract 16996 4.95%
Services contract 112634 32.77%
Supply contract 214058 62.28%
All 343688 100.00%
Award mechanism
Open procedure 308891 89.88%
Restricted procedure 10550 3.07%
Competitive dialogue 240 0.07%
Negotiated procedure 7032 2.05%
Other procedures 16975 4.94%
All 343688 100.00%
Criteria
Lowest price 217112 63.17%
Most economically
126576
36.83%
advantageous tender
All 343688 100.00%
Panel B: Country Level Variables
No. of Mean CI (lower) CI (upper) S.D.
Countries
CPI 30 65.58 62.76 68.39 15.59
Population (million) 30 17.08 13.00 21.16 22.58
GDP per capita (e) 30 28585.47 25077.80 32093.15 19405.39
Imports (% of GDP) 30 61.08 55.17 66.98 32.66
Min. 25th 50th 75th Max.
CPI 40 53.75 63 79 92
Population (million) 0.32 2.95 7.87 16.82 80.98
GDP per capita (e) 5642.34 13913.23 22780.73 38866.66 96191.04
Imports (% of GDP) 26.45 39.19 48.97 77.06 187.47
Notes. “CI (lower)” and “CI (upper)” refer to the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence
interval.
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 Main Results
This section presents OLS estimates to examine how discretion and corruption are
related to the number of bidders and price rebates. Because of data limitations, we are
unable to adopt more advanced techniques to mitigate the problem of omitted variables
(e.g. information transparency) and the potential reverse causality between award mech-
anisms and the number of bidders. Therefore, the empirical results should be viewed as
exploratory.
Table 6.3 shows the estimates using the number of offers received (specifications (1),
(2), (3)) and contract rebate (i.e. the ratio between contract value and estimated value)
(specifications (4), (5), (6)) as the dependent variables.15 For each dependent variable, its
linear relationship with CPI is tested when not controlling for and controlling for the year
and country fixed effects. Specifications (2) and (5) are better fitted than specification (1)
and (4) because all year dummies and the majority of country dummies are significant (not
shown in the table) and R-squared statistics are greatly improved when controlling for the
year and country fixed effects. Specification (2) shows that the number of offers received
is positively related to CPI. It implies that every 10-score increase in CPI (less corrupt)
is associated with 0.69 more number of bidders. No significant relationship between the
contract rebat and CPI is found in specification (5).
Specifications (3) and (6) explore the non-linear relationships by introducing CPI2
as an independent variable. CPI2 is statistically significant in both specifications. The
number of offers received is minimised at a CPI of 28 (= − −0.112
2×0.002), ceteris paribus. Since
the lowest CPI score in the data is 40, the results indicate all countries in this sample would
experience increases in the number of bidders when the perceived corruption improves.
15It should be noted that the number of offers received is count data, which is concentrated from 1
to 10. Therefore, the residuals in OLS regressions may not be normally distributed and the estimates
may be biased. Further work should formally test residual normality and/or apply the Poisson regression
model when taking the number of offers received as the dependent variable.
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Holding other variables fixed, an increase from the lowest CPI (40) to the mean CPI (66)
predicts 1.76 more bidders; an increase from the lowest CPI (40) to the highest CPI (92)
predicts a rise of 7.9 in the number of bidders; an increase from the mean CPI (66) to
the highest CPI (92) predicts 6.1 more bidders. Both the linear and non-linear estimates
lend credence to Hypothesis 1.
Specification (6) shows that contract rebate is the smallest at a CPI level of 50 (=
− −0.004
2×0.00004). Below this level, contract rebate decreases as CPI scores increases. Above this
level, the positive relationship between contract rebate and CPI is contrary to Hypothesis
2. This implies that the increase in the final contract value from the estimated value is
more substantial in countries that are deemed to be less corrupt.
Table 6.4 is to find out whether the contract value or the estimated value drives this
discrepancy. Specifications (1) and (2) take the natural logarithm of the contract value
as the dependent variable and take the natural logarithm of estimated value as the proxy
for complexity. No significant relationship between CPI and contract value is found.
Specifications (3) and (4) take the natural logarithm of estimated value as the dependent
variable and control the natural logarithm of contract value for complexity. A significant
non-linear relationship exhibits between CPI and estimated value. The model predicts
that the estimated value increases as the CPI score approaches to 50 (= − 0.005
2×(−0.00005))
from zero and decreases as the CPI score increases from 50. This result suggests that
changes in the estimated value are likely to drive the rebate changes predicted by CPI.
Table 6.5 illustrates how the estimated value changes with the change in CPI for a
contract with an average level of complexity (i.e. estimated value = e263,105), using
a CPI of 50, the lowest CPI (40), the average CPI (66) and the highest CPI (92). For
example, an increase in CPI from 40 to 50 corresponds to an increase of e1318.819 in the
estimated value; an increase in CPI from 50 to 92 corresponds to a decrease of e22211.92
in the estimated value.
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Table 6.3: OLS Regressions for the Number of Offers Received and Contract Rebate
Dependent variable:
Number of offers received Contract rebate (Contract value/Estimated value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPI2 0.002∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗
(0.0004) (0.00002)
CPI −0.019∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.011) (0.038) (0.00005) (0.0005) (0.002)
Award mechanism
Negotiated procedure (B)
Open procedure 0.353∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Restricted procedure −0.201∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Competitive dialogue −1.328∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗ −0.986∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.017 −0.017
(0.305) (0.295) (0.295) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Other procedures 0.294∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Quality criterion dummy 0.106∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log contract value −0.008 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Population (million) −0.038∗∗∗ 0.034 0.074∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.044) (0.045) (0.00004) (0.002) (0.002)
Log GDP per capita 0.936∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗ 0.787∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.006
(0.027) (0.370) (0.370) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016)
Imports (% of GDP) −0.011∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ 0.001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.00005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Legal origin
English common law (B)
French civil law −2.773∗∗∗ 2.509 6.603∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.017
(0.063) (2.189) (2.338) (0.003) (0.094) (0.101)
German civil law −3.928∗∗∗ 0.569 5.131∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.008 0.087
(0.061) (2.379) (2.549) (0.003) (0.102) (0.110)
Nordic law −4.289∗∗∗ −0.582 1.213 −0.042∗∗∗ 0.061 0.100
(0.091) (2.336) (2.363) (0.004) (0.100) (0.102)
Contract type
Works contract (B)
Services contract −1.566∗∗∗ −0.975∗∗∗ −0.972∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Supply contract −2.294∗∗∗ −1.668∗∗∗ −1.668∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 2.890∗∗∗ −12.001∗∗ −12.067∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗
(0.268) (5.713) (5.713) (0.011) (0.245) (0.245)
Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 343,688 343,688 343,688 323,066 323,066 323,066
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.125 0.125 0.038 0.068 0.068
F Statistic 1,549.287∗∗∗ 1,113.505∗∗∗ 1,089.386∗∗∗ 855.042∗∗∗ 540.317∗∗∗ 528.440∗∗∗
Note: (B) indicates the baseline category of each variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.4: Predicting Contract Value and Estimated Value
Dependent variable:
Log contract value Log estimated value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CPI2 0.00002 −0.00005∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002)
CPI −0.0004 −0.003 0.0004 0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Award mechanism
Negotiated procedure (B)
Open procedure −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Restricted procedure −0.034∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Competitive dialogue −0.020 −0.020 0.024 0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Other procedures 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Quality criterion dummy 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log estimated value 0.996∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log contract value 0.984∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Population (million) 0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log GDP per capita −0.001 −0.002 0.015 0.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Imports (% of GDP) −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.001 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Legal origin
English common law (B)
French civil law −0.123 −0.071 0.111 0.006
(0.112) (0.120) (0.111) (0.119)
German civil law 0.001 0.060 −0.015 −0.132
(0.122) (0.131) (0.121) (0.130)
Nordic law 0.077 0.101 −0.102 −0.150
(0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.120)
Contract type
Works contract (B)
Services contract 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Supply contract 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.008 0.007 0.176 0.178
(0.292) (0.292) (0.290) (0.290)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 323,066 323,066 323,066 323,066
Adjusted R2 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986
F Statistic 501,068.300∗∗∗ 489,934.200∗∗∗ 504,578.700∗∗∗ 493,373.600∗∗∗
(df = 44; 323021) (df = 45; 323020) (df = 44; 323021) (df = 45; 323020)
Note: (B) indicates the baseline category of each variable. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.5: Changes in Estimated Value Predicted by Changes in CPI for a Contract with
an Average Level of Complexity (Estimated Value = e263,105)
Change in CPI Change in Log estimated value Change in estimated value (e)
From 40 to 50 +0.005 +1318.819
From 50 to 66 −0.0128 −3346.282
From 50 to 92 −0.0882 −22211.92
From 66 to 92 −0.0754 −19108.67
We offer a potential explanation of these differences in elasticity. Usually, government
agents would conceal their corrupt behaviours by inflating estimated values and budgets.
A high contract price due to corruption is less noticeable and sounds more reasonable when
it is compared with a high estimated value. However, very corrupt government agents
tend not to bother to disguise their corruption because their corruption is well-known to
the public.
According to the estimates for award mechanisms in Table 6.3, compared with the
negotiated procedure, the open and restricted procedures imply more number of bidders
and more price rebates. Moreover, the estimates for the open procedure are more signifi-
cant than that for the restricted procedure. The quality criterion dummy, which indicates
a higher discretion, is negatively related to the number of bidders and price rebates.
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. The competitive dia-
logue implies less number of bidders and perhaps more price rebates than the negotiated
procedure.
6.5.2 Robustness Check
This subsection provides robustness tests, repeating the estimations disaggregated
by contract type (Table 6.6). The three contract types are works, services and supply
contracts.
194
T
ab
le
6.
6:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
C
h
ec
k
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
ia
b
le
:
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
ff
e
rs
re
c
e
iv
e
d
L
o
g
e
st
im
a
te
d
v
a
lu
e
W
o
rk
s
S
e
rv
ic
e
s
S
u
p
p
ly
W
o
rk
s
S
e
rv
ic
e
s
S
u
p
p
ly
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
C
P
I2
−
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
0
5
−
0
.0
0
0
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
C
P
I
0
.0
7
6
∗∗
0
.0
6
3
∗∗
∗
0
.1
3
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
1
−
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
A
w
a
rd
m
e
c
h
a
n
is
m
N
e
g
o
ti
a
te
d
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
(B
)
O
p
e
n
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
1
.0
1
3
∗∗
∗
0
.9
6
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
6
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
R
e
st
ri
c
te
d
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
−
3
.4
0
1
∗∗
∗
0
.7
6
0
∗∗
∗
−
0
.2
2
2
∗∗
0
.0
3
4
∗∗
0
.0
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
2
∗∗
(0
.2
7
9
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.1
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
C
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
d
ia
lo
g
u
e
−
4
.5
3
1
∗∗
∗
−
0
.5
6
0
−
1
.1
0
1
∗∗
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
4
8
∗
(1
.6
7
7
)
(0
.4
0
4
)
(0
.4
7
3
)
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
O
th
e
r
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
−
1
.3
4
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
7
−
2
.0
7
0
∗∗
∗
−
0
.0
0
5
−
0
.0
4
8
∗∗
∗
−
0
.0
3
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.2
3
7
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
Q
u
a
li
ty
c
ri
te
ri
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
0
.0
6
1
−
0
.2
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
3
−
0
.0
0
1
−
0
.0
2
6
∗∗
∗
−
0
.0
0
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
L
o
g
c
o
n
tr
a
c
t
v
a
lu
e
0
.3
1
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
7
∗
−
0
.0
0
5
0
.9
8
7
∗∗
∗
0
.9
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.9
8
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
−
0
.4
4
0
∗∗
0
.0
5
5
−
0
.1
8
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
6
∗∗
−
0
.0
0
2
−
0
.0
1
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
L
o
g
G
D
P
p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
−
9
.8
2
3
∗∗
∗
−
0
.1
5
0
0
.5
9
2
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
5
3
∗
−
0
.0
6
2
∗∗
(2
.1
3
1
)
(0
.6
2
3
)
(0
.4
7
9
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(%
o
f
G
D
P
)
−
0
.0
9
7
∗∗
0
.1
4
5
∗∗
∗
−
0
.0
0
7
−
0
.0
0
5
∗∗
0
.0
0
2
∗∗
∗
−
0
.0
0
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
L
e
g
a
l
o
ri
g
in
E
n
g
li
sh
c
o
m
m
o
n
la
w
(B
)
F
re
n
c
h
c
iv
il
la
w
−
3
6
.8
5
8
∗∗
∗
−
1
.0
7
9
−
2
.9
7
6
1
.0
1
0
0
.1
4
9
−
0
.7
2
9
∗∗
∗
(1
0
.5
3
2
)
(3
.5
0
8
)
(3
.0
4
7
)
(0
.6
9
8
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
G
e
rm
a
n
c
iv
il
la
w
−
2
4
.4
9
7
∗∗
2
.0
3
3
−
6
.5
8
5
∗∗
1
.1
9
0
−
0
.0
1
5
−
0
.8
5
0
∗∗
∗
(1
1
.1
4
4
)
(3
.9
9
7
)
(3
.2
5
8
)
(0
.8
0
3
)
(0
.2
0
3
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
N
o
rd
ic
la
w
−
2
9
.2
4
9
∗∗
∗
1
.3
4
3
−
1
1
.6
6
0
∗∗
∗
1
.4
7
5
∗∗
−
0
.1
6
9
−
0
.8
0
7
∗∗
∗
(1
0
.6
2
2
)
(3
.9
5
3
)
(3
.2
5
9
)
(0
.6
6
0
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
8
1
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
3
5
.2
3
2
∗∗
∗
−
5
.6
1
2
0
.7
6
5
−
1
.2
9
6
−
0
.2
3
1
1
.5
2
5
∗∗
∗
(3
0
.2
2
3
)
(8
.9
6
4
)
(7
.8
4
8
)
(1
.5
6
0
)
(0
.4
2
8
)
(0
.4
3
3
)
Y
e
a
r
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
6
,5
1
3
1
0
4
,2
3
2
2
0
2
,3
2
1
1
6
,5
1
3
1
0
4
,2
3
2
2
0
2
,3
2
1
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.2
0
8
0
.1
7
4
0
.1
1
8
0
.9
7
4
0
.9
8
2
0
.9
8
5
F
S
ta
ti
st
ic
1
0
4
.0
1
8
∗∗
∗
5
2
2
.2
0
6
∗∗
∗
6
4
7
.3
5
6
∗∗
∗
1
4
,4
2
5
.9
5
0
∗∗
∗
1
3
2
,1
6
9
.7
0
0
∗∗
∗
3
1
8
,4
1
4
.0
0
0
∗∗
∗
(d
f
=
4
2
;
1
6
4
7
0
)
(d
f
=
4
2
;
1
0
4
1
8
9
)
(d
f
=
4
2
;
2
0
2
2
7
8
)
(d
f
=
4
3
;
1
6
4
6
9
)
(d
f
=
4
3
;
1
0
4
1
8
8
)
(d
f
=
4
3
;
2
0
2
2
7
7
)
N
o
te
:
(B
)
in
d
ic
a
te
s
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
c
a
te
g
o
ry
o
f
e
a
c
h
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
∗ p
<
0
.1
;
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
;
∗∗
∗ p
<
0
.0
1
195
Since the main tests show that the linear and non-linear models for the number of
bidders generate consistent and similar results, we adopt the linear model in the robustness
tests in order to facilitate comparison. The estimates for CPI are positive, which are
consistent with the main estimates. The estimates for award mechanisms are consistent
with the those in the main estimates, except for the estimate of the restricted procedure for
services contracts. The reason for the difference may be that services contracts are more
miscellaneous and the terms of services contracts are more difficult to be standardised
than the other two contracts.
The non-linear model is used for testing the estimated value. Although the estimates of
CPI for works contract have the same sign as the main estimates, they are not significant.
This may because a greater proportion of works contracts are of high value and more
complicated ones, which are subjected to tight regulation and supervision. Thus, the
room for discretionary decision is smaller. The CPI estimates for the services contracts
are with the opposite sign and are not significant. This may also be explained by the great
variation within the services contract. The estimates of CPI for the supply contracts,
which are generally more standardised, are significant and consistent with the main tests.
The estimates for award mechanisms are consistent with those in the main estimates.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter explores the relationship between discretion, corruption and competition
in public procurement. The chapter makes two contributions. The first is providing
a simple theoretical framework for understanding the interaction between corruption,
competition and the choice of award mechanism. Building on the revenue equivalence
theorem, we propose a model that taking the willingness to accept bribes as endogenously
determined. The model shows increasing bribes is a mechanism that transits discretion
to corruption and that honest bidders are discouraged from participation due to lower
expected profit. The conclusion from the model is in accordance with the literature on
corruption and competition, i.e. discretion fosters corruption, which in turn depresses the
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number of bidders and softens price competition.
The second contribution of this chapter is an exploratory analysis of the relationship
between discretion, corruption and competition. Evidence of a negative correlation be-
tween the perceived corruption and the number of bidders is found. In an aggregate level,
an increase of 10 in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
(an improvement of integrity) predicts one more bidder in the competition.
We also find evidence that the estimated value has a non-monotonic association with
the CPI.16 This result suggests that procuring agents, who conduct procurement on be-
half of procuring authorities, are likely to hide the impact of their corrupt behaviour on
contract price by artificially increasing the estimated value. This relationship between
CPI and the estimated value is most evident in supply contracts, which are more easily
standardised and are less complicated than works and services contracts. At lower CPI
levels, the estimated value increases while the CPI increases; at higher CPI levels, the
estimated value decreases while the CPI increases. A responsible procuring agent is more
likely to act for the social welfare and to work under a tighter budget. By contrast, very
corrupt procuring agents do not bother to disguise their corruption and do not care much
about the estimated value and the aftermaths of cost-overruns.
While this explanation indeed deserves to be tested more rigorously, it highlights the
need to monitor the estimated value of contracts more carefully.
In addition, this study tests how discretion, measured by award mechanism and quality
criterion dummy, is related to competition. The results generally support that discretion
is negatively related to entry and rebates. Compared with the negotiated procedure, the
open procedure is associated with a greater number of bidders and more contract rebates.
The competitive dialogue is associated with fewer bidders but more contract rebates than
the negotiated procedure. Award criteria that consider both quality and price is related
to less number of offers and fewer rebates. Our finding is consistent with Baldi et al.
(2016), partially different from Hyytinen et al. (2018), and in contrast to Coviello et al.
16Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda (2006) identify a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and growth.
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(2018).
This study has a number of limitations. First, in the theoretical analysis, all cases
of our theoretical model consider only one potentially dishonest bidder. In reality, bribe
competition among bidders can exist. In addition, the models do not allow for the pos-
sibility of a corrupt relationship, where bribes are paid on successive occasions, so more
dynamic studies are called for. Second, the empirical analysis has several limitations
due to data unavailability: it fails to include information barriers as an explanatory vari-
able; a contract specific measure of corruption is better than the CPI; the price rebate is
measured by contractual value, but the final payment may differ (significantly) from the
contractual value. Third, we show empirical evidence that discretion and corruption are
related to competition and price rebates. However, the empirical result is preliminary.
More comprehensive works should be done to uncover the source and direction of causality
regarding the relationship between discretion, corruption and competition.
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Appendix: Extensive-Form Games
This Appendix reviews the representation of an extensive-form game, and the def-
initions of imperfect information game and incomplete information game. Our model
proposed in Section 6.3 relies on these game theory fundamentals.
Unlike normal form games, extensive-form games contain a sequence of possible moves
by players.17 Extensive-form games are usually represented by game trees. Their repre-
sentation consist of five components:
1. A set of players;
2. Every opportunity for each player to move (i.e. node or decision point);
3. Types of the players and possible strategies or actions for each player at each node,
driven by decision or nature;
4. The knowledge of each player at each node;
5. A set of payoff functions for each player given possible combinations of all players
moves.
In a game of imperfect information, some players do not know the action chosen by
other players, but they know the type of other players, other players’ possible strategies or
actions, and possible payoffs of other players. In a game of incomplete information, some
players may not know the other players’ type, possible strategies or payoffs. Therefore,
a game of imperfect information imposes more stringent assumptions than a game of
incomplete information.
The model proposed in Case 1 in Section 6.3.1 is a game of imperfect information.
It describes a procurement in a world with a bidder and a procuring agent. Both the
bidder and the procuring agent may behave dishonestly if offering or accepting bribes can
17References used for this subsection are Jackson (2013), Osborne (2004) and Tadelis (2013).
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maximise their expected monetary payoffs. When deciding whether to offer a bribe, the
bidder does not know whether the procuring agent would accept the bribe.
Case 2 in Section 6.3.2 is also a game of imperfect information. It describes a world
with a potentially dishonest bidder, a potentially dishonest procuring agent and an honest
bidder. The honest bidder has a very high cost of corruption which cannot be compensated
by any payoffs generated by the misbehaviour. As a result, the honest bidder would
never offer a bribe. Any information about which bidders have chosen to enter into the
competition is kept confidential to the public before the outcome of the procurement is
released. The potentially dishonest bidder and honest bidder essentially simultaneously
make the decision of entering. Neither of the bidders knows whether the other has opted
to participate in the tender. Also, neither of the two bidders knows whether the procuring
agent would accept a bribe. However, the procuring agent knows which bidder(s) choose(s)
to enter the competition and whether the potentially dishonest bidder offers a bribe.
Case 3 in Section 6.3.3 is a game of incomplete information. It is a world with a
potentially dishonest bidder, a potentially dishonest procuring agent and more than one
honest bidders. No honest bidder can recognise the potentially dishonest bidder. Neither
do they knows whether the potentially dishonest bidder chooses to enter the competition
or whether the potentially dishonest bidder chooses to offer a bribe. No honest bidder
knows which other honest bidder would enter the competition. The potentially dishonest
bidder does not know which honest bidder would choose to enter the competition. None
of the bidders know the procuring agent’s choice of accepting a bribe. The procuring
agent knows which bidder(s) choose(s) to enter the competition and whether a bribe is
offered by the potentially dishonest bidder. The distribution of the type of honest bidders
is common knowledge.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Public procurement has attracted increasing interest of both researchers and practi-
tioners, because of its economic significance and because of concerns about saving public
money and improving social welfare. Public buyers implement award mechanisms to select
contractors, so the features of award mechanisms play an important role in procurement
performance.
This thesis exploits the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), a publically available EU-
wide database on public procurement that has not been used in many previous research
papers. The EU complies with the award mechanism classification and publication re-
quirements of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement
(WTO GPA), applied by 88 WTO member countries to promote international competi-
tion in public procurement. The EU applies four benchmark award mechanisms, i.e. the
open procedure, the restricted procedure, the negotiated procedure and the competitive
dialogue.
The thesis analyses the application of the four EU benchmark award mechanisms and
their associated procurement outcomes. The thesis contains three separate but interre-
lated studies with each focusing on one stage of the procurement process.
The first study in this thesis (Chapter 4) focuses on the initiation stage, when a
public buyer has to decide the process for purchase (i.e. the award mechanism), before it
publicises the procurement. Based on UK data, this study analyses the factors that are
related to public buyer’s tendency in choosing a particular award mechanism. Our results
generally agree with the award mechanism design theory that higher entry costs and ex
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post renegotiation costs call for more discretion (e.g. prequalification and negotiation) in
awarding complex contracts with a low level of completeness and that auctions are more
suitable for simple contracts that are easy to be specified (Albano et al., 2017, Ehrman
and Peters, 1994, McAfee and McMillan, 1988, Tadelis and Bajari, 2006).
The results also show that public buyers, when facing complex contracts, rely more on
the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue, which allow for both prequalification
and negotiation, than the restricted procedure, which allows for prequalification only.
The results imply that public buyers tend not to differentiate the competitive dialogue
from the negotiated procedure or treat the restricted procedure differently from the open
procedure, when considering only contract complexity. However, public buyers use the
competitive dialogue only occasionally and have tended to use the restricted procedure
less frequently over time. The reasons underlying this fact deserve further exploration.
In addition, our results reveal that accumulating experience makes public buyers use
the open and negotiated procedures more frequently than the other two procedures. This
is probably because public buyers become more skillful in reducing costs in running an
open procedure and in bargaining to extract surplus (Bajari et al., 2008).
The second study in this thesis (Chapter 5) tests the factors related to award decision
speed. It focuses on the period from announcing a purchasing intention to awarding
a contract. Practitioners and policymakers tend to take the negotiation as a very time-
consuming process without offering convincing evidence (Lynch, 2015, UK National Audit
Office, 2007, Yescombe, 2007). UK public procurement data exhibit results that do not
agree with this conventional wisdom. The negotiated procedure is likely to be associated
with more rapid decisions than the restricted procedure regarding the duration of the
overall award process, the probability of delaying award, and the duration of delay. The
competitive dialogue performs the worst in terms of these three decision speed measures,
while the open procedure performs the best. The results indicate that bureaucratic delays
arise from internal organisational reasons rather than the process of negotiation may be
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responsible for a slow award procedure.1
The negotiated procedure endows the procuring agent with high discretion through-
out the whole procedure, whereas the restricted procedure allows high discretion dur-
ing the prequalification but limits discretion thereafter. Transferring from a discretion-
permissible stage to a discretion-forbidden stage may incur excessive bureaucratic proce-
dures. Bandiera et al. (2009) also express their concerns about such bureaucratic process
in procurement.
Moreover, the results show that a slower award decision speed is associated with
the need to evaluate more bids, greater complexity and higher quality concerns. This
highlights the need to allow for more time in awarding contracts with such features. Also,
the results suggest that the public buyers may be increasingly over-confident as they
accumulate more experience. This implies that more experienced public buyers should
consider adopting more conservative time schedules for awarding contracts.
Based on the revenue equivalence theorem and the extensive form game, the third
study (Chapter 6) develops a model to show how corruption is positively related to dis-
cretion and how honest bidders are driven out by corruption-led discretion. Although
many studies acknowledge the link between discretion and corruption, few of them has
shown the link in a formal model.
This third study also assesses the procurement outcomes when an award process is
completed. In particular, it examines the links between discretion, corruption and compe-
tition. The majority of studies on public procurement focus on the connections between
discretion and competition because corruption, especially corruption in the contract level,
is difficult to quantify (e.g. Spagnolo, 2012, Baldi et al., 2016). We partially overcome this
problem by analysing public contracts in 30 European countries from 2012 to 2015 and
adopting corruption perception index (CPI, provided by Transparency International), a
1Both the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue contain a negotiation process, but the com-
petitive dialogue has an additional competitive bidding process. Neither the open procedure nor the
restricted procedure allows negotiation, but the restricted procedure contains an additional prequalifica-
tion process.
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measure for country level corruption. Our regressions that simultaneously include discre-
tion and corruption show a significant negative correlation between the corruption level
and the number of bidders. The results also suggest that corrupt procuring agents tend to
artificially increase the estimated contract value to conceal the inflated contractual price.
The estimates for discretion are consistent with the estimates for corruption. The
negotiated procedure, which allows for more discretion than the open procedure, cor-
responds to fewer bidders and smaller contract rebates than the open procedure. It is
unclear whether the restricted procedure attracts more bidders than the negotiated pro-
cedure. The rebate from the restricted procedure is smaller than that from the open
procedure. Compared with the negotiated procedure, the competitive dialogue tends to
receive fewer offers. These two award mechanisms do not differ significantly in rebates.
This thesis has a number of implications for practitioners and policymakers:
First, the simpler versions of auction and negotiation, i.e. the open and negotiated
procedures, seem to perform better in saving time during the award process and in obtain-
ing higher rebates. This is in accord with the increasing use of the open procedure (see
Figure 2.4). However, public authorities should probably consider using the negotiated
procedure more often. Also, it may be necessary to diagnose any redundant administrative
process in implementing the restricted procedure and the competitive dialogue.
Second, this thesis provides theoretical and empirical evidence that corruption is a
nonnegligible concern in public procurement. Reducing trade barriers and allowing firms
free access to bid in public procurement contracts in foreign countries is likely not only to
improve the integration of the single market but also to increase competition and mitigate
corruption.
Third, it highlights that delay is an important issue in awarding public procurement
contract. The literature has expressed concerns about the lengthy award process in public-
private partnership (PPP) contract, the complicated and expensive public contracts. This
thesis puts forward that delay in the awarding process can be a serious issue for all public
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contracts (even for contracts with small values). Nearly half of the contracts in our UK
sample experienced delays in awarding. Public buyers should adopt more reasonable time
schedules for awarding contracts and take measures to meet the schedule.
Future research may extend from this thesis from the following dimensions:
First, the results from this thesis indicate that the more complicated auction and nego-
tiation versions, i.e. the restricted procedure and the competitive dialogue, perform worse
than their simpler counterparts, i.e. the open procedure and the negotiated procedure,
regarding the process outcome (i.e. award decision speed) and ex ante economic outcome
(i.e. contractual price). Future research may investigate whether the ex post economic
outcomes (i.e. final payment, quality and delivery time) justify the use of the restricted
procedure and the competitive dialogue.
Second, empirical research on corruption in public procurement is still scarce and mea-
suring corruption and discretion separately will generate more accurate results. Future
studies may construct contract specific corruption index, for example, using the difference
between the market value of the purchase and the price paid (e.g. Coviello et al., 2018),
or conduct questionnaire to survey firms that have participated in the bidding.
Third, while this thesis underlines the problem of delaying contract award, it has not
provided a very clear solution to this problem. Future research may investigate the role
of over-confidence in the award process and the factors that can predict a reliable time
schedule for awarding contracts or speed up the award process.
Lastly, it calls for further exploiting details in public procurement data. For example,
most studies in the literature focus on works contracts as a whole but sector-specific
attributes may exist. The common procurement vocabulary (CPV) may be a proper sector
indicator, but to group the CPVs into sectors requires careful subjective judgements.
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